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Abstract
Evaluations of the usability and security of alphanumeric passwords and Personal
Identification Numbers (PINs) have shown that users cannot remember credentials
considered to be secure. However, the continued reliance upon these methods of user
authentication has placed end-users and system designers in a coevolutionary strug-
gle, with each defending competing concerns of usability and security. Graphical
passwords have been proposed as an alternative, and their use is supported by cogni-
tive theories such as the picture superiority effect which suggest that pictures, rather
than words or numbers, could provide a stronger foundation upon which to design
usable and secure knowledge-based authentication. Indeed, early usability studies
of novel systems harnessing this effect appear to show promise, however, the uptake
of graphical passwords in real-world systems is low. This inertia is likely related to
uncertainty regarding the challenges that novel systems might bring to the already del-
icate interplay between usability and security; particularly the new challenges faced in
scaffolding user behaviours that comply with context-specific security policies, uncer-
tainty regarding the nature of new socio-technical attacks, and the impact of images
themselves upon usability and security.
In this thesis we present a number of case studies incorporating new designs,
empirical methods and results, that begin to explore these aspects of representative
graphical password systems. Specifically, we explore: (i) how we can implicitly sup-
port security-focused behaviours such as choosing high entropy graphical passwords
and defending against observation attack; (ii) how to capture the likely extent of
insecure behaviour in the social domain such as graphical password sharing and ob-
servation attack; and (iii) how through the selection of appropriate properties of the
images themselves we can provide security and usability benefits. In doing so, we gen-
erate new insights into the potential of graphical passwords to provide usable, secure
and deployable user authentication.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
From the very dawn of computing, knowledge-based authentication (KBA) has been,
and remains to be, the predominant technique by which a user’s secure access to
computer systems is realised. One study reports that the average user has approxi-
mately 25 online accounts that require passwords, and must enter an average of eight
passwords per day [46]. In the face of the cognitive demands that result, users are
known to respond by adopting strategies of credential selection and usage that can
ultimately weaken the security of the systems they use [74]. Attempts to correct this
subversive behaviour are based upon methods to scaffold [146] more desirable user au-
thentication behaviours. That is, to provide advice or system features that direct user
behaviour along a path that is thought to produce an outcome with security benefits;
for example, implementing strict credential selection guidelines [65] proactive pass-
word checking [148] or password expiry [152]. However, research is beginning to show
that these scaffolds can have either positive or negative effects upon usability and
security, as designers seek to support or suppress particular user behaviours. Indeed,
where interventions simply force unreasonable constraints upon user behaviour, users
may become ever more likely to adopt new insecure workarounds to reclaim the miss-
ing usability [99]. It is well known that users are often not minded to follow the strict
security guidelines relating to KBA that might be prescribed [155]. This depicts a
scenario where system administrators and users are placed in a coevolutionary strug-
gle; where the security and usability of the authentication system is paradoxically
threatened – yet sustained – by the ability of its users to appropriate interactions
with secure systems into a personal framework of coping with the cognitive load,
which may inevitably have insecure components. This has led some to speculate that
the current forms of KBA provide a poor fit to the socio-technical challenges inherent
in contemporary user authentication, and will abandoned in the future [22].
Recently, the implications of research in human-computer interaction (HCI) [104],
particularly relating to usability, have started to impact the computer security com-
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munity, as security researchers proclaim their desire to design secure systems that
people can use [25]. This still nascent field of user-centred security 1 advocates en-
gagement with users in the design and evaluation of security systems considered to be
socio-technical. One design response of the this community is the graphical password
[124, 5], an alternative method of KBA that was designed from the outset with human
cognitive limitations in mind and aims to provide a much-needed balance between us-
ability and security. Graphical passwords are underpinned by the cognitive theory
of the picture superiority effect [117] which suggests that a concept is more likely
to be remembered experientially if presented as a picture rather than as words or
numbers. Numerous such schemes have emerged, and end-user evaluations measuring
memory retention of these new types of credential have showed considerable promise
[11, 28, 143].
However, even where the underlying computer infrastructure is flexible (such as
web-based interfaces) the uptake of graphical passwords is low. Inertia is likely, in
part, caused by the extent to which existing methods of KBA are entrenched into our
digital infrastructure, but also the gaps that remain in our understanding of how unan-
ticipated positive and negative scaffolds placed upon user behaviour might mutate the
socio-technical challenges currently experienced with existing methods of KBA. The
increasing diversity of platforms and contexts that require user authentication: rang-
ing from mobile devices, to desktop computers and touchscreen displays, also increases
the difficulty to transfer insights from one platform to another. A myriad of other rea-
sons could be posited, however an innovative empirical research approach is required
to begin to explore the space of security and usability issues, threats, requirements
and value that should be accommodated by contemporary methods of user authen-
tication. Indeed, Sasse et al. [109] comment that security engineers should adopt
a more holistic approach to the design and evaluation of security mechanisms that
includes the context, the user, and the technology.
In this thesis we present system designs, empirical methods and results that ex-
plore methods of scaffolding authentication behaviours in exemplar graphical pass-
word systems, and evaluate the impact upon usability and security. We take a case
study approach that explores the impact of interaction design and image choice; we
also consider a number of previously unexplored contextual phenomena including in-
secure behaviour such as graphical password sharing and use of graphical passwords
in (increasingly prevalent) shared public interfaces such as digital tabletops (where
users are particularly vulnerable to observation attack). The aim of the research
is to contribute to the set of empirical methods and results pertaining to the field
of graphical password-based KBA, and to begin to provide a more holistic account
of how graphical passwords can be a usable, secure and deployable method of user
authentication.
1The field of user-centred security is sometimes interchangeably referred to as usable security,
security usability, and others. In this thesis we typically use the name user-centred security
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1.2 Research Context
This thesis contributes to the research areas of human-computer interaction and com-
puter security. Relevant sub-domains include password security and usability, user-
centred security, and graphical passwords.
1.2.1 Password Security and Usability
User authentication is usually the first stage of interaction had by users with a security
sensitive system. Alphanumeric passwords are ubiquitous for this purpose; however,
over time their adversarial model has changed significantly from providing a means
of security through obscurity in the early days of computing when computers were
not widely networked, to providing a source of entropy [115] to resist automated
remote guessing attacks. However, early in this transition it became clear that the
theoretical security benefits offered by passwords were not being born out in everyday
system deployments. Morris and Thompson [87] collected a sample of 3289 passwords,
where 86% of them were categorised as being shorter in length than six characters
or appearing in a common word dictionary; their findings suggested that user-chosen
passwords could be relatively easy to guess if an individual were inclined to try.
Klein [74] did try, and carried out an experimental attack on a corpus of 15,000 UNIX
passwords and discovered that using a typical word dictionary containing 62,727 words
he was able to guess 25% of that password collection. The first real-world exploitation
of these weaknesses was by the infamous Morris Worm [41, 122], malware which used
a small attack dictionary of 432 words to seed password guessing to great effect,
infecting 10% of computers on the Internet at that time.
To secure passwords for this threat, organisations have attempted to scaffold [146]
behaviour that results in stronger (less guessable) passwords. Unfortunately, research
has suggested that characteristics of strong passwords inhibit their memorability [155].
Indeed, while the research and institutional focus is placed upon the need to impose
stronger passwords upon users, users in parallel develop practices that enable them to
cope with those more complicated passwords e.g. writing down and reusing passwords.
Such workarounds are difficult to regulate centrally and often prioritise usability at
the expense of security which contributes to the adage that users are the weakest link
in the security chain [109]. This scenario is perhaps the most prominent exemplar of
the conflict between usability and security. After decades of KBA deployments, the
security community is beginning to acknowledge the extent of these workarounds and
the importance of holistic study of user authentication systems [109]. At present it
can be said that password security and usability is at an impasse [60], due to the need
for users to behave ever more securely in terms of password choice and management,
while usability is already overexerted and contingent upon insecure coping practices.
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1.2.2 User-Centred Security
The field of computer security has its roots in military systems where the adversar-
ial model is such that users themselves are treated principally as threats to system
security [153]. This meant that strategies to design secure systems were focused prin-
cipally upon its conceptualisation as a technical problem. Recently, the study of
HCI has diffused through the computer security community, with the aim to design
secure systems that people can use [25]. This field of usable security advocates en-
gagement with users in the design and evaluation of security facing mechanisms, with
the motivation that user-facing security systems should be more openly considered
as socio-technical systems. Indeed, in recent years Bruce Schneier, a prominent cryp-
tographer was quoted in one of his books to acknowledge the wider concerns at play
in security: ”If you think technology can solve your security problems, then you don’t
understand the problems and you don’t understand the technology” [111].
A number of seminal papers motivated the importance of changing the user-hostile
mentality in the design of security systems. Zurko and Simon [153] first used the
term user-centred security, Whitten and Tygar [141] carried out a usability study of
the email encryption software Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) 5.0 with damning results.
Adams and Sasse [1] argued that the need to know principle inherited by organisations
from the military roots of the field should be abandoned, due to its detrimental effect
upon user motivation to comply with security policies. This entry point for computer
security into 1990s HCI resulted in a conceptualisation of the user as an information
processing machine, their capabilities reasoned over using cognitive strengths and
limitations, leading to abstract modelling of user decision making and behaviour e.g.
Norman’s seven stages of action [93]. The importance of considering the role of users
in the security of digital systems has manifested in a the form of a dedicated ACM
symposium: Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS) and increasingly,
conferences traditionally focused upon systems and network security solicit work in
this domain.
1.2.3 Graphical Passwords
The field of user authentication has arguably received the most research attention
from the user-centred security community; this is due to the wide applicability of the
problems associated with remembering securely composed passwords. The hope is
that a user-centred approach to the design of KBA can alleviate the need for users to
resort to insecure workarounds to cope with the cognitive load of remembering strong
credentials. This has led to the exploration of new approaches to user authentication
including that of graphical passwords [5, 124]; systems of this class are designed to
complement rather than conflict with human cognitive ability due to their harnessing
of a picture superiority effect [117] observed in cognitive psychology research. This
has stimulated research into the design of systems that harness visual stimuli as an
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authentication credential, first proposed in a patent by Blonder [7] in 1996 in which
users were challenged to remember previously chosen areas of an image. Systems can
be specifically designed to provide differing levels of entropy: PIN-level, password-
level and crypto-level [5]. Exemplar systems have emerged and include the commer-
cial Passfaces [96], Draw a Secret [68] and Passpoints [143]. A prominent research
approach encompasses the theoretical analysis of proposed systems complemented by
empirical studies to validate the memorability of the credentials. Seminal results in-
clude a field study of the Passfaces system across 12 weeks, where users of Passfaces
made one third of the errors made by users of alphanumeric passwords [11].
While numerous studies of memorability have shown promise, fewer studies have
explored the likely need for graphical password systems to incorporate mechanisms for
positive and negative scaffolds to support or restrict context specific user behaviours;
this reflects the reality that different deployment contexts will have different security
and usability requirements. Renaud [101] considered the impact of methods of cre-
ating image content upon the memorability of the resulting images. Everitt et al.
[42] carried out a longitudinal study of users asked to remember multiple Passfaces
[96] graphical passwords. Hlywa et al. [62] explore the impact of different image
types upon the usability of recognition-based graphical passwords. Such studies are
promising, as they question the key assumptions regarding the extent that perceived
benefits of graphical passwords would be born out under the constraints of everyday
deployments. Such deployments could bring about novel attacks [54, 31, 97, 27], but
also entice users to reformulate attacks and coping strategies trained upon alphanu-
meric passwords and PINs. One specific threat to which graphical passwords are
perceived to be particularly vulnerable is that of observation attack: using simple ob-
servation techniques to capture the credentials of the user at the point of login. This
is thought to be a particularly potent attack vector due to the difficulty to mask the
image stimulus onscreen combined with its perceived memorability, which may make
the credentials also memorable to collocated attackers. Such an attack bypasses the
security gains of encouraging users to choose strong passwords. A number of graphical
password protocols have been designed specifically to defend against this threat e.g.
[144]. However, providing a balance between usability and security in this context
is an open problem, due to the tendency for designed defences to force indirection
into user interactions that are complicated for a user to perform, and an observer to
capture.
1.3 Research Questions and Contributions
The research question for this thesis is how graphical password systems can provide se-
cure, usable and deployable knowledge-based authentication? This can be decomposed
into a number of sub-questions:
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• How can interaction design scaffold secure behaviour in graphical password
schemes?
• How can strategic selection of images provide scaffolding in graphical password
schemes?
• What is the impact of graphical passwords upon socio-technical threats?
In the course of responding to these questions, in each chapter we make contri-
butions to the field of graphical passwords and KBA more generally through novel
designs, empirical methods and discussion. The main contributions of this thesis are
as follows:
1. We highlighted the importance of the role of deployability when considering the
usability and security of graphical passwords. Our conceptualisation of deploy-
ability comprised the explicit recognition of the problem of providing context-
specific scaffolding to desired user authentication behaviours, and the impact of
interventions upon usability and security. Our empirical studies explored how
interventions could positively and negatively shape user behaviours.
2. We proposed a framework for supporting designers to scaffold user behaviours
to defend against observation attack. By applying this framework to the con-
temporary problem of authentication on shared public multi-touch interfaces,
we were able to articulate a design space of observation resistant augmentation
to a standard graphical password.
3. We identified description as a threat to recognition-based graphical passwords
and performed an empirical study to explore the ability of users to verbally share
Passfaces [96] graphical passwords. We discovered that through the manual
manipulation of similarity of decoy images and key images we could directly
impact on users ability to identify key images from audio descriptions.
4. We proposed novel empirical methods to facilitate the study of socio-technical
threats in laboratory-based studies, and the usability of systems outside of a
laboratory environment. We measured user performance in matching audio de-
scriptions to face images as an estimator for the prevalence of description. Also
we refined a method proposed elsewhere to explore the observation resistance
of graphical passwords on shared displays and mobile devices, asking users to
perform as attackers and observe live authentication sessions. Finally we per-
formed the first field study of graphical passwords on mobile devices, where our
system was installed on the personal devices of participants.
5. We performed the first attempt to harness image processing techniques to iden-
tify instances of image similarity that could be detrimental to usability if in-
cluded in a recognition-based graphical password grid. The need for a human
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to perform this task is a severe limitation in terms of the deployability and
scalability of this genre of graphical password. We conducted a usability eval-
uation of the best method we tested with over 300 participants recruited using
Amazon Mechanical Turk where login challenges were assembled to include dif-
fering levels of similarity. We found that manipulation of the similarity levels
allowed us to provide both positive and negative scaffolding of user authentica-
tion behaviours behaviours, highlighting the importance of image choice in the
usability and security of graphical passwords.
1.4 Research Approach
To explore the research questions we adopt a case study approach, this follows from
our position that overarching principles and insights for KBA are our ultimate goal,
and the best route to these is often the detailed unpicking of concrete examples of
authentication schemes (and their assumptions). These case studies were chosen to
represent a cross section of issues faced with KBA in the past, but to also be mindful
of the new challenges graphical passwords may pose: (i) the problem of users choosing
strong credentials; (ii) observation attack; (iii) password sharing; (iv) image filtering.
The latter came about as it was noted to be a particular challenge throughout the
thesis, and thus a likely deployment challenge to future graphical password instanti-
ations. To explore each phenomenon we chose a existing graphical password system
that we believed would provide the greatest insight, due to the lack of a consensus
around which system is the most promising. The sum of these case studies amounts
to our consideration of the challenges of usability, security and deployment challenges
facing graphical passwords (a visual overview is presented in Figure 1). Our method-
ology is primarily empirical and quantitative, and lends from techniques prominent in
the HCI community: contextual inquiry [104]: A method of data gathering for system
requirements that involves a combination of discussion and observations made with
the potential users of a system; heuristic evaluation [92]: the evaluation of a system
by experts based upon its adherence to particular usability standards or guidelines;
human subject experiments : principles of experiment design are applied to perform
hypothesis testing regarding the usability of system interventions. In some cases we
were interested to capture the experiences of participants using the systems we de-
signed, in those situations we would use questionnaires and informal discussions to
capture this feedback. The length of each study was chosen to appropriately cap-
ture the phenomenon under study. Participants were recruited opportunistically in a
university or organisational setting through word of mouth and other message distri-
bution lists where the research was being conducted, as a result this means people not
present in those settings (such as older people) are under-represented in this research.
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Figure 1: A visual description of the thesis structure.
1.5 Thesis Structure
The thesis is organised as follows: in Chapter 2 we present a literature review that
encompasses relevant aspects of user-centred security, the security and usability of
alphanumeric passwords, and the current state of the art of graphical passwords. The
focus of our review of graphical passwords places a particular emphasis on the nature
of empirical studies conducted with representative schemes, and analysis of usability
and security properties.
Chapter 3 comprises the first case study into how interaction design can be used
to scaffold the choosing of strong graphical passwords. Draw a Secret (DAS) [68]
is a graphical password scheme designed to enable usable generation of memorable
credentials that have high levels of entropy [115]; credentials that, for example, can be
used in authentication or to seed the generation of encryption keys. Previous research
has highlighted the fact that theoretical estimates of DAS security may not be born
out in practice as users are likely to select weak drawings that exhibit predictable
(i.e. guessable) characteristics [130, 131]. To address this we proposed and evaluated
a novel DAS variant called Background Draw a Secret designed to encourage users to
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avoid the user choice biases predicted for DAS, through the use of added visual cues
in the drawing grid. Our empirical evaluation sheds light on the resulting patterns of
user choice encountered in both systems.
Chapter 4 describes a different case study for interaction design being used to scaf-
fold secure user behaviours, in which we focused upon how harnessing (and designing
for) the affordances of particular technologies can facilitate secure entry of KBA cre-
dentials in the face of observation attack. The class of KBA system we considered is
less concerned with the generation of high levels of entropy, however inherits a vul-
nerability to observation attack due to both, the simple interactions required, and the
memorable nature of the visual stimulus presented. Traditionally, the responsibility
to secure such systems against observation attack is placed on the user, through be-
haviours that are often difficult to maintain in the face of pressure to adhere to social
norms. In this chapter we propose a framework for observation resistant interactions
for KBA in general and explore the design space for authentication on inherently
social shared multi-touch interfaces, a technology of contemporary interest that has
been explicitly designed to support collocated users.
In Chapter 5 our focus shifts slightly to question of how manipulation of the
frequency that images are presented to users can scaffold desirable security behaviours.
We again concern ourselves with observation attack and recognition-based graphical
passwords, but consider the problem of the observation resistance provided by an
image portfolio-based system [28, 31], in which users are challenged to identify only
a random subset of their secret images at every login. Through an empirical study
across two weeks we evaluated the usability of this approach and showed its resistance
to intersection attack [31].
In Chapter 6 we identify a new threat to recognition-based graphical password
systems, which stems from factors relating to the visual and verbal image similarity of
the constituent images, and to elaborate this we report our exploration of users ability
to share Passfaces [96] graphical passwords. The results from our novel empirical study
suggest a relationship between the level of similarity and the associated difficulty of
sharing graphical passwords by description (i.e. verbal description).
Chapter 7 considers a question that gradually emerged as we progressed through
the project as a whole: how to systematically assemble image grids that resemble a
usable and secure login? In answering this question we explored the role that image
processing can play to optimise image selection (i.e. the systems choice of key and
decoy images) with respect to the detection of image similarity. In our user study
we identified colour histograms as being useful image signatures, and assembled login
challenges based upon judicious manipulation of thresholds to affect image similarity.
In an empirical study we measured user recall performance using image sets assembled
in an automated manner, and explored its impact on both usability and security.
Finally, in Chapter 8 we revisit our contributions, consider the findings of our case
studies in relation to each other, and propose some promising and pressing directions
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for future work in this domain.
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Chapter 2
User-Centred Security and
Graphical Passwords
Given the scope of social, psychological and technical concerns that must be embraced
in the development of usable and secure user authentication mechanisms, our research
inevitably adopts an inter-disciplinary approach. To this end, this chapter reviews a
number of research sub-domains that relate to our proposed research approach: the
emergence of user-centred security; user authentication; and, the state of the art of
graphical passwords.
2.1 User-centred Security
We presented an overview of the research domain of user-centred security in Section
1.2.2, which briefly highlights key learnings from the field; in this section we expand
upon that description to include more detail of seminal research results that shaped
thinking in this nascent field.
The contention that the constraints placed upon end-users should be considered in
the design of secure systems was born out of a retaliation to the user-hostile roots of
computer security in the military sector. Indeed, the perspective of security engineers
towards users has traditionally been that of the user-as-the-problem; one example of
this perspective is provided by Herschberg:
”They range all the way from very occasional users, contacting their
systems once or twice a day almost incidentally, up to very professional
users sitting at their terminals all day. Still, these users appear to have
one characteristic in common: they are all, men and women, rather devoid
of imagination” [61] (p. 1).
The foundations of the research community that challenged this hostile perspective
were laid by Zurko and Simon [153] who called for a user-centred approach to the
design of security models, systems, and software. Their motivation was to highlight
25
the importance of usability in the design of secure systems across a wide range of user
stakeholders: end-users, application programmers, system administrators and even
social units. This recognised that poor usability of system features can unintentionally
undermine the security of a system through the resulting impact upon work practices
and social norms. However, prior to the formal assembly of a purpose-fit research
community, a number of researchers in more traditional fields of security had already
highlighted the need to design secure systems usable by humans. Wood suggested
that ”One of the fundamental trade-offs found in many areas of the computer security
field is ease of use versus security” [145] (p. 3). Also, as early as 1975 Saltzer and
Shroeder coined the term psychological acceptability to describe how users should be
able to interact with security mechanisms:
”It is essential that the human interface be designed for ease of use,
so that users routinely and automatically apply the protection mechanisms
correctly. Also, to the extent that the user’s mental image of his protection
goals matches the mechanisms he must use, mistakes will be minimised. If
he must translate his image of his protection needs into a radically different
specification language, he will make errors.” [108] (p. 6).
Saltzer and Shroeder also identified design principles that have remained a fixture
in discourse on computer security, including: the principle of least privilege, open
design, and fail-safe defaults. In 2005 Bishop [6] argued that three areas of computer
security particularly violated psychological acceptability: passwords, patching and
configuration. He suggested that while reaching the goal of psychological acceptabil-
ity might be impossible, there is still scope to improve the way that security systems
are designed and deployed. Indeed, Adams and Sasse [1] claimed that the lack of un-
derstanding between security administrators and users contributed to unsatisfactory
outcomes with respect to security. They propose that to improve, the culture of need
to know inherited from the military sector should be abandoned in favour of practices
that motivate and encourage security awareness amongst users. Research methods
proposed to meet this challenge were drawn from the field of human-computer in-
teraction (HCI) and included contextual design, lab-based experimentation involving
users, and contextual enquiry [104]. In 2005 the field came into formal existence with
the release of Cranor and Garfinkel’s edited collection of papers on usable security
[25], and the first Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS) which has
taken place every year since.
One source of relief for the security community in the face of this new wave of
insight was the assumption that the use of cryptography was one system feature that
could not be undermined by users; however, this assumption was soon under attack.
Whitten and Tygar [141] present a seminal usability evaluation of the Pretty Good
Privacy (PGP) email encryption software, which demonstrates that users could make
potentially dangerous errors during typical usage. The creators of PGP had claimed
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that it was usable by novice users, however: three (of a total of 12) participants
unintentionally sent emails in plain text, seven sent email using the wrong encryption
key, and one participant was unable to encrypt at all. The results of this study
prompted Whitten and Tygar to identify properties of secure systems that make the
design of usable and secure systems difficult:
• The unmotivated user property : user interaction with security is usually a sec-
ondary task. Designers should not assume that users will be motivated to learn
the required skills to use a system correctly.
• The abstraction property : interaction with security-facing systems usually re-
quires interaction with abstract concepts such as choosing rules for access con-
trol. Such procedures are intuitive to engineers but not to inexpert users.
• The lack of feedback property : the current state of a security system can be
complicated to articulate or visualise in feedback to an inexpert user.
• The barn door property : once a user has made a mistake in configuring a security
system, recovery can be difficult (if not impossible) where data may have been
leaked.
• The weakest link property : a system is only as secure as its weakest link, which
is often the user.
In the context of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), Davis [26] highlighted that
much of the promised security and organisational benefits of a PKI were obtained by
shifting responsibility for critical operations onto end-users, who could not in practice
be relied upon to execute them correctly. Davis highlighted the existence of what
he termed compliance defects, rules of operation that are both difficult to follow and
unenforceable, and recommended that non-experts should not interact directly with
a PKI. In a similar vein, Anderson [2] provided concrete examples of how user errors
or insider involvement led to security breaches in the banking industry, where the use
of cryptography was a principal security feature. These cases served as warning to
the security community that a reliance purely upon cryptography did not provide a
guarantee of a secure system.
The early discourse on user-centred security provides critique of the relationship
between users and security, and highlighted the difficulty of designing systems that
were both theoretically and practically secure. One domain that particularly received
research attention to ground such critique is that of user authentication, due to it
being a task universally encountered by users, and the notable usability and security
issues at play.
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2.2 User Authentication
User Authentication [120] is usually the first security procedure encountered by users
of a security-focused system; during this process the system challenges the user to
prove their right of access. The process begins with identification, where the user
makes a claim of identity, and is followed by authorisation, where the user provides
credentials that prove the claimed identity [100]. The credentials are usually based
upon one of three factors of authentication: something you have; something that is ; or
something you know [120, 100]. Something you have authentication is typically based
upon the possession of a digital authentication token, which is particularly common
in the context of enterprise security. One user study of smart cards and USB to-
kens highlights usability issues relating to their mobility in terms of the diverse range
of form factors, and the associated need to install drivers on each new machine that
should accept the tokens [98]. Biometrics measure human physiological or behavioural
characteristics and are often assumed to be the best solution, as they present the per-
ception that user authentication can be achieved purely through technical innovation.
However, in practice biometrics present their own set of usability and security issues,
in particular, the stability and salience of the measured characteristic across diverse
user groups [24]. Something you know 1 authentication typically requires the user to
remember a an alphanumeric secret, and prove knowledge of this secret to access a
system. This approach is ubiquitous on the Internet as it is convenient to deploy, and
the credentials are easy to replace. However, the increase in systems that harness this
method of authentication creates a high cognitive load for users who may forget the
association of passwords to user accounts, or even the password itself. Attempts to
cope with the cognitive load include users choosing passwords that are easily guessable
[74], or writing them them down.
In addition to choosing appropriate factors of authentication, there are various
system architectures that impact system design: local authentication, direct authen-
tication, indirect authentication and offline authentication [120]: local authentication
is where the authentication and access control mechanism both reside within a single
security perimeter (e.g. a PIN on a mobile device); direct authentication is where
users authenticate directly to a remote service, but communicate with the service
remotely via a system in a different security perimeter (e.g. logging into a website);
indirect authentication is where there are many points of service and a single point
of authentication (e.g. Kerberos [89]). Offline authentication is where authentication
can be completed without an active connection to a service (e.g. PKI).
1Often referred to as knowledge-based authentication
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Category Features
Accessibility Special Hardware or Software
Convenience
Inclusivity
Memorability Retrieval Strategy
Meaningfulness
Depth of Processing
Security Predictability
Abundance
Disclosure
Confidentiality
Privacy
Crackability
Cost Hardware
Software
Key Replacement
Maintenance
Table 1: A collation of the user authentication quality criteria proposed by Renaud
[100].
2.2.1 Summary
User authentication is a fundamental process required to secure computer systems for
unauthorised access. The process of selecting the appropriate factor and architecture
has been considered by Renaud who proposed a framework to aid such decision mak-
ing [100] (a summary of this framework is presented in Table 1). However, despite
widespread technical innovation and the diversity of potential solutions, the bottom
line for most organisations is the financial cost of a solution; this serves to partly
explain why alphanumeric passwords and PINs are widely used despite shortcomings
in terms of both usability and security. Not only are alphanumeric passwords and
PINs easy to integrate in a system, but users themselves are well accustomed to their
usage, and their limitations are perceived to be well understood by organisations.
In the following section we further explore the security and usability considerations
brought about by the ubiquitous deployment of knowledge-based authentication.
2.3 Alphanumeric Passwords
Alphanumeric passwords (herein passwords) have been widely used to secure com-
puters for unauthorised access since the time of the Compatible Time Sharing System
(CTSS) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Today, the need to authenti-
cate users in a familiar manner across a diverse range of service providers has firmly
placed the password as the authentication method of choice. The study of passwords
in research literature can broadly be separated into studies of security, the impact of
security upon usability, and contextual studies of password usage.
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2.3.1 Security
Passwords can serve two functions in the security of computer systems [86]: authenti-
cation: to validate the identity of a user based upon knowledge of a shared secret; and
key generation: to provide a source of entropy (as termed by Shannon [115]) to seed
the generation of cryptographic keys. Today, it has become increasingly important
that the same password is usable and secure in both modes of operation. However,
in any context of use passwords are vulnerable to a range of attacks:
• Replay Attack: the password of a legitimate user is reused by an unauthorised
person.
• Social Engineering: an attacker persuades a legitimate user to reveal a password
[84].
• Observation Attack: an attacker captures a password using simple observation
techniques at the point of password entry.
• Phishing: the password is captured via an interface that is maliciously designed
to masquerade as a trusted entity (this usually culminates in a replay attack)
[66].
• Brute Force Attack: an automated guessing attack where every possible valid
password is tried until the correct one is discovered. This can take place online,
where guesses are mediated by the system under attack (against which certain
automated defences can be realised) or offline where the attacker has obtained a
copy of an encrypted password database and can make an unrestricted number
of guesses. This is guaranteed to succeed, but could take a prohibitively long
time.
• Dictionary Attack: an optimised version of a brute force attack that uses the
assumption that password content is likely to contain a word found in a typical
word dictionary [74]. This can also be executed online or offline.
From the earliest days of password usage, automated guessing has been prioritised
as the most potent attack. Automated tools can be configured to make many thousand
password guesses per second, whereas a human may be able to make only one or two.
The threat of automated attacks meant that without stipulation over the complexity
of a password, little confidence could be had in the identity of the individual who would
present it to a system. In order to reason over this required complexity, measures of
password strength are computed in terms of entropy based upon the seminal work
of Shannon [115]. Where each character of a password is chosen randomly, entropy
H (measured in bits) can be calculated by H = log2(a
l). Where a represents the
size of the alphabet from which each character is drawn (e.g. a = 26 where the
password is comprised of lowercase alphabetic characters), and l is the length of the
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password. However, if it were demonstrated that passwords were chosen in a non-
random manner, this computation of entropy would overestimate password strength
in practice.
Morris and Thompson [87] present early reflections upon password security through
the analysis of the content of over 3000 UNIX passwords. Strikingly, they observed
that users were very likely to choose predictable passwords, as many were very short in
length, with 15 comprised of only a single ASCII character. Also, as a significant pro-
portion of the passwords were comprised of pronounceable words, they propose that a
dictionary attack could be a particular threat, and tenuously conclude that ”The use
of encrypted passwords appears reasonably secure in the absence of serious attention
of experts in the field” (p. 4). This concedes that the security of passwords was based
purely upon the hope that nobody would try to exploit their clear weaknesses. In an
experiment, Klein [74] carried out such a dictionary attack on a corpus of collected
UNIX password files and discovered that using a dictionary of only 62,727 words he
was able to guess 25% of 15,000 passwords. Arguably, the first real-world execution
of a dictionary attack was by the infamous Morris Worm [122], which infected over
6000 machines [41] using an attack dictionary of just 432 words as seeds for guesses.
Measuring password entropy in the presence of such user-imposed bias relies upon
an understanding of the particular biases that might manifest in a user population.
A report on password choice by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) [12] bases estimates of the entropy of user-chosen passwords upon Shannon’s
analysis of the entropy of English text [116]. This analysis suggests that the first
character in a password provides 4 bits of entropy; the next 7 characters provide 2
bits each; characters 9 to 20 provide 1.5 bits each; and beyond 21 each character has
1 bit. For example, a strong eight character password where characters are drawn
randomly from the full ASCII character set could have 53 bits of entropy, but a user-
chosen eight character password may only have 18 bits. While the NIST analysis has
a certain illustrative value, estimates could be refined to account for the idiosyncrasies
of a particular user sample.
The typical attack scenario is that the attacker may wish to compromise the pass-
word of a particular user in order to abuse their associated system access privileges.
In a batch guessing attack [48] the attacker has no specific user target, and so chooses
a password considered to be common amongst the user population and uses it to guess
the password of a sequence of known users (user identifiers, as compared to passwords,
are more readily accessible in many systems). Single Sign On (SSO) is a class of soft-
ware tool designed to store all user passwords, and provides functionality to provide
the correct password to the correct online service. This potentially removes issues of
memorability, although a user must instead remember a single master password to
access the SSO system. Chiasson et al. [20] carried out a usability evaluation of two
SSO systems but found that users reported usability issues, which included the lack of
visibility of when the tools were working. Other disadvantages concern portability, as
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SSO software must usually be installed on each system that it is used; also users tend
to have difficulty to trust SSO software with their credentials, as this is a convenient
instantiation for malware to steal large numbers of passwords.
The literature on password security amply demonstrates that when users are un-
constrained in password choice, they are unlikely to create passwords desirable from
a security perspective. Indeed, that security is contingent upon behaviour that users
are unlikely to display, is a fundamental limitation in the design of a system, and a
clear example what Davis termed a compliance defect [26]. However, rather than sim-
ply abandon password authentication at this point as being inadequate, the research
focus changed to explore how user behaviour could be scaffolded (within the limits of
existing infrastructure) to prefer secure passwords. That is, to develop interventions
that support users to choose from a class of more desirable passwords.
2.3.2 Scaffolding Choice of Secure Passwords
The observed tension between usability and security in relation to alphanumeric pass-
words has led to the proposal of a number of interventions that attempt to find an
appropriate balance. Such proposals range from security guidelines, technological in-
terventions and self-help strategies; all of which aim to add diversity to user choice of
passwords with minimal changes to existing infrastructure.
2.3.2.1 Password Guidelines & Proactive Password Checking
One early Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) provided guidance on
the level of password entropy that should be enforced for contexts that require low,
medium and high levels of security [44]. NIST [12] proposed that password compo-
sition rules enforced by proactive password checking [74, 148] can help to increase
the entropy of chosen passwords, and should be a solution of choice for businesses
seeking to protect their data from unauthorised access. Proactive password checking
is a process by which a system prevents users choosing passwords judged to be weak
at the point of enrolment, before acceptance into a system. The most common way
to judge weakness in this context is a dictionary attack, where the user chosen pass-
word is searched for within a list of passwords judged to be predictable (i.e. those
containing common pronounceable words). However, there is a trade off between the
extensiveness of the checking and the requirement that, from the point of view of the
user creating the password, the checks are completed within a reasonable period of
time. Yan [148] claimed that the use of the dictionary attack as a key determinant of
password weakness may still miss passwords that could be considered predictable; in
response he advocates an approach based upon analysis of widely used determinants
of password entropy (i.e. password length, use of upper and lower case characters
etc.). Proctor et al. [99] carried out a study of the impact of imposing these composi-
tional restrictions on the security of the resulting passwords chosen by users. In a user
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study they discovered that increasing the length restriction on the passwords users
were asked to create from five to eight characters reduced the percentage of passwords
they were able to guess by 42% when using the John the Ripper [94] password cracking
tool. Also they observed that their intervention increased the time it took for users to
choose a password that satisfied the prescribed criteria. Finally, a qualitative analysis
of the passwords they collected shows that users tended to satisfy the need to add
complexity to passwords in predictable ways which could be exploited by an attacker
(e.g. adding numbers to the end of a password to increase its length). Komanduri et
al. [76] also carried out a user study considering the entropy of passwords produced
when users were placed under various password choosing constraints, and discovered
that the most strict password composition policies did not produce the highest en-
tropy passwords. In their study, a group of users constrained only by a minimum
length requirement of 16 characters in the password, chose higher entropy passwords
(44.67 bits) than those constrained to an 8 character password where characters were
drawn from the full ASCII set (34.3 bits). Both estimates were made to incorporate
possible biases using Shannon’s estimates of the entropy of English text [116]. Despite
this interesting finding, they did however note a relationship between the increasing
entropy of the password a user would choose, and the increased likelihood of the user
writing it down. Both studies indicate that password composition guidelines focusing
upon a minimum length requirement alone, appears to provide the most usable means
to encourage users to increase password strength. However, both provided warnings
of that the nature of coping techniques that users may adopt to cope with the added
cognitive load may undermine security.
2.3.2.2 Mnemonic Passwords
Mnemonic passwords are a self-help technique often advocated as a usable approach
to support users to choose high entropy passwords; the deployment benefit attached is
that no significant modifications to existing system infrastructure is required. Mnemonic
passwords are based upon a phrase, for example: a bird in the hand is worth two in
the bush which can serve as a mnemonic for the password abithisw2itb!. Kuo et al.
[77] examined the security of user choice of mnemonic passwords using the John the
Ripper password cracking tool, and were able to guess 4% of 144 passwords compared
to 11% for the passwords created in a traditional manner by a control group. Un-
surprisingly, their analysis also shows that many of the base phrases used to generate
mnemonic passwords were taken from widely known sources, such as song lyrics or
well known lines from movies, potentially leaving them vulnerable to appropriately
configured guessing attacks. Consequently, they propose that a good phrase should
not be based upon the text from such sources. Yan et al. [147] also carried out a
study with 288 participants across a university term to evaluate the memorability
and security of user-chosen mnemonic passwords, contrasting these with both pass-
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words based upon standard selection advice and randomly generated passwords. A
dictionary attack against all collected passwords was able to compromise over 30% of
user selected passwords based upon standard advice, but only 14% for the combined
random and mnemonic groups. As in previous studies, users described randomly
generated passwords as being significantly more difficult to remember, thereby lend-
ing further support for the more widespread utilisation of advice that encourages
mnemonic-based password use. In addition the authors noted a significant number of
occurrences (10% of participants) where participants did not comply with the pass-
word selection advice they were given; another clear reminder that it is necessary
to study how password systems are used in practice and that systems should take
account of compliance issues [26].
The base phrase chosen to seed a password mnemonic has itself been proposed
as a secure and usable passphrase [78]. This is based upon the observation that the
very length of an entered phrase mitigates against guessing attacks as the password
space increases exponentially with each additional character. Porter [145] proposed
that passwords should have at least 64 bits of entropy and based upon a passphrase
of up to 80 characters. Of course, remembering and typing long passwords is in-
evitably associated with usability issues. In a field study that explored the use of
passphrases, Keith et al. [70] found that the use of passphrases caused a significant
increase in the number of login errors when compared to a group of users authenti-
cated by conventional passwords. In addition, they report that the source of most
failed authentication attempts could be attributed to typography errors, rather than
users failing to remember the passphrase correctly. When ignoring typography errors,
the success rate of those using passphrases increased by 14%. This adjustment placed
the success rate of passphrase users above that of participants using passwords under
typical password choosing constraints.
2.3.2.3 Cognitive Passwords
The research presented so far documents methods to improve the security of pass-
words that leave existing password infrastructure undisturbed; other approaches have
considered how reconception of the password protocol could serve a usability purpose.
Cognitive passwords require the user to answer some form of question to gain access to
a system. Smith [145] considers the use of word association (or associative passwords)
where the user password is comprised of a series of single word responses to a sequence
of stimulus words e.g. where black is the stimulus, white could be a candidate user
response. More recently Jakobsson et al. [67] propose a protocol based upon the
user recalling preferences expressed at enrolment (e.g. do you prefer cats or dogs?);
the design rationale being that preferences have been shown to be relatively stable in
psychological studies. In a user evaluation they explored the entropy of the responses
gathered from particular questions and reported low error rates when the stability of
34
the preferences was tested upto 14 days later. Zviran and Haga [154] carried out a
questionnaire-based empirical study of 106 users to explore the usability of cognitive
passwords, in which users are provided with a cue for passwords using a question that
relates to some aspect of their personal experience or personal history, for example,
what is the name of your first school? The result suggested that participants better
retained cognitive passwords than two modes of alphanumeric password (self-chosen
and randomly assigned).
Zviran and Haga [155] conducted a 103 participant user study to compare each of
the aforementioned forms of password: cognitive passwords (comprised of 20 items),
associative passwords (comprised of 20 items), passphrases, self-chosen passwords and
system generated passwords. In their within-subject study, each participant enrolled
with each password type on the first day; after a three-month delay participants
returned and were tested on memory retention for all assigned credentials. The re-
sults show that 27% of participants could remember their self-generated password,
compared to 13% for a system assigned password and 21% using a passphrase. Unfor-
tunately, subjects were assigned multiple cognitive password items but only a single
alphanumeric password, which raises concerns of how comparable these results might
be in practice. However, on average participants recalled 15/20 of their cognitive
password items, and recalled on average 14/20 of associative password items. It is
interesting to note that in a post-study questionnaire subjects expressed a preference
for the method that did not correspond with predications made based upon their
measured performance; participants ranked self-generated passwords their favoured
approach despite the overall success rate (i.e. 27%) being significantly lower than for
other approaches (i.e. cognitive passwords).
While cognitive passwords and associative passwords promise usability benefits,
they may potentially be more vulnerable to guessing attacks through social engineer-
ing, and are more likely to result in low entropy credentials due to the password
response bring constrained by a question. Although widely used in commercial sys-
tems, such approaches are generally only deployed as an additional layer of security
in relation to password reset protocols (and password hint provision). Indeed, recent
research has suggested the information used in cognitive questions is not as secret as
may be perceived, and that even unsophisticated attackers can be effective at guessing
the answers to those questions [110].
The search for a method to support user choice of secure passwords has produced a
number of candidate solutions that attempt to balance usability and security. Renaud
[100] provides a user-centred framework to assist designers in making a suitable trade-
off between accessibility, memorability, security and cost. However, in order to apply
such a framework it is important that system designers understand the trade-offs
being made by users themselves in response to contextual factors of everyday life,
such as the existing cognitive load imposed by other systems (e.g. the number of
systems for which they need unique passwords, and the relative infrequency of use
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of some systems), and organisational factors (such as forced password expiry) that
impact the password management problem. So far, the studies we have presented have
involved the study of systems in isolation from this surrounding phenomena, however
an interesting branch of password security and usability research has focused upon
documenting the everyday constraints placed upon users in everyday interactions with
password systems.
2.3.3 Studying the Usage Context
Our review of alphanumeric passwords has shown that a widely explored approach
to finding a balance between the usability and security of passwords is to develop
methods to facilitate (or force) users to choose strong passwords. However, many of
these studies of password security have been conducted without taking account of
the experiences of users and the realities of everyday deployments that can constrain
usability and security. Sasse et al. [109] conducted a qualitative study that explored
socio-technical issues centred upon passwords in a large organisation. The findings
shed light on a diverse and conflicting array of concerns at play between an organi-
sation and its users; their analysis is framed within four domains: (i) technology; (ii)
user; (iii) goals and tasks; and (iv) context. Participants in the study had an average
of 16 passwords to manage and they discovered that users experienced the most pass-
word resets related to rarely used passwords (see Figure 2). In a related investigation,
Inglesant and Sasse [65] conducted a diary study and follow-up interviews to explore
the impact of password policies upon people working in an organisation. They suggest
that time spent on actions such as devising passwords, responding to password expiry,
and password reset is not emphasised sufficiently as time employees spend unable to
do their jobs. In conclusion they suggest that the institutional focus upon password
strength and frequently changing passwords is counterproductive, and highlight the
importance of studying the context of use when designing security policies to ensure
compatibility with work practices.
The abundance of computer systems with which typical users engage (in their work
and non-work activities) and the corresponding high number of secure passwords they
are required to manage, is a key source of pressure that leads to insecure password
practices. Florencio and Herley [46] report online user password habits recorded via
a software component bundled with a version of Windows Live Toolbar. They found
that an average web user had 6.5 passwords and 25 accounts that require password
authentication (these findings were from a study conducted in 2007 and these fig-
ures are likely to be an underestimate for 2012). While proposals for just how many
passwords a user should be asked to remember have hovered around seven (as argued
by Miller in the context of human information processing [83]), there is no widely
accepted figure. Inevitably, users will find workarounds to the near impossible task
of managing such large numbers of passwords; Chiasson et al. [20] reports that 26 of
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Figure 2: Illustration of self-reported data where users were asked to remember the
cause of their last password problem, and the regularity at which they used that
password (as reported by Sasse et al. [109]).
27 participants in their study claimed to reuse passwords across websites. Research
also documents other workarounds such as sharing credentials [28, 69], writing down
passwords [147, 154] and basing new passwords upon old passwords to aid memora-
bility [1]. Florencio and Herley [47] explored the nature and enforcement of password
security policies across a corpus of websites. They discovered that those websites with
the most users, were the least likely to impose onerous password selection guidelines
on its users. This suggests that those sites with more active users (usually large com-
panies) were more concerned to ensure customers had easy access to the site rather
than less widely known sites, who appeared more likely to impose strict password
selection guidelines upon its users.
Singh et al. [118] describe password usage in scenarios where authentication cre-
dentials were shared amongst diverse social groups. In a striking account of the
practices of a group of indigenous Australian islanders, they describe how banking
transactions were delegated to a single person who would board a flight to visit the
bank on the mainland. Such examples serve to show how sharing of secret security
credentials can be appropriated as an act of trust, and also be necessary for survival.
While such behaviour may seem extraordinary to designers, it provides an important
glimpse of how social imperatives can encourage non-standard security behaviour.
Studies of contexts that have password deployment as a key feature use have
yielded insights into the nature of password use that could not have been uncovered
by lab-based studies and mathematical analyses alone. As we have seen, how security
mechanisms are supposed to be used and how they are used in practice can often be
very different [147].
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2.3.4 Summary
Computer users have more passwords than ever before and approaches to securing
alphanumeric passwords for threats related to users’ lack of motivation to comply
with security policies have been explored. We have highlighted that the security of
the password is based upon the assumption that users comply with password se-
lection guidelines. Studies have highlighted that password selection biases can be
exploited where a bias towards pronounceable words exists; methods to scaffold se-
cure behaviour, such as proactive checking have been seen to create a space for new
workarounds. However, while passwords have a number of widely understood limita-
tions, they remain to be cheap and convenient for security administrators and easy
to understand for users. Our review of the principle proposals to scaffold secure be-
haviour in the user groups of passwords does not contain a panacea, as technical
interventions may not be trusted [20] and self-help techniques may be ignored [147].
Rather than simply scaffolding the use of standard alphanumeric passwords where us-
ability is already overexerted, an alternative is to design new usable knowledge-based
authentication methods that have memory requirements that complement our actual
cognitive abilities.
2.4 Graphical Passwords
Cognitive psychology literature can readily explain the biases exhibited by users in
selection of alphanumeric passwords. Hulme et al. [63] report that memory span for
words is significantly better than for non-words, and suggest that words hold a more
prominent place in long term memory. The same research community has also demon-
strated other interesting memory capabilities had by humans, for example, it has been
proposed that there exists a picture superiority effect : that concepts are more likely
to be remembered experientially if presented as pictures rather than words. Shep-
ard [117] demonstrated that human performance on a recognition task was better
with pictures than with words (selected to be both common and rare in everyday
usage), and sentences. This effect is thought to be explained by Paivio’s dual coding
theory [95]: that memory is comprised of both visual and verbal components that pro-
vide a complementary encoding for an item in memory. Such results have motivated
research that seeks to re-envision knowledge-based authentication for the contempo-
rary challenges faced when authenticating users. Graphical passwords [5, 124] are
knowledge-based authentication protocols proposed to enable users to remember au-
thentication credentials in a usable and secure fashion, and reduce the inclination for
users to adopt insecure behaviours that may undermine security. The most common
taxonomy of graphical password systems categorises approaches in terms of the mem-
ory task placed upon the user: recall; cued-recall; recognition; Tables 3,4,5 (positioned
at the end of this chapter) provide a grouping of prominent systems that emphasises
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system and evaluation features relevant to the discussion of security, usability, and
deployability. A related tabulation is provided by Chiasson [13] which focuses upon
the results of empirical studies and security characteristics. In the following sections
we describe the state of the art in each of the three genres of the graphical password.
2.4.1 Recall-based Graphical Passwords
Recall-based graphical passwords require users to remember credentials in the absence
of a memory cue (thus deployments of alphanumeric passwords are also usually recall-
based). This genre of graphical password was proposed with the aim of generating
credentials with crypto level [5] entropy and as such can be deployed in the modes of
both local and direct authentication. Draw a Secret (DAS) [68] is the exemplar recall-
based system and was proposed to exploit the stylus capability of Personal Digital
Assistants (PDAs). At the enrolment phase the user is presented with an nxn grid and
is asked to draw something memorable within its boundaries; the drawing is encoded
internally as a sequence of cells (x, y) crossed by the pen of the user punctuated by
pen lift events which are represented in the as (n + 1, n + 1) (see Figure 3). The
benefit of such a raw encoding, when contrasted with more sophisticated methods
of pattern matching, is that the raw encoding is exactly reproducible by the user
without the need for an exact visual correspondence between the enrolled drawing
and the authentication attempt. As a result, the encoded drawing can be used as an
encryption key and can be securely stored using a one-way function [32]: a function
that is easy to compute but prohibitively difficult to invert. In order to authenticate
using the enrolled drawing, the user must re-sketch the drawing ensuring the same
grid cells are crossed in the same order, and the pen is lifted at the same points in
the sequence. However, one usability constraint is that users are not permitted to
draw into so-called fuzzy boundaries, areas of the grid that could lead to complexity
being added to the drawing that is difficult to replicate later (e.g. lines cutting cell
intersections or cell borders) as illustrated in Figure 4.
An authentication mechanism that represents a constrained instantiation of DAS
is available on the Google Android platform for local authentication to touchscreen
devices. This system presents a 3x3 grid, and users are restricted to the creation of
patterns comprised of straight lines. In addition this variant restricts users to a single
stroke and only allows users to visit each of the nine cells once. The formula used to
calculate the DAS password space [68] can be modified to calculate the password space
of the Android patterns; the full password space is 18.6 bits. Such a small password
space is still suitable for local authentication when a restriction is enforced upon the
number of permitted incorrect attempts to safeguard against guessing attacks.
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Figure 3: An example of a DAS [68] graphical password that has a single stroke and
length of seven. The raw encoding of the drawing is (2,2) (2,3) (3,3) (3,2) (2,2) (1,2)
(5,5).
Figure 4: Examples of lines that cross fuzzy boundaries in the DAS system. Such lines
would difficult for users to recreate according to the rules of DAS due to proximity to
the cell boundaries.
2.4.1.1 Security of Recall-based Graphical Passwords
DAS is the canonical recall-based graphical password system; studies have been con-
ducted into its theoretical security in terms of its password space, however relatively
few conducted with respect to other attack vectors; a summary of the possible threats
is as follows:
• Replay Attack: the credentials can be used by an unauthorised person.
• Dictionary Attack: where user choice is allowed, there may be a vulnerability
to guessing attacks.
• Brute Force Attack: where users choose credentials from a predictable set, it may
be possible to mount a guessing attack using all possible graphical passwords
passwords.
• Phishing: users may be tricked to provide their graphical password to unautho-
rised services.
• Observation attack: observation of a single login may reveal enough information
to facilitate a replay attack [151].
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The theoretical password space for DAS is large (or as large as user motivation
allows). The key determinants of the security of a DAS graphical password are: (i)
length: the number of cells crossed in the drawing; and (ii) stroke count: the number
of separate lines, captured as the number of pen-up events; a drawing that crosses 11
cells has 53 bits of entropy, which is greater than an eight character password drawn
from the full ASCII set. As with alphanumeric passwords, the threat of automated
guessing attacks has been prioritised as the most significant threat. Thorpe and Van
Oorschot [131] studied the password space of DAS and determined that the number
of strokes present in a drawing had a greater security impact than the length of a
drawing; this led to the recommendation that for a drawing of length L the stroke
count should be at least L/2. In later work [130], the same authors proposed that
the theoretical password space of a knowledge-based authentication system has little
significance if users are shown to choose credentials from a much smaller memorable
password space (as observed with alphanumeric passwords). To illustrate this point in
a graphical password context, they constrained their analysis to drawings of maximum
length 12 and approximated the memorable password space for DAS using the set of
possible mirror symmetric drawings. In fact, their smallest attack dictionary assumed
mirror symmetry about the centre horizontal and vertical axes, which reduced the
theoretical password space from 57 bits to 42 bits; although, this is still a large attack
dictionary. Such results are striking but the predicted biases were not born out of
empirical evidence with users of DAS. Nali and Thorpe [88] report the results of
a small empirical study of DAS which used a 6x6 grid in which 45% of drawings
collected were symmetric and 80% of drawings had a small number of strokes (1-3)
which provided preliminary evidence that earlier theoretical predictions may be born
out in practice.
When gathering empirical data from the usage of graphical password mechanisms,
the most common way to reason over usability is to measure the memory accuracy of
the user who has been tasked to remember authentication credentials across a period
of time. The end measurement is usually referred to as the success rate S which
can typically be calculated in two ways: a function of the number of successful and
unsuccessful login attempts recorded across all study participants Sa; or the fraction of
users who were able to authenticate successfully using a particular system (irrespective
of the number of attempts required) Sp.
Sa =
|attemptss|
|attempts| (1)
Sp =
|userss|
|users| (2)
Equation 1 is most commonly used2, where attempts refers to all authentication
attempts (successful and unsuccessful) recorded across all users of a system, and
2The success rates reported are based upon Equation 1 unless otherwise stated
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Figure 5: The Pass-Go [127] system requires users select cell intersections to assemble
a graphical password.
attemptss refers to the subset of those attempts that resulted in successful authenti-
cation. In Equation 2 users refers to the set of users who were asked to use a system
and userss refers to the set of users who were able to authenticate successfully.
Tao and Adams [127] propose Pass-Go, a system based upon a Chinese board
game; the system is designed to provide a larger password space than DAS, and
overcome the likely usability issues caused by fuzzy boundaries (see Figure 5). In a
user study with 167 computer science students across 13 weeks the success rate was
78%.
Due to the difficulty of executing automated guessing attacks upon credentials
perceived to be strong, it is likely that much less sophisticated attacks such as obser-
vation attack become more attractive. Zakaria et al. [151] explored how interaction
design could help to secure DAS for observation attack. They empirically evaluated
a number of defence techniques: disappearing strokes : where each stroke would dis-
appear after it was completed; decoy strokes : where randomly positioned and shaped
strokes would appear on screen for obfuscation; and line snaking : where the tail of
the stroke fades away whilst the user is still in the process of drawing. In an empirical
study they identified the disappearing stroke technique as providing the best balance
between usability and security, and that the decoy stroke technique provided little
protection.
2.4.1.2 Summary
DAS is a promising candidate to enable users to choose and remember high entropy
authentication credentials, as proposed attack dictionaries still appear prohibitively
large. However, research to-date has focused upon theoretical analysis of the password
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space and the prediction of biases that could reduce this space in practice [130]. Such
predicted weakness has been observed to some extent in a small study [88], however,
no formal empirical studies have been conducted to explore likely user behaviour
with this system to determine the types of drawings users are likely to create, if such
drawings are memorable, or if scaffolding can be provided to support the choice of
drawings that are difficult to predict. Such research would be important to determine
whether in practice DAS and potential variants would be usable and secure in practice.
2.4.2 Recognition-based Graphical Passwords
Recognition-based graphical passwords harness the reliability of human memory to
recognise events or stimuli that have been previously seen to authenticate users. Dur-
ing an enrolment phase a user becomes acquainted with a sequence of k key images; at
login, users must perform a visual search to identify these key images amongst d de-
coy images which provide the authentication challenge. If the user can demonstrate
knowledge of the sequence of key images, they are considered to be the legitimate
user. This genre of system is often proposed for contexts requiring password or PIN
level entropy [5], and as a suitable approach to local authentication, or as a second
authentication factor for direct authentication [96]. Representative schemes can be
broadly classified as either being mono-grid [28] or multi-grid.
Mono-grid schemes provide an intuitive mapping from the standard PIN entry, as
a user is presented with a single grid of images and is challenged to identify key images
in a specific order. The associated entropy can be calculated as log2(
(k+d)!
((k+d)−k)!), which
in the configuration illustrated in Figure 6, is less than the entropy offered by a 4
digit PIN (where k = 4 and d = 6) since each image can only be selected once. In
this configuration images are usually static after each user selection, and across future
authentication sessions, although the positions of the key and decoy images may be
shuffled.
Multi-grid systems have emerged as a method to scaffold higher entropy graphical
passwords through a modification to the original mono-grid design, where images
presented during the login phase are distributed across a sequence of image grids
of equal dimensions. Key images can be distributed across grids using one of two
approaches: one-key-per-screen [96] (see Figure 7): a single key image appears in each
displayed grid, and where g is the number of grids, password entropy is higher than
that of a mono-grid system system for the same number of key images: log2((k+d)
g);
or random [59, 125] (see Figure 8): images randomly spread across grids as zero, one,
or more than one key image can appear in a single grid which provides a positive
impact on password entropy: log2(
(
(k+d)
k
)
). Finally, key images can be presented in
one of two modes: monolithic: where the user identifies all known key images; portfolio
[56][31]: users are challenged to identify a random subset of their known key images.
These two modes do not have a direct impact upon password entropy, but can serve to
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Figure 6: A mono-grid recognition-based graphical password system [28]. In this
configuration the image positions are unchanged between selections and logins. Red
squares represent example selections.
complicate attacks to capture and reuse key images (e.g. through observation attack).
Figure 7: An example of a multi-grid recognition based graphical password system
[98] in a one-key-per-screen configuration. Red squares represent example selections.
2.4.2.1 Usability Studies
Early usability research in this domain has focused upon the memorability of diverse
types of image stimulus, mainly centred upon different types of photographs. Brostoff
& Sasse [11] conducted a field trial of the commercial Passfaces [96] system over a three
month period with 34 participants where the system secured a university coursework
submission system. At the end of the study they report that users of Passfaces
experienced a 5% login failure rate, compared to 15% for those using alphanumeric
passwords. The study also showed that those using Passfaces accessed the system less
frequently than those using alphanumeric passwords; the mean number of logins was
34 (σ = 20) for alphanumeric passwords, and 12 (σ = 7) for Passfaces users. This
reduction in usage could have been the result of a number of factors, for example
perceived effort associated with Passfaces; a subtle artefact of experimental design;
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Figure 8: An example of a multi-grid recognition-based graphical password system
where key images are randomly spread across grids. Red squares represent example
selections.
or the contextual motivations of the students. However, it is notable that the lower
login failure rate for Passfaces was apparent despite this reduced usage.
De Angeli et al. [28] conducted a usability analysis of a photograph-based Visual
Identification Protocol (VIP) in three forms: VIP1 requires users to identify 4 key
images in a fixed order from the onscreen set of 10; VIP2 is the same as VIP1 with
the exception that images appear in random positions at each login; VIP3 assigns
users 8 key images, and at login requires the user to identify 4 from the onscreen
image set of 12. In a one-week recall study with 61 participants they found that
the VIP3 system had the largest error rate of over 10%. Elsewhere, there were no
significant differences between those using VIP1, VIP2 and and those using standard
PINs in a control group. The key source of errors in the mono-grid style systems (i.e.
the VIP1 and VIP2 conditions) resulted from users forgetting the specific ordering of
the key images. These results lend further weight to an observation by Davis et al.
[27] that problems of remembering image order are significant (for Davis et al. this
was related to their Story system). However, in the VIP3 condition the key source
of error came from simply making the wrong selection, likely exacerbated by the
variation in key images between logins (i.e. the portfolio mode of operation). Despite
this detailed analysis of errors, all participants were able to provide credentials within
three attempts.
Whereas De Angeli et al. [28] evaluated publicly available sets of photographs,
Tullis and Tedesco [133] explored the usability of personal photographs for user au-
thentication. Across three studies they found that participants were most accurate
in an authentication procedure when the key images were personal photographs as
opposed to generic stock images, even where decoy images were handpicked to be se-
mantically similar to the key image. In a remarkable follow-up study six years later,
Tullis et al. [134] found that nine out of thirteen participants were able to successfully
authenticate using credentials comprised of personal images. To strengthen these re-
sults, there does appear to be an intuitive logic to the utility of personal photographs
in this context, that users are more likely to establish meaningful associations with
images drawn from personal collections due to having an increased familiarity with
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the content. Renaud [101] provided further support for this hypothesis in a study that
explored the impact upon usability of differing levels of user involvement in creation
of images for authentication. Users with a greater involvement in the creation of the
image content achieved higher subsequent success rates in the authentication chal-
lenge; the group with the highest accuracy was a group that produced handwritten
doodles, followed by those who added their own photographs from a camera.
Dhamija and Perrig [31] conducted an evaluation of the De´ja` vu system, which
explored the use of fractal images as authentication credentials. The use of fractals
in this context means that, unlike in the other studies, images could be automatically
generated to comprise a login which is potentially a useful property from the per-
spective of deployment. In a one-week recall test they discovered that those assigned
photographs or fractals had a higher login success rate than those using PINs and
passwords. No statistical tests were performed to determine the significance of this
result, although the small differences might suggest no significant differences existed
over this short time scale.
2.4.2.2 Memory Interference
One important question concerning graphical passwords is the extent to which re-
membering multiple credentials impacts usability. In a study of 172 participants over
4 weeks, Moncur and Leplaˆtre [85] carried out the first study of the usability of mul-
tiple mono-grid recognition-based graphical passwords. Participants were distributed
across 5 conditions, one of which was a control group using PIN; they assigned 5
credentials to each user, and tested recall at two-week intervals. Despite the need to
recall the order of images due to the mono-grid configuration of the authentication
challenge, participants assigned five graphical passwords demonstrated significantly
higher login accuracy than those remembering five PINs 3. Everitt et al. [42] car-
ried out a five week study of a Passfaces-based system with 100 participants. The
experimenters controlled both the number of graphical passwords given to users and
the frequency with which participants accessed their experimental system (Figure 9
depicts and describes the experimental conditions). Their findings can be summarised
as follows:
1. Frequency: participants using a particular graphical password every day (Group
5, week 1) had a lower failure rate (0%) than those using the same graphical
password once per week (Group 1) (1.96% not statistically significant).
2. Training: of the participants assigned four graphical passwords, those who en-
rolled with all four at the same time (Group 4) performed significantly worse
than those who were gradually enrolled with new graphical passwords (Group
5).
3Note that the unusually high dropout rate of 65% makes it difficult to establish the general
applicability of this result.
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3. Interference: participants assigned four different graphical passwords had the
worst failure rate overall at 15% (Group 4). Participants with the best perfor-
mance (1.45%) used one graphical password once per week (Group 1).
4. Long Term Recall: in a long-term recall test, conducted four months after the
original experiment, of the participants who had multiple graphical passwords,
and were tested on a different one every day, Group 4 had the highest failure
rate (14%) and Group 1 and Group 5 (who were assigned multiple graphical
passwords over time) had the lowest failure rate (0%). These relatively low fail-
ure rates demonstrate the potential of recognition-based schemes to be useful in
a multi-graphical password context. Note that an important difference between
this study and that of Moncur & Leplaˆatre [88] is that this system operated
in a multi-grid, one-key-per-screen configuration, whereas Moncur & Leplaˆtre
trialed a mono-grid configuration.
Figure 9: The five conditions from the study carried out by Everitt et al. [40] exploring
the usability of remembering multiple Passfaces graphical passwords. Rows represent
the 5 study weeks (Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday) and each distinct character
represents a distinct graphical password. The recurrence of those characters depicts
how frequently users had to login using that graphical password.
2.4.2.3 Security
The key security benefit of using images in recognition-based authentication is that
users are more likely to have the cognitive resource to remember randomly assigned
credentials. However, there are a number of subtle, but significant attacks that must
be considered:
• Replay Attack: an attacker can reuse captured credentials.
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• Brute Force Attack: due to the small password space (usually < 20 bits) a
brute force attack is trivial. Therefore this genre is only appropriate for local
authentication where automated attacks are less accessible.
• Intersection Attack: where variation exists in the images presented at each login,
patterns in frequency (i.e. some images appear more than others) could provide
clues as to whether an image is a key image [31].
• Observation Attack: due to the greater memorability of images, key images are
likely to be more memorable to casual observers.
• Educated Guess Attack: where credentials are not assigned randomly, attackers
can either use knowledge of the user to guess predict user choice [133, 97], or
exploit knowledge of known user preferences in image selection.
Davis et al. [27] conducted a security focused study of user choice in the context
of a variant of Passfaces, called Faces, and a novel mono-grid scheme called Story.
In the story system, the image stimulus comprises photographs curated to represent
diverse content ranging from faces to everyday objects. The design rationale is that
such semantically different images could assist the users to develop a narrative around
chosen images to aid memorability. Users were allowed to choose key images, and in a
user study across a four-month period they observed interesting trends of user choice.
They noted that users of the Faces system were much more likely to select female
images as opposed to images of males; over 40% of choices by white males were of
images of white female models; over 60% of male choices were for female models. They
also observed a race affiliation effect whereby users were more likely to choose images
of faces from within their own racial group (Figure 2 illustrates the exact effect). For
the Story scheme, user choice patterns were not so pronounced. In the analysis of
usability, users were accurate in the authentication protocol as they exhibited a daily
mean success rate of over 90%; most login errors originated from users in the Story
condition who could not remember the correct order to enter images. Indeed, despite
advising users to create a story around the chosen images as a usability scaffold, users
were still inclined to make errors.
Table 2: The race affiliation effect noted by Davis et al. [27], white females chose
faces to comprise their graphical password within their own race 50% of the time.
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While Davis et al. [27] demonstrated a particular set of bias effects for facial
images, whether systematic selection biases exist for other types of image stimulus
has not been extensively explored. However, in a context where personal images are
used as authentication credentials, research has explored the possibility of an educated
guess attack. The threat arises if an attacker has personal knowledge of the life of a
user and may be able to distinguish between images that may and may not belong
in their personal collection (e.g. using knowledge of friends or holidays). Pering
et al. [97] proposed a system where users must remember one-time authentication
images from their own image collections to authenticate at public terminals. The
authentication task for a user is to identify personal images amongst decoy images
provided by other users of the same system. In user study exploring both the usability
and security of this configuration they found that 2/12 attackers given a small number
of personal images from a given user were able to extrapolate themes in the images
to break-in to their account. Tullis and Tedesco [133] also conducted a study of
an educated guess attack where attackers were allowed to target a known person to
guess their password images. In the worst-case configuration (i.e. best case for the
attacker) guessing accuracy was 38% on a per-image basis (where 100% corresponds
to an attacker successfully guessing all 4 images used per login). This would indicate
that where the authentication task is for a user to distinguish personal images amongst
non-personal images, a diligent attacker would have much to gain from observation
attacks and very simple social engineering.
In addition to user choice, the very composition of the graphical password login
challenge can constitute a vulnerability. Dhamija and Perrig [31] identify intersec-
tion attack as a particular concern. Observation attack is an obvious threat to this
genre of authentication mechanism, hence introducing visual diversity into each login
challenge is desirable, to complicate the attacker capturing and reusing credentials.
However, where this diversity is anything but random, observing the frequency that
an image appears at login relative to others could be used to reveal its role as a key or
decoy image. Current wisdom to defend against this threat is that all login challenges
should be kept identical. Tari et al. [128] carried out a empirical study to determine
the vulnerability to observation attack of Passfaces [96] graphical passwords and al-
phanumeric passwords. Users were asked to pose as attackers and observe live input.
They discovered that alphanumeric passwords were more vulnerable to observation
attack than Passfaces where a mouse was used. However, perhaps a consequence of
the usability of Passfaces, users perceived Passfaces entry with a mouse to be the
configuration most vulnerable to this form of attack.
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2.4.2.4 Scaffolding Secure Behaviour for Recognition-based Graphical Pass-
words
Komanduri and Hutchings [75] compared the usability of a recognition-based system
where images were comprised of simple icons, to that of alphanumeric passwords.
The credentials assigned to users in both conditions were manipulated to ensure that
the password entropy was 50 bits. This level of entropy in the graphical password
condition was primarily achieved by enforcing that users remembered a specific or-
dering of the key images. A recall test was conducted one week after credentials had
been assigned, and both groups performed relatively poorly. However, relaxing the
constraint that users had to remember the ordering of individual credential compo-
nents (i.e. particular images or characters) meant that the success rate for graphical
password users increased to 100%, compared to 67% for alphanumeric passwords.
This mirrors a trend observed in other studies [28, 27, 85] that increasing password
entropy by enforcing recall of a the ordering of a stimuli is not a usable approach to
maximising entropy and that a multi-grid system is the only practical way to scaffold
choice and recall of stronger recognition-based graphical passwords.
2.4.2.5 Summary
Recognition-based graphical passwords are considered to have significant limits in
terms of the entropy of the credentials that user can remember, as the act of authen-
tication becomes increasingly difficult and slow as password entropy is increased, that
is, users would be required to remember more images and navigate more grids. How-
ever, within certain bounds of entropy it appears they show promise as a usable and
secure authentication mechanism. Some significant results to note are the following:
• Recognition-based graphical passwords have good memorability characteristics,
even over extended periods of non-use [134].
• Recall of image order negatively impacts memorability [28, 75].
• User involvement positively impacts memorability [101, 133].
• User choice may introduce systematic biases that give rise to vulnerability to
guessing attacks [27].
Finally, it is interesting to note that although we have described seven well known
memorability studies reporting very favourable performance results, Passfaces is the
only known deployment of a recognition-based graphical password.
2.4.3 Cued recall-based Graphical Passwords
Cued recall-based graphical password systems have been proposed to provide a middle
ground between recall and recognition-based systems, in terms of both usability and
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security. To assist the user to authenticate, a memory cue is provided that assists the
user to reconstruct the correct credentials. There are few cued recall-based systems,
however the most widely studied is Passpoints4 [143]. Passpoints requires the user
to choose memorable locations (usually four or five) within an image to comprise
their authentication credentials. Visual features of the image itself assist users to
choose and remember the chosen locations; to authenticate, the user must be able to
select the same specific locations within the image bounded by a small pixel tolerance.
Figure 10 illustrates example user interactions with the system.
Figure 10: Example visualisation of 5 chosen points in an image as required by the
Passpoints system, taken from [143].
2.4.3.1 Usability Studies
Wiedenbeck et al. [143] conducted a user study to compare the usability of Passpoints
and alphanumeric passwords across six weeks. They recruited 40 users to take part in
a laboratory-based study where recall tests were conducted one week, and six weeks
after enrolment. Tey discovered that Passpoints users made fewer mistakes during
authentication, yet in a questionnaire perceived their authentication task to be more
difficult than using alphanumeric passwords.
Chiasson et al. [14] conducted a laboratory-based study and a field study to
explore the impact on user performance of varying the size of the pixel tolerance
allowed around click points, and the impact of image choice. The lab study confirmed
the presumption by Wiedenbeck et al.[142] that success rates could vary significantly
depending on the image stimulus. A key finding was that the traditional measure
of the efficacy of a password scheme: success rate, was significantly higher in the
lab study than in the field study. In the lab study, calculating a success rate for the
authentication phase of the study across all 17 images was 94%; in the field study login
success rates ranged from 78%-83% This raises questions as to the most appropriate
4The origins of Passpoints can be found in Blonder’s graphical password patent [7] in which he
proposed the concept of a graphical password that authenticates users through selecting areas of an
image.
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Figure 11: The cued-recall graphical password scheme proposed by Weinshall [139].
Users begin in the top left corner, and traverse the grid by moving down if they see
a key image, or right otherwise. The user must then enter the number they arrive to
at the edge of the grid.
way to evaluate a user authentication system and what can be learned from studies
conducted in each environment. In a later study, Chiasson et al. [18] found that that
those users asked to remember six Passpoints graphical passwords, had a significantly
higher success rate than users asked to remember six alphanumeric passwords.
2.4.3.2 Security
Cued recall-based graphical passwords in general face a number of threats:
• Replay Attack: an attacker can capture the credentials and reuse them to obtain
unauthorised access to an account.
• Brute Force Attack: a 5-click graphical password with a tolerance of 19x19
pixels on a 451x331 pixel image, leaves a theoretical password space of 43 bits
[132]. However, just five or six click points one can make more passwords than
an eight character UNIX password based upon an alphabet of 64 characters
[143].
• Observation Attack: as with all graphical passwords, observations of user input
can be replayed to the system to gain unauthorised access.
• Image Processing-based Guessing Attack: a dictionary attack is seeded using
automated detection of image features likely to be incorporated into click point
sequences [132, 33].
• Human Seeded Guessing Attack: a dictionary attack is seeded by gathering a
corpus of user-chosen click point sequences to serve as predictors for a different,
larger sample [132].
52
Dirik et al. [33] present an analysis of Passpoints user choice for two particular
images; they used image processing techniques to identify image features that users
may be likely to choose as click points, and used them to compile an attack dic-
tionary (see Figure 12). By using this dictionary to attack a corpus of user-chosen
graphical passwords, they were able to guess 80% of user click positions (although
this did not consider a full sequence of click points). Thorpe and van Oorschot [132]
formulated a dictionary attack against full Passpoints passwords using two methods:
a human-seeded attack and a fully automated attack. In the human seeded attack
they collected a corpus of click points from one set of users, and used these to assem-
ble an attack dictionary to use against a different set of collected click points. Their
results suggest that the success of the method is highly dependent upon qualities of
the particular image; for one image, using permutations of raw collected click points
yielded a success rate for guesses of 34% (using a 36.7 bit dictionary), while for an-
other image the success rate was 52% (using a 37.1 bit dictionary). For the same
two images the automated attack was less successful, yielding a success rate of 9.1%
and 0.9% respectively (using a 35 bit dictionary). In fact, they had varying degrees
of success across different types of images and their approach was more successful at
guessing click points collected during a lab study than guessing those collected in a
field study. One explanation for this could be that the fairly intense nature of the
lab study could have enticed participants to behave more predictably than normal.
In later work Salehi-Abari et al. [107] developed more sophisticated image processing
techniques and assumptions of user choice by focusing upon particular user selection
strategies, using the same images analysed by Thorpe and van Oorschot [132] and a
34.7 bit dictionary they increased the accuracy of automated guess attacks to 48%
and 54%.
2.4.3.3 Scaffolding Secure Behaviour in Cued Recall-based Graphical Pass-
words
Empirical studies of the Passpoints system created a number of questions regarding
the extent to which biases in user choice of click points could be attacked, and in
response, which methods were suitable to scaffold more secure user choice of Pass-
points credentials. Wiedenbeck et al. [142] explored the most appropriate tolerance
square for Passpoints, and the most appropriate image type. The smaller the toler-
ance square is, the greater the password space will be, but the more precise user recall
must be to correctly remember the target point in the image. Through a process of
experimentation they discovered that for their particular input device, a 10x10 pixel
tolerance around the click point produced more login errors than a 14x14 pixel square.
They also found that some images were more appropriate to be used with Passpoints
than others, with the swimming pool image in their study giving rise to the highest
error rates, and a map image the lowest number of errors.
53
Figure 12: Dirik et al. [33] used image processing techniques such as corner detection
to predict likely sequences of Passpoints graphical passwords. (left) an overlay of click
points collected from a corpus of users; (right) overlay of click points predicted using
their image processing methods.
Chiasson et al. [19] proposed a method to resist predictable user choice in Pass-
points. In Cued Click Points (CCP) each click point in the sequence is made upon a
distinct image. This reduces the number of click points a user must choose on a single
image, and spreads the guessing load for an attack across a larger number of images.
In addition, this approach provides implicit feedback to the user, as the presentation
of subsequent images is contingent upon the location of the click point selected; if
an unexpected image appears onscreen, it is likely the user has made an error. In a
short-term recall test, 24 participants had a 96% success rate overall when using this
system. In a later study, Chiasson et al. [16] proposed Persuasive Cued Click Points
(PCCP) which augments the enrolment phase of CCP by encouraging users to select
click points within a randomly chosen region of the image. The reported success rate
for their short term recall test of PCCP was 91%. Chiasson et al. [17] went on to
analyse the effects of scaffolding secure user choice by comparing user choice between
PCCP, CCP and Passpoints; a number of patterns emerged including that users of
Passpoints were more likely to choose click points positioned closer together, or posi-
tioned adjacent across the horizontal axis of the image. User choice of click points for
PCCP and CCP appeared more randomly distributed in the image which suggests a
security benefit as these credentials appear less guessable than those chosen by users
of the original Passpoints.
A small number of cued recall-based graphical password systems differ from Pass-
points, yet have the scaffolding of secure user behaviour as a key design motivation.
Wiedenbeck et al. [144] proposed the Convex Hull Click (CHC) scheme which requires
users to click within the convex hull formed by the on-screen position of key images,
rather than clicking the images themselves. In a one-week recall test with 15 users,
14 were able to repeat their assigned graphical password. However, the complexity of
the login task led to a mean login duration of 71.66 seconds. Weinshall [139] proposed
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a cued-recall based protocol designed to resist observation attack which requires the
user to remember an assigned shared secret comprising a set of images, and then to
use these to perform pre-determined moves to navigate across a grid of images con-
taining decoy images (see Figure 11). The daily success rates of users recorded in
a longitudinal user study were consistently over 90% for both low and high entropy
instantiations of their proposed system. Although, Golle and Wagner [54] showed
that the indirection introduced in Weinshall’s protocol could be reverse engineered
more efficiently than was suggested in the original proposal.
2.4.3.4 Summary
Cued-recall based graphical passwords, primarily in the form of the Passpoints system
(and extensions), have been extensively studied. Scaffolding secure user choice has
in particular received attention. Interference has also been observed to be significant
where multiple click passwords are selected on the same image [14]. In addition, it
has been highlighted that lab studies and field studies have resulted in very different
usability and user choice results. The PhD thesis of Chiasson explores a number of
issues related to the usability and security of Passpoints graphical passwords [13].
2.5 Thesis Overview
The study of user authentication has expanded in recent years from a purely theoret-
ical focus, to encompass research approaches that capture more holistic insights into
user behaviour, technology, and context; this shift reflects the contemporary chal-
lenges faced in securing computer systems for unauthorised access. This approach
has generated insight into the ways authentication mechanisms can be appropriated
in ways not envisioned by designers; however, such insight has been generated from
the study of existing deployments of alphanumeric passwords. The effective absence
of real-world deployments of representative graphical password systems receiving de-
tailed study means that similar insight cannot be generated, which creates inertia for
potential adopters who would be reluctant to introduce systems into an environment
that could negatively impact an already delicate balance between usability and se-
curity. In response, there is a need for either: real-world longitudinal deployments
of graphical password systems; or empirical methods that enable a more lightweight
approach to begin to map the space of the future challenges that could be brought
about by future deployments; this thesis focuses upon the latter.
The literature review of graphical passwords has highlighted three promising ex-
emplars of graphical password system: DAS [68], mechanisms based upon image
recognition, and Passpoints [143]. Passpoints has received much study [13], however
the remaining two classes of system appear to provide an interesting lens through
which to study user authentication phenomenon in this graphical password context.
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As there are a myriad of issues in the design and evaluation of usable and secure
user authentication, our case study approach must inevitably capture only a subset
of interesting issues that the deployment of usable and secure graphical passwords
might generate. Figure 13 provides an overview of the primary issues captured by
each chapter of the thesis; each issue has been highlighted as a complication to the
understanding of the usability and security of graphical passwords. Our research ap-
proach did not seek to champion one particular authentication system, however, made
appropriate selection of a system that would enable us to generate the most inter-
esting insight into a particular phenomenon. Our chosen contexts were user choice:
a principle concern in knowledge-based authentication; observation attack : a threat
thought to be particularly accessible and potent to graphical passwords; password
sharing : one technique adopted by users to cope with the excessive memory load
imposed by alphanumeric passwords. The final chapter focuses upon the problem of
image filtering: the process of understanding the usability and security properties of
images, and using that to identify images appropriate for use by a particular system;
such a process likely must take different forms for different schemes. This is a recur-
ring issue experienced during the projects described in the thesis and in other work
(as indicated in Tables 3,5), yet is often placed out of the scope of research despite
its important role in underpinning the usability and security properties of a system.
We started the research with a focus upon DAS due to its proposal as a method to
generate crypto-level entropy [5], and the entropy of authentication credentials tradi-
tionally being the principal recipient of theoretical research in knowledge-based user
authentication. Through this study we became particularly aware of the importance
of the interplay between usability, security and deployability, and the potential for
context-specific scaffolding of user behaviours that could impact all three aspects.
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Figure 13: Illustration of the sub-domains of graphical passwords encountered in each
chapter of the thesis.
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Chapter 3
Scaffolding Choice of High Entropy
Graphical Passwords
The literature review of alphanumeric passwords highlights that forcibly scaffolding
secure user choice can be held partly responsible for the insecure user practices that
result. Indeed, it has been demonstrated that there is only a weak relationship between
strictness of password composition policies and the choosing of strong passwords [76,
99]. The greater interface assumptions of graphical passwords (when compared to
alphanumeric passwords) potentially allows for a larger design space of interventions
that support the creation and memorization of credentials with desirable levels of
password entropy. However, while various attempts have to made to improve the
security of user choice in cued recall-based schemes such as Passpoints [16, 19], recall-
based schemes such as Draw a Secret (DAS) [68] have been largely ignored. DAS is of
particular interest in this context of user choice as it has a large theoretical password
space; however, there have been a number of predictions that the usable password
space of DAS could be much smaller in practice [130, 131] which could undermine the
significance of these theoretical estimates. These predicted user behaviours had been
made in the absence of formal empirical study; as such, there remain open questions
regarding the type of DAS drawings users would be likely to create, and indeed how
user interaction could be designed to support users to avoid these predicted biases.
We propose that the user choice biases predicted for everyday usage of DAS may
actually be exacerbated by the use of the bare drawing grid (see Figure 3) which has
few distinctive features that might be used to aid memorization of a drawing. Conse-
quently, we created the Background Draw a Secret (BDAS) system, a variant of DAS
that we hypothesized would passively support secure user creation and memorization
of more complex drawings than DAS. This intervention to the user interaction with
the DAS scheme could be one promising way to enhance the usability and security of
DAS.
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3.1 Threat Model
The principal threat to the security of DAS we consider is that an attacker can perform
an offline brute force attack in a reasonable amount of time. If an attacker obtained
the encoding of a DAS drawing which has been passed through a one-way function
[32], then it is possible to make an unrestricted number of guesses to recover the
plain-text DAS drawing. Thorpe and van Oorschot [131] report that drawings with
a small number of strokes can reduce a password space of 58 bits to 40 bits; and
propose that the stroke count of user-chosen drawings should be at least half of the
drawing length S > L
2
where L is the length. Today, 40 bit searches are feasible in a
reasonable amount of time [147] and so any valuable authentication credential should
aim to exceed this level of security; if the entropy of a drawing is less than 40 bits, it
is likely an attacker can recover the graphical password with few optimisations to the
search.
3.2 Background Draw a Secret (BDAS)
BDAS is a system that comprises an enhancement to the user interface of DAS through
the placement of an image underneath the drawing grid (see Figure 14), essentially
turning BDAS into a cued-recall graphical password system. The addition of new
visual cues to the grid could allow users to further leverage the picture superiority
effect [117] to remember the positioning and composition of their drawing. Procedures
of enrolment and login remain the same as in the original DAS proposal, however,
the added visual cues in the grid intuitively could aid users to choose drawings that
contain increased complexity, and also remember those more complex drawings.
Figure 14: Example of a DAS drawing grid (left); example of a BDAS grid (right).
Of course, no formal or empirically verified criteria exist to pre-select images for
the purpose to support DAS drawings; intuitively, desirable images are likely to con-
tain diverse image content to ensure that user attention across the image is distributed
more randomly about an image; this would reduce the opportunity for an attacker
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Figure 15: An image with few hotspots (left) and a large number of hotspots (right).
to predict how a particular background image might influence user choice of draw-
ing content. Desirable BDAS images are likely to include a large number of hotspots :
memorable discrete areas within an image where objects or the local context is partic-
ularly salient. Such areas of an image are components of images that are likely to be
memorable to users in the challenge to recall their drawing. Figure 15 illustrates two
example images that illustrate extremes in the presence of hotspots that are useful to
consider from both a usability and security perspective. Discussion on the security
impact of the background images is provided in Section 3.4.1.
3.3 User Study
We conducted an empirical study1 to explore whether users of BDAS would be more
likely to choose stronger graphical passwords than users of DAS; also, to determine
whether DAS and BDAS drawings would be memorable if in widespread usage. Such
results would help us to explore whether theoretical predictions made by Thorpe and
van Oorschot [130, 131], would be born out in tests with users, and whether these
biases could be corrected for by BDAS.
3.3.1 Method
We carried out a between-subjects study where the independent variable was the
system to which participants were randomly assigned (DAS or BDAS), and the de-
pendant variable was the memorability of the user chosen credentials. We recruited
46 participants, 32 male and 14 female. All participants were undergraduate students
at the time of the experiment, and none had previously heard of DAS or BDAS.
The typical age range of subjects was 18-25 with one participant in the group 50+.
Most participants had technical backgrounds (20) e.g. majoring in computer science
or engineering, and the remaining 26 subjects non-technical (majoring in modern
languages, business etc).
We chose a paper-based experiment as paper prototyping is a common technique
in human-computer interaction [104] to test new ideas, but also because previous
1A pilot study is reported in addition to this study in a publication at the ACM Computer and
Communications Security conference in 2007 [39].
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short-term empirical studies of DAS were also conducted on paper [88, 53]. A few
days in advance of the experiment, each participant was sent an information sheet
(see Appendix A) that provided information on both the experiment and the DAS
and BDAS passwords (depending on their assigned group).To begin, each participant
in the BDAS group is presented with five images, and instructed to choose one to
use as a background image to the grid. We allowed BDAS users to choose their
background image, as we wished to gauge the kind of images that might prove to
be popular. In an initial training phase the participant was permitted to practice
with the assigned scheme (either DAS or BDAS). The experiment commenced in the
enrolment phase in which a participant was asked to draw upon the enrolment form
to set their graphical password. The path of a drawing was captured on video, but
also noted by an experiment facilitator (for later evaluation of the correctness of the
drawing created).
The participants would be tested after two time intervals to test their retention
of their chosen graphical password: after a five-minute delay, and one week later;
at each recall test participants were given three attempts to correctly authenticate,
where correctness was assessed by the experiment facilitator.
3.3.2 Study Materials
The experiment used a number of custom paper forms which we used to capture
participant interactions: (i) the enrolment form has two rows of three drawing grids,
one row for enrolment and one row for the short-term recall test (the first row of grids
were covered during the recall test); (ii) the login form has three drawing grids, one
for each login attempt (see Appendix B); and finally (iii) the practice form, a nine
drawing grid form on which participants could practice creating valid drawings. The
size of all drawing grids was chosen to be 3.7 (corner to corner) replicating the screen
size of a popular Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) at the time. The resolution of
the drawing grid was set to 5x5 based on previous research [130] that suggests that
this configuration provides an appropriate trade-off between usability and security.
The DAS and BDAS forms were printed on transparency, this ensured both groups
used the same materials, plus allowed BDAS users to overlay the grid on a printed
background image (which themselves were printed on high quality A4 paper). Another
form was developed so that the facilitator could make notes in a structured way whilst
observing each participant. This too included drawing grids so that they could trace
the route of the drawing being created and record interesting traits exhibited by the
participant. Coloured marker pens were made available to BDAS participants to
take account of the possibility that the colour of a background image clashed with a
standard black marker.
The background images made available to the participants in the BDAS condition
are shown in Figure 16. Due to our lack of intuition regarding the type of image
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Figure 16: The background images selected for the user study, BDAS participants
were able to choose one upon which to draw their BDAS graphical password.
that would be most suitable for BDAS, we provided a small yet diverse set from
which participants could choose. These images were selected on the basis that each
exhibited one or more desirable qualities for a background image (i.e. in relation
to detail, hotspots and the distribution of each within the image). The stars image
(Figure 16, top-left) provides users with the opportunity to join the dots (i.e. stars)
in their drawings. The crowd image (Figure 16, bottom-middle) and the map image
(Figure 16, top-right) both provide a large number of evenly distributed hotspots, and
also share characteristics with the crowd and stars images in showing high levels of
detail. The plant image (Figure 16, bottom-right) and the playing card image (Figure
16 bottom-left) were chosen as exemplars of images with a small number of hotspots
containing low-levels of detail.
3.3.3 Results
We collected 23 drawings in the DAS group and 23 in the BDAS group. Analysis of
the memorability results, and the drawings that participants created is presented in
the following sections.
3.3.3.1 User-chosen Drawings
The most common drawings that users created were apparently random construc-
tions of lines and shapes which accounted for 30% of all drawings; everyday objects
accounted for 20% of user drawings. The most intricate drawings were that of a bas-
ketball, and the name of one participant written in Persian script (see Figure 17);
both were successfully repeated in the recall tests and were of high complexity. While
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Figure 17: Examples of complex drawings that participants were able to remember:
(left) Basketball and backboard created using DAS (7 strokes, length 39) (right)
Persian name written with BDAS (9 strokes, length 27).
Figure 18: Examples of simple drawings created in the study that had a low stroke
count, (left) from a BDAS participant (7 strokes, length 7), (right) from a DAS
participant (4 strokes, length 4).
we noted meaningful drawings of high complexity, we also noted drawings of abstract
shapes of low complexity. Figure 18 shows examples of drawings that exhibited little
complexity. Both drawings involved the creation of shapes that followed a simple
pattern. While such drawings proved memorable, they appear to be in the weak class
of drawings outline by Thorpe and van Oorschot [131]. In the figures that follow of
participant drawings, drawings created with DAS are presented on the blank drawing
grid, and those created with BDAS are presented upon the background image, with
the colour of the background image slightly faded so as to not occlude the drawing.
The playing card was the most popular background image chosen in the BDAS
group (8), closely followed by the plant image (7); stars (4), crowd (3) and map (1)
were less popular choices.
3.3.3.2 Drawing Complexity
The complexity of the drawings chosen in each of the two experimental groups is
presented in Table 6. The mean stroke count of drawings created using BDAS was
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Group Strokes Length
µ σ Max Min µ σ Max Min
BDAS 7.22 2.21 12 4 21.43 7.76 37 6
DAS 5.30 2.44 10 1 18.26 9.19 42 6
Table 6: Complexity of drawings created by participants in both experimental groups.
Figure 19: Entropy of the drawings (in bits) created by participants in the BDAS
group. Calculations are made from the tables provided by Thorpe and van Oorschot
[131]; off chart calculations are estimated.
7.22, compared to 5.30 with DAS (t(44) = 2.78,p < 0.01), thus the use of background
images led to drawings with a higher stroke count. The mean length of BDAS drawings
was greater than for DAS (21.43 vs.18.26) although this difference was not statistically
significant. The entropy of a graphical password with the mean characteristics shown
in Table 6 is 70.2 bits for BDAS and less than 60 bits for DAS; both results show
promise for the creation of strong authentication credentials. We noted instances of
very high entropy credentials created by participants in both groups, however the
entropy of created drawings was significantly greater in the BDAS group (Mann-
Whitney U=157.5, p < 0.05). The median entropy of a BDAS drawing was 71 bits,
while the median entropy of a DAS drawing was 49 bits; the overall distribution of
the security of the drawings created by BDAS participants is illustrated in Figure 19,
and in Figure 20 for DAS users.
3.3.3.3 Symmetry & Centring
The creation of drawings that incorporate some level of symmetry in its content, and
are centred in the grid are thought to be predictable techniques that users could adopt
to aid the memorisation of drawings [130]. To explore the prevalence of such features
in our own dataset, we attempted to use the qualitative criteria used by Nali and
Thorpe [88] in their small study of DAS. We found that 10 drawings (43%) created
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Figure 20: Entropy of the drawings (in bits) created by participants in the DAS group.
Calculations are made from the tables provided by Thorpe and van Oorschot [131];
off chart calculations are estimated.
Group Responses Correct Success Rate
BDAS 23 22 96%
DAS 23 23 100 %
Table 7: Recall results for both experimental groups at the five minute recall test.
with BDAS exhibited global symmetry, compared to 13 (57%) in the DAS group;
also that 10 (43%) BDAS drawings exhibited centring, while 20 (87%) DAS drawings
appeared to be centred.
3.3.3.4 Short Term Recall Test - 5 Minutes Later
Table 7 summarises the results of the recall test conducted five minutes after the
enrolment phase; success rates are calculated using the participant success rate intro-
duced in Equation 2 in Chapter 2. Only one person in the BDAS group was unable
to repeat their drawing (see Figure 21). The problem encountered by the participant
was not related to remembering the visual appearance of the drawing, but the point
at which to start drawing the circle that formed the head of the drawn person. Table
8 compares the complexity of drawings that were successfully recalled in both groups.
The average stroke count of a BDAS drawing was 7.45 compared to 5.3 for DAS
drawings t(44)=2.9, p < 0.01 indicating that the stroke count of memorable BDAS
drawings was significantly higher than that of those created using DAS. The mean
length of recalled BDAS passwords (21.7) was not significantly longer than for DAS
(18.26). Only 9 (41%) of recalled drawings in the BDAS group had global symmetry,
compared to 13 (57%) in the DAS group; 9 (41%) of recalled drawings in the BDAS
group were centred, compared to 20 (87%) in the DAS group.
The difference in magnitude of the entropy of mean memorable drawings produced
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Figure 21: The BDAS drawing that one participant could not recall in the five minute
recall test. The blue dots indicate erroneous attempts to remember the starting point
of the circle that forms the head of the person (4 strokes, length 18).
Group Strokes Length
µ σ Max Min µ σ Max Min
BDAS 7.45 2.26 12 4 21.7 8.31 37 6
DAS 5.30 2.44 10 1 18.26 9.19 42 6
Table 8: Complexity of successfully recalled drawings in the five minute recall test.
in each condition is greater than 10 bits. We also examined the number of attempts
users needed to recall a drawing successfully, for which the performance of DAS users
was marginally better than BDAS: 18 DAS users succeeded in recalling their drawing
first time, compared to 16 with BDAS; 5 users in both schemes needed 2 attempts,
and 1 BDAS user required 3 attempts; no DAS user needed more than 2 attempts.
This would indicate the usability of BDAS is broadly similar to that of DAS.
3.3.3.5 Long Term Memorability - One Week Later
One week after the initial enrolment and recall test participants returned to conduct
a longer term recall test. Two participants from each group failed to return at this
stage and so are excluded from further discussion. Of the remaining 42 participants,
two participants (one from each group) were unable to repeat their drawing within
3 attempts (see Table 9). Figure 22 illustrates the drawing that a participant could
not repeat successfully in the BDAS group, and Figure 23 illustrates the drawing the
participant in the DAS group could not repeat successfully.
Group Responses Correct Participant Success Rate
BDAS 21 20 95%
DAS 21 20 95%
Table 9: Recall results for each experimental group at the 1 week recall test.
Table 10 compares the complexity of drawings that were successfully recalled in the
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Figure 22: The BDAS drawing that a participant could not recreate correctly in the
one week recall test (12 strokes, length 34).
Figure 23: The drawing incorrectly repeated by the DAS participant in the one week
recall test: (left) the original drawing; (right) the drawing as created by the participant
one week later (7 strokes, length 24).
two conditions at the one week recall test. The complexity of drawings recalled in the
BDAS condition was significantly greater than those in the DAS group (t(40)=2.96,
p < 0.01). The length of memorable BDAS passwords was not significantly longer than
for DAS passwords (20.9 vs. 17.45). Furthermore, only 10 (46%) of the memorable
drawings in the BDAS condition exhibited global symmetry, compared to 13 (59%)
in the DAS condition; 10 (46%) memorable drawings in the BDAS condition were
centred, compared to 19 (86%) in the DAS condition. The entropy of a graphical
password with the mean characteristics observed in Table 10 for BDAS was greater
than 70.2 bits, but less than 60 bits for a mean DAS-generated password.
We again also collected the number of attempts each user needed to recall their
drawing. DAS users performed marginally better, with first-time 16 recalls, compared
with 13 using BDAS. Five BDAS users needed 2 recall attempts, compared with 4
using DAS, and only 1 person (a BDAS user) required 3 attempts. Again we can
conclude that although BDAS drawings were inherently more complex, this complex-
ity did not significantly hinder users ability to recall them, even after a period of one
week.
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Group Strokes Length
µ σ Max Min µ σ Max Min
BDAS 7.1 2.16 12 4 20.9 7.71 37 6
DAS 5 2.44 10 1 17.45 7.63 37 6
Table 10: Complexity of successfully recalled drawings in the one week recall test.
3.4 Discussion
The user study has confirmed that BDAS did increase graphical password entropy by
significantly increasing the stroke count of memorable graphical passwords. This is
encouraging as it has been said that stroke count has a more important role in the
entropy of a DAS graphical password than the overall length [131]. In a pilot study
we also noted that BDAS significantly affected the length of the graphical passwords
created [39]. Qualitatively, it also appears to make drawings less predictable by
reducing global symmetry and centring. Furthermore, it appears the DAS graphical
passwords were just as memorable as the more complex BDAS graphical passwords
created. This outcome is important as any added gains in terms of complexity are
not useful without a sufficient gain in memorability. It is possible that if we had
conducted a longer study that interesting differences in the ability for participants to
recall their drawings would emerge, this would introduce more stress into the memory
task and provide a stronger test of memorability.
Background image choices in the study show that the playing card was the most
popular image, followed by the plant image. Informal feedback we received suggests
that the apparent simplicity of the image gave the impression it would be more usable
for purposes of creating a drawing. The feedback from participants choosing the plant
image included that the plant divided the picture conveniently and provided a good
focal point around which to construct a drawing without being too distracting. The
word distracting was a recurring one; our own guess at what makes a BDAS image
distracting includes a number of contrasting colours and few elements of symmetry.
The remaining three images show much less structure but contain the most diverse
colours; this is possibly why they were chosen so few times. The participants selecting
the stars and crowd images commented that they simply liked the image as a whole.
Due to the lack of constraints placed upon the drawings users were asked to create,
it is not surprising that there were drawings of low entropy created in both experi-
mental groups. For this reason it seems while we were able to significantly improve
the complexity of the drawings created by users, it is unlikely we have removed the
reliance upon mechanisms such as proactive checking to detect low-quality passwords
in both the DAS and BDAS schemes.
In the majority of cases where participants incorrectly recalled their drawing, the
visual appearance of the drawings was usually remembered. The nature of a number
of recall failures was due to either mixing up the order of the strokes in a drawing, or
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forgetting the starting point of a symmetrical shape such as a circle or square. This
seems to echo observations by Goldberg et al. [53] that recall errors would result due
to the need to remember the composition of the drawing.
3.4.1 Security Implications of BDAS
Throughout this chapter we have calculated the entropy of BDAS passwords using
a method suited to unbiased selection of DAS drawings. As discussed earlier, back-
ground images in principle could introduce bias to drawings reducing their theoretical
entropy. Would this imply that the observed increase in BDAS password complexity
may not in fact indicate increased password security? Our estimate of BDAS password
entropy did ignore possible negative biases that could be introduced by background
images. However, the following are open problems in this domain:
• What are the biases caused by background images?
• How these biases would aid attackers?
• Can security reduction caused by image biases can be compensated by reduced
symmetry and centring?
Our study did not collect sufficient data per image to meaningfully explore these
questions. However, recent studies [132, 33] demonstrate that a relationship between
image hotspots and user choice could impact graphical password entropy in the Pass-
points [143] system. The weakness highlighted by these studies is a concern, however
at present we have little knowledge on the implications of these results in the different
BDAS environment. Firstly, there is a difference in the user-facing protocol of each
scheme as BDAS users must create a free-form drawing upon an image, whereas Pass-
points credentials are a sequence of explicitly chosen salient positions in the image.
This means there are more ways a BDAS user could use a hotspot:
1. The hotspot content is used to aid memorability of the position or form of
strokes.
2. The hotspot position is used to aid recall of the positioning of strokes.
3. A combination of 1 and 2.
Due to the way the BDAS image is visually partitioned into relatively large cells by
an overlaid grid, it is possible a relatively small number of well distributed hotspots can
be sufficient to align the size of the password space targeted at hotspots, with the full
DAS theoretical space. For instance, if every cell contained a hotspot in a 5x5 grid, 25
hotspots suitably positioned, could give the attacker no obvious guessing advantage.
Due to the finer granularity of selections in Passpoints, many more hotspots would be
required to achieve a similar effect. Hotspots are likely to beneficial to attackers when
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Figure 24: Based upon a password space of at most 40 bits, The resulting impact of
the location of a hotspot upon the password space using the assumption that a user
will visit a hotspot in every stroke: (left) the hotspot is a corner cell (middle) the
hotspot is a border cell (right) the hotspot is a central cell.
there are few of them. An interesting example of the background image appearing
to exert influence over users is apparent in the left image in Figure 18. Here the
participant has chosen to augment the structure of the background image with simple
shapes.
However, If it were empirically observed that hotspots create bias over the drawings
users were likely to create in BDAS, then the location of the hotspot could likely
contribute to a reduction in entropy. Using a modified version of the calculation
provided by Thorpe and van Oorschot [131], Figure 24 illustrates the types of hotspot
according to its position within the drawing grid; this suggests that if the user visited
a corner cell in every stroke of their drawing, as much as 18 bits of entropy can
be removed. These differences in reduction can be rationalised due to the differing
number of cells that can be visited from each type of cell. (visualised by the arrows in
Figure 24) Further empirical research is required to verify that such an effect would
exist in real usage of BDAS.
3.5 Study Limitations
The study was carried out under controlled laboratory conditions which can provide
results that illustrate user performance when the participant has no distractions from
the task at hand. However, security is often described as a secondary task for users
[150], complementary results could be obtained by moving the experiment out of
the laboratory to an unsupervised environment that mirrors usage of a system of
real value. A knock-on effect of this is that those taking part in our studies had no
personal incentive to perform as they were not choosing or using a graphical password
to access anything of real-life value to them, which could have impacted motivation
in terms of choosing and remembering a complex drawing. Also we did not consider
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the impact of user choice bias introduced by background images upon calculations of
password entropy, future work could gather a larger amount of data per background
image to explore this further. Finally, we did not note significant differences in the
memorability of drawings created with either system, however a recall test across a
longer period of time could provide a better opportunity for such effects to emerge.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter has described an empirical study that has shown the potential to pas-
sively improve the entropy of DAS drawings through an intervention to the interaction
design of DAS; this was achieved without onerous password composition policies and
through design of the user interaction with the system. This provides an example of
how to harness the greater interface assumptions of graphical passwords to potentially
create a new space of interactions to support the user selection of high entropy cre-
dentials. In our empirical study, users of our BDAS system chose stronger graphical
passwords than their counterparts using DAS, and included fewer instances of weak
graphical password characteristics such as global symmetry and centring within the
drawing grid. The median entropy of a BDAS drawing was 71 bits, while the median
entropy of a DAS drawing was 49 bits. BDAS also appeared to facilitate the mem-
orability of these more complex drawings, as both experimental groups performed
similarly in terms of recall success in tests conducted 5 minutes and 1 week after en-
rolment. This suggests that BDAS could simultaneously support enhanced usability
and security.
BDAS did not completely solve the problem of low entropy password selection, as
we recorded low entropy drawings from participants using both systems. The need
for users to choose and remember drawings that form high entropy credentials could
be considered as a compliance defect [26]. This could indicate that DAS and BDAS
must in the immediate term retain a reliance upon a graphical password equivalent
of proactive password checking [74]. We believe that proactive checking would be
more obstructive when applied to DAS due to the likelihood that participants would
choose comparatively weaker passwords than BDAS participants. Imposing proac-
tive password checking in this graphical password context could entice users to add
complexity to drawings in predictable ways, as has been noted with alphanumeric
passwords [76, 99]. One benefit of BDAS in a proactive checking context is that users
may be less likely to choose sufficiently weak passwords that fail proactive password
checks, and thus avoid the need to spontaneously add new complexity.
The need to entice users to choose high-entropy credentials clearly does not con-
stitute the only way to ensure the security of knowledge-based authentication creden-
tials. The increased difficulty of sophisticated guessing attacks will likely make less
sophisticated attack vectors such as phishing [66] or observation attack much more
attractive. Observation attack appears to be a pressing problem for graphical pass-
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words, however BDAS and DAS to some extent have some protection as replication of
the drawing visually is not sufficient to obtain a successful login. Recent research has
indeed explored the possibility to redesign the user interaction of DAS to provide ob-
servation resistance [151, 79]. Recognition-based graphical passwords are thought to
have a particular vulnerability to observation attack due to the simplicity of the user
interaction and the memorable nature of the stimulus presented at login. This is a
pressing concern, particularly with the increasing prevalence of ubiquitous computing
devices in widespread usage.
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Chapter 4
Observation Resistant Graphical
Passwords through Multi-Touch
Interaction
In Chapter 3 we found that an intervention to the user interaction design of Draw a
Secret (DAS) [68] supported users to choose and remember significantly more secure
graphical passwords, than those using DAS in its archetypal form. That approach was
hardware neutral, however Sasse et al. [109] remind us that designing security around
the affordances of the specific technology upon which mechanisms are deployed can
result in security mechanisms that better fit the context. Such an approach appears
particularly appropriate when considering the threat of observation attack due to the
increasing diversity of ubiquitous computing [140] technologies that require a user
authentication protocol to be performed in public e.g. (Automatic Teller Machine)
ATM, mobile devices. This attack involves the use of techniques to surreptitiously
view the sensitive user interactions with the authentication system. While this is not
an attack that is scalable digitally, the impact of observation attack in everyday life
is routinely encountered in an ATM context by the UK Financial Ombudsman [45];
indeed, as more technical expertise is required to carry out sophisticated guessing
attacks against large password spaces, attacks would likely be drawn towards more
accessible methods to capture login credentials.
Recognition-based graphical passwords are assumed to be particularly vulnerable
to this attack, due to exemplar systems being simple to understand, the high memora-
bility of visual stimulus [95, 117], and the user interaction directly exposing the secret
credentials in their entirety. The difficulty of designing user authentication resistant
to observation attack is embedded in the need to design observation resistance as a
core part of the user interaction, in a way that is compatible with the social context.
Poor compatibility with the social context can lead to either: (i) sloppy adherence
to secure protocols on the part of the user; or (ii) users not performing security be-
haviours at all. An accepted tenet in security research is the ease with which people
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can be persuaded into insecure behaviours, because of the imperative to comply with
normative social protocols [84].
In this chapter we populate the design space for techniques for observation resis-
tant input of user authentication credentials; we operationalise our analysis in the
context of multi-touch tabletops, a public computing technology that allows partic-
ularly expressive forms of user interaction, and is proposed to become commonplace
as commercial products such as Microsoft Pixelsense (formerly known as Microsoft
Surface) [82] begin to penetrate the marketplace. Such interactive tabletop systems
are designed to afford co-located collaboration between groups of users, i.e. the table-
top becomes a communal work-space shared by a small group of friends or colleagues;
indeed, future applications are envisioned that include financial transactions, and
other security sensitive interactions that require differentiation between collaborators
with different levels of security clearance. Where user authentication is required on
this platform, it will likely be focused upon something you know authentication as
it is cheap and easy to understand. In an empirical study we explore the usabil-
ity and security of one particularly promising and novel mechanism: Pressure Grid,
which exploits multi-touch interaction to provide observation resistance to PINs and
recognition-based graphical passwords with no adaptation to the underlying authen-
tication scheme.
4.1 Threat Model
Tabletop interfaces and other public displays potentially pose new challenges for pri-
vacy and security-related interactions. Indeed, they create a worst case scenario for
observation attacks because the displays are are: large, high resolution and designed
to accommodate multiple collocated users. These systems will likely be placed in en-
vironments such as hotels or restaurants which suggests areas with high public traffic
in the surrounding area; people in the surrounding area could be strangers, individ-
uals accompanying the user, either of which could take the role of an attacker. The
challenge is made still more pressing by the social context of tabletop usage – close
colleagues will not wish to signal mistrust in their fellow users and are therefore less
likely to adhere to proper security compliant behaviours (such as shielding PINs). Our
threat model consists of resisting at least one observation attack from an attacker who
can take any position they please around the tabletop; resisting an attack means that
one observed authentication session should not yield sufficient information to perform
a successful replay attack. The importance of resisting a single attack is due to the
assumption that requiring an attacker to observe an additional authentication session
from the same user could be a sufficient deterrent to this kind of threat, as circum-
stances may not allow this for a period of time. We assume camera-based attacks are
possible and can at best be hindered by our approach to design interaction techniques;
such a threat is alleviated by the assumption that social norms will prevent the direct
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video recording of login sessions by attackers.
4.2 A Framework for Observation Resistant Inter-
actions
To assemble a framework for observation resistant interactions we focus upon software
methods that do not rely on additional hardware devices. Where a designer must
develop a system to defeat or at least hinder observation attack, which strategies can
be called upon to provide authentication that is intuitive for the user,but confusing
for the observer? Observation attacks can be complicated by interfering with one or
more steps in the observers process of sense making and knowledge acquisition. These
strategies are summarised in Table 11.
The strategy to reduce visibility involves designing interactions that themselves
mask the sensitive areas of the screen, or the usage of computer graphics techniques
to actively conceal the secret parts of the user credentials. This approach results
in minimal addition to the cognitive load of the user as intervention is confined to
the interaction technique itself; one example of this in the context of alphanumeric
passwords include the masking of the credentials onscreen with dots, or asking users
to shield the keypad.
Subdivide action involves removing the one-to-one mapping between a single user
action and a single component of the authentication credential. This increases the
number of interactions a user must perform, however increases the number of interac-
tions an attacker must observe. One example of this is provided by Roth et al. [105],
who describe a protocol to permit observation resistant entry of PINs in a cognitive
trapdoor game. In this procedure, the user must perform a number of rounds of a
simple protocol per PIN digit to convince the system that each correct PIN digit is
known, however the correct PIN digit is never explicitly revealed. However, in an
empirical study they found that their system increased login durations by a factor of
ten over standard PIN entry.
Dissipate attention involves the presentation of extraneous information onscreen to
overwhelm the memory capacity of the attacker; this carries the disadvantage that the
legitimate user must also navigate this extra information. This is a common method
to create uncertainty for an attacker and a number of schemes harness this technique
at least to support other methods of indirection. Tan et al. [126] developed an on-
screen keyboard for public displays to protect against observation of alphanumeric
passwords. This method also incurred a heavy time penalty for legitimate users, with
mean login times when using their novel keyboard 50 seconds greater than when users
used a conventional keyboard.
Transform knowledge involves the user being asked to enter credentials in a form
that makes it difficult to decipher the original credentials. For example, instead of
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Principle Summary
Reduce visibility Reduce the saliency of areas on a display
where sensitive actions are taking place. This
can be achieved through computer graphics
techniques e.g. to reduce visual quality or
exploit orientation or can rely upon interac-
tions that occlude the sensitive area.
Subdivide action Remove the one-to-one mapping between one
user action and one part of the authenti-
cation credential. For instance by dividing
a single action temporally or spatially and
performing the resulting sub-actions sequen-
tially or concurrently. This increases the
work required of an attacker to capture the
credentials.
Dissipate attention Display redundant information to hinder the
observer identifying information on the inter-
face that is useful to memorize.
Transform knowledge Enter the credentials in a form that is diffi-
cult, in isolation, to be used to reconstruct
the correct credentials. The user could be
asked to perform some function over the cre-
dentials in memory and enter the result.
Table 11: Principles for designing observation resistant user authentication.
entering the credentials x, the user enters f(x). This is a widely considered technique
to defend against observation attack, however it is likely that this approach intro-
duces additional cognitive load to the user. The Convex Hull Click scheme [144] is a
recognition-based graphical password scheme designed specifically to complicate ob-
servation attack. The user is assigned a number of icons to comprise key images that
they must locate amongst a large number of decoy images (also icons). At each login
the user must locate three key image icons and click within the convex hull formed by
their on-screen positions, this can be repeated multiple times to reduce the likelihood
of a random guess attack. In their empirical study, the mean successful login duration
was 72 seconds, although users were accurate in recognising the images. The patent of
Baker [3] describes a simple input mechanism where the user is presented with a 6x6
grid (populated with randomly positioned alphanumeric characters) and must identify
a row or column in which each particular character of a memorised password resides.
A drawback of this approach as a whole is that while the user does not explicitly
reveal their credentials, the interaction still leaks useful information over time.
Each of these identified methods illustrates a trade-off between the usability of the
scheme and the desired level of resistance to observation attack.
79
4.3 Observation Resistant User Authentication on
Multi-Touch Surfaces
Multi-touch interaction contributes to the collaborative context as it affords the pos-
sibility to exploit a number of interactions not possible in traditional desktop settings.
Firstly, visually complex bi-manual manipulations are relatively easy to perform but
difficult to reproduce based on observation alone. Secondly, the physicality and direct-
ness of multi-touch interaction means that interface elements can be directly touched
and direct physical metaphors can be exploited this could improve usability and com-
prehension of group activities. We attempted to populate the design space of multi-
touch interaction methods that could provide observation resistance. The particular
affordances of multi-touch interaction we exploit include physical gestures, concurrent
actions, and detection of changes in finger pressure. Each approach can potentially
be used or adjusted to be used on a number of specific multi-touch platforms such as
mobile devices, tablets etc; in each case we discuss an exemplar system and discuss
its implications for usability and security 1. Each example is not intended to provide
a perfect solution, but serve to exercise the design space we have introduced.
4.3.1 Exploiting Intuitive Physical Gestures
ShieldPIN (Figure 25) is an interaction technique that forces users to perform a shield-
ing gesture around a keypad before the entry of authentication credentials is permit-
ted; this forms an interlock mechanism that ensures a physical barrier to visibility is in
position before the credentials can be disclosed, as the keypad appears and disappears
in response to the detection of the shielding gesture. This ensures that the shielding
gesture is no longer a voluntary action that could be interpreted as an indicator of
mistrust. The entry procedure of PINs and recognition-based graphical passwords
would be unchanged which has significant usability and comprehensibility benefits.
The defence is based upon security through obscurity, with observation attack likely
to be difficult due to the small screen real estate occupied on the interface and the
comparative size of the users shielding gesture. In the configuration illustrated in
Figure 25, an attacker is most likely to be successful from a vantage point behind
the user; careful design of the size and shape of the input area can minimise this
possibility.
4.3.2 Exploiting Multiple Concurrent Touches
Colour Rings (see Figure 26) is an interaction technique that augments a typical
recognition-based graphical password scheme, and requires the user to select images
through the placement of coloured rings within the image grid; the rings must be
1Added discussion of this project is provided in our publication at the ACM SIGCHI conference
in 2010 [71]
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Figure 25: Exploiting Intuitive Physical Gestures - ShieldPIN screenshot with added
example interaction (left), in situ (right): the PIN keypad only appears once the
shielding gesture is detected in the green zone which serves to force the user to enter
the PIN and visually cover the keypad.
moved concurrently, and can capture more than a single image. The capture of multi-
ple images at the same time creates uncertainty for an attacker regarding which iden-
tified images comprise the graphical password. Also, this overcomes one particularly
problematic feature of this genre of graphical password with regard to observation
attack which is the highly observable point and touch interaction. In the illustrated
instantiation, the user is assigned k key images that are collectively assigned one sin-
gle colour-ring (from red, green, blue or pink). At login the user is presented with
k grids of icons where 72 icons are displayed per grid and one key icon is presented
in each. To begin, the user must place 4 fingers down on the display (ideally index
finger and thumb from each hand) around which four rings of different colours then
appear. Using the four rings the user must drag them concurrently and drop them in
the grid, three of the rings should capture images that comprise dummy selections,
while the fourth ring (that is their assigned colour) should capture at least the key
image.
At each login the position of the icons is randomised and distinct icons may be
displayed per grid (although the images are the same between logins). As users can
select more than one icon per-ring, there is a need to consider the security impact on
guessability. Key determinants of security are the number of rings n, and the number
of distinct icons in a grid i and capacity of the rings c. The probability of a random
guess k(( 1
n
)( c
i
)) is significantly smaller than the probability of a random guess attack
against PIN where n = 4, c = 5,i = 72, k = 4. Clearly, knowing the colour of the
correct ring further reduces the number of possibilities an attacker must try after
a single observation. Over time this scheme leaks information, however it is likely
the task of deciphering the key images on- screen across a number of logins would
be difficult where the adversary is restricted to the use of short-term memory. After
recording a single successful login the attacker has narrowed down the password space
to log2(k(nc)), which still provides greater resistance than provided by a PIN which
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Figure 26: Exploiting Multiple Concurrent Touches - Colour Rings screenshot with
added example interaction (left), in situ (right): The user drags coloured rings to
select key icons amongst decoys, one ring lassos a key image of the user, the rest
represent decoy selections to create confusion for an attacker.
is revealed in a single login. Limitations of this approach include that it introduces
additional cognitive load to the user as a result of the added need to remember the
assigned secret colour. In terms of both usability and accessibility the scheme requires
good hand dexterity, and it is possible interaction biases may occur in practice such
as the consistent placement of a ring around a key image before any other image.
4.3.3 Exploiting the Invisibility of Pressure Change
Pressure Grid (see Figure 28) is another interaction technique that aims to avoid the
point and touch interaction associated with recognition-based graphical passwords
and even numeric PINs. The Pressure Grid is a dynamically positioned and sized
area of the screen that enables the user through discrete changes in finger pressure
to communicate an (x,y) coordinate to identify an object in a grid. This approach
exploits the difficulty to identify changes in pressure applied to individual fingertips
already resting upon a surface and is particularly suited to multi-touch technology that
can detect changes in finger pressure, for example Frustrated Total Internal Reflection
(FTIR). Figure 27 illustrates the extent to which differences in finger pressure can be
detected from hands resting upon the tabletop exhibiting similar postures.
The user begins by placing three fingers of each hand in calibration areas on the
interface; we chose to design for three fingers per hand due to intuition that the 1st,
2nd, and 3rd fingers of each hand appeared to be the most comfortable to use for
this purpose. The system uses the location of these touch points around which to
dynamically position a grid of objects, and assign pressure zones to each finger, the
dimensions of which are dynamically customised by the size of the hands and the
spacing between fingers. Once the grid appears, the user is presented with an NxN
grid of objects where N should also correspond to the number of fingers per hand used
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Figure 27: Exploiting the Invisibility of Pressure Change - Two images of a hand
resting upon a multi-touch surface (based upon Frustrated Total Internal Reflection
(FTIR) [57]) where different levels of pressure upon each finger are illustrated by
different sized circles upon the interface.
in the interaction. Each cell is referenced by a (x, y) coordinate where x increases
from left-to-right and y from bottom-to-top. Each finger on the left hand is assigned
a value of y and those on the right hand values of x. For example on the right hand
the 3rd finger is assigned x = 3, the 2nd finger x = 2 and the 1st finger x = 1. To
select a particular cell, the user must apply additional pressure on one finger per hand.
The system can attribute this additional pressure to particular pressure zones, and
thus derive an (x, y) coordinate, which can be interpreted as selection of object (x,
y). This can be repeated until an entire sequence of objects is selected. If fingers are
completely removed from the surface during the input, the login is cancelled as the
user may be at risk of exposing components of their credentials.
The key element that underpins the security of this technique is that attackers
will have difficulty attending simultaneously to sources of pressure from both hands
and the object to which the pressure maps. One possible limitation of this approach
is in terms of accessibility as it requires good dexterity of the hands. A camera attack
seems difficult, although one useful approach could exploit technology described by
Marshall et al. [80], where cameras are used to detect the change in the colour of the
flesh beneath the finger nail, caused by pressure of the finger upon a surface.
In the implementation we chose a static pressure threshold used across both hands
to distinguish resting fingers and those exerting additional pressure. However, in
future the pressure values recorded in the calibration step could be used to assign
each finger an individual threshold as the strength and size of a finger likely impacts
the pressure it can apply.
4.3.4 Reflection
We conceptually categorise the interaction techniques proposed, along with related
work in terms of the four approaches to resisting observation attacks in Table 12.
Each of our proposed interaction techniques attempts to reduce visibility, ShieldPIN
in the form of the design of the physical gesture to block the view of the keypad,
while Colour Rings and Pressure Grid do this due to the reduced quality of the
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Figure 28: PressureFaces screenshot with added example interaction (top), photo
(bottom). The user increases pressure on one finger per hand in the coloured pressure
zones to communicate an (x, y) coordinate and select an object.
images onscreen. The Pressure Grid appears promising as it does not increase the
cognitive load for the user, as opposed to the Colour Rings technique which relies
upon transforming knowledge and requires users to additionally remember a colour.
Indeed, related work appears to rely quite heavily on the need to dissipate attention
and transform knowledge, two techniques that carry a usability penalty for the user,
who must sacrifice usability to gain security [126, 105, 144].
The ShieldPIN system appears to be a very attractive mechanism due to its sim-
plicity, however could still permit observation attack from particular vantage points
behind the user, which appears to be a likely attack position. In early user-based
pilot work, the Pressure Grid was well regarded and appeared to allow a fast inter-
action. We chose to evaluate the usability of this method further to explore whether
this approach was usable in an empirical study, but also whether perceived benefits
of observation resistance would be born out in practice.
4.4 Observation Attack User Study
We carried out a user study to discover the efficiency of the Pressure Grid in terms
of both usability and its resistance to observation attack. To reason over the re-
sistance to observation we developed a method similar to Tari et al. [128] where
participants would be asked to perform an observation attack upon live input. We
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System Reduce Subdivide Dissipate Transform
Visibility Action Attention Knowledge
ShieldPIN *
Colour Rings + * +
Pressure Grid * + +
Cognitive Trapdoor [105] * + +
Spy Resistant Keyboard [126] + * +
Convex Hull Click [144] + *
Vibrapass [30] + * +
Table 12: Observation attack resistance techniques used in methods proposed in this
chapter and in related work ( * = primary; + = supporting).
believed that the most likely real-world manifestations of the Pressure Grid based on
current research trends included the PIN, and recognition-based graphical password
due to them sharing a reliance upon a point and touch interaction. To provide a
graphical password system to evaluate we implemented a system where the image
stimulus comprised face images from a stock database; this was designed to resemble
Passfaces [96], a system which is a commercial exemplar of this genre of graphical
password system. One key operational difference between PINs and Passfaces is that
traditional PINs are entered on keypads with fixed digit positions, whereas the Pass-
faces system randomises the locations of face images at each login. This difference
was included when implementing both Faces and PressureFaces. This meant we eval-
uated four systems: basic PIN, basic Faces, PressurePIN and PressureFaces. For the
PIN system the credentials would be a four digit PIN comprised of the digits 1-9, for
Faces the user would see four 3x3 grids of faces, in each grid one image would be a
key image. Differences in entropy between the two systems were present, but these
configurations represent common instantiations of the respective systems.
4.4.1 Method
We chose a within-subject user study where the independent variable was the system,
and the dependant variables were the observability of the system and the login time.
We recruited 21 participants (14 male, 7 female) to take part in the study. Twelve
participants were in the age group 18-30, and nine in the group 31- 50. Participants
were either undergraduates or postgraduates in the university. In advance of the study,
each mechanism was randomly assigned a correct authentication sequence, which
remained consistent for each system throughout the study. Groups of 3 participants
were invited to a one hour session, the protocol of the study was explained, and
all participants were given time to familiarise themselves with each of the 4 systems.
One participant was then randomly assigned the role of inputter for the entire session,
while the remaining two were assigned as observers (attackers). Then, a system was
chosen at random (from PIN, Faces, PressurePIN, PressureFaces), and the inputter
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Figure 29: The custom-built FTIR table used for the evaluation (49x95x105cm) and
the user study context.
given time to master the entry of the correct credentials for that system. This was
judged by successful input three times consecutively. The observers would then return
to the interface and position themselves anywhere around the tabletop interface they
chose, and the inputter asked to achieve three consecutive successful logins in their
presence. Mistakes by the inputter were ignored. After viewing a login the observers
performed a 30 second distractor task (reading a short text). The use of a distractor
task is common in memory studies, often to simulate memory stress; its use here
was motivated by our assumption that an attacker cannot immediately make use of
observed information, and may be required to retain the information over an extended
time period or perform other tasks before they can commence an attack. After the
distractor task the observers were invited back to the tabletop individually to attempt
to re-create the credentials they had observed. Each observer had three attempts to
input the correct credentials. If successful in less than three attempts they were not
required to login again using that system; The procedure was repeated for each of the
four systems.
4.4.2 Study Materials
Figure 29 illustrates the custom built FTIR [57] tabletop system, the dimensions were
49x95x105cm. The figure also illustrates a typical user study context including one
instance of the free choice of positioning given to inputter and observers. Each system
was instrumented to record the duration of a login (from the first touch to the last
touch), and the accuracy of the input.
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Figure 30: Percentage of observers able to replicate the inputters credentials (by
authentication method).
4.4.3 Results
4.4.3.1 Observation Resistance
The key results regarding observation resistance are summarised in Figure 30. Out
of the 14 observers, 10 of the 14 (71%) were able to login using an observed PIN.
The PIN was considerably more vulnerable to observation than the remaining three
systems, confirming our earlier assumption that this mechanism in its traditional
form is not appropriate for authentication in public contexts. Faces was considerably
more resistant to observation attack with only 3 observers (21%) able to perform
a successful login. This could be due to the difficulty of forming fast and effective
memory associations with faces, combined with the face locations being shuffled at
each attempt (though our methodology does not illustrate which aspect is the most
significant). PressurePIN was successfully compromised by 2 observers (14%), which
is a significant improvement over a PIN in its traditional form. PressureFaces was
not successfully compromised by any observer. This led us to analyse the extent to
which components of authentication sequences were recalled (i.e. how many of the 4
faces, or 4 digits, each observer correctly identified). Table 13 shows the accuracy of
participants on a per-system basis. Although observers were able to select one correct
component of a PressureFaces sequence in 40% of attempts, this success rate appears
similar to the probability of making random guesses on every grid and successfully
guessing one correct component overall (4
9
= 44.4%), particularly given that all ob-
servers claimed to have no knowledge of face components when questioned after the
study.
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System Components Guessed
Logins 0 1 2 3 All
PIN 22 14% 18% 14% 9% 45%
Faces 36 25% 19% 36% 11% 8%
Pressure PIN 38 42% 32% 18% 3% 5%
Pressure Faces 42 57% 40% 2% 0% 0%
Table 13: Rounded percentage of logins where participants guessed a particular num-
ber of authentication components (138 attempts collected across all systems).
Figure 31: The distribution of successful login durations recorded for each system.
4.4.3.2 Login Durations
In addition to observer success rates, we recorded the login durations for the desig-
nated inputters, this would help us determine the impact of the Pressure Grid upon
usability. We did not analyse timings for observers as we specified that their concern
was to observe and repeat the captured credentials. The mean login time for PIN was
0.79 seconds, and 3.71 seconds with PressurePIN. The mean login duration of a Faces
login was 6.3 seconds compared to 10.8 seconds using the PressureFaces. In both cases
the impact of the Pressure Grid upon was approximately 3 seconds. These login times
were subject to a 2 (PIN vs. Faces) x 2 (pressure grid vs. no pressure grid) analysis of
variance using SPSS that demonstrated significant main effects on both factors, with
PIN logins proving faster than faces (F (1, 20) = 61.89, p < 0.001), and pressure sys-
tems proving slower than no-pressure systems (F (1, 20) = 234.51, p < 0.001). There
was no significant interaction between conditions. The distribution of login times for
each of the four conditions is illustrated in Figure 31.
88
Question Mean σ
How confident are you PIN is safe from Observation Attack? 1.9 (1.2)
How confident are you Faces a is safe from Observation Attack? 3.5 (1.3)
How confident are you PressurePIN is safe from Observation Attack? 3.1 (1.2)
How confident are you PressureFaces is safe from Observation Attack? 4.7 (0.6)
Table 14: Perceptions of PIN, Faces and Pressure Grid on a 1-5 likert scale where 1
is not very confident and 5 is very confident.
4.4.3.3 Questionnaire
After the experiment we asked participants to complete a short questionnaire to elicit
opinions on each of the systems and the problem domain. Overall participants were
experienced with multi-touch interfaces with 66% having previously used one; 72%
were concerned about the ease of observing passwords and PINs entry in everyday
life, and 50% of participants reported no confidence in the privacy of their PIN when
entered in public environments. Participants were also asked a number of questions to
rate on a 5 point Likert Scale regarding their confidence in the observation resistance
provided by each mechanism, where 1 indicates no confidence and 5 is very confident.
Table 14 illustrates the results. A Mann-Whitney U test reveals that participants
believed the Faces system to be significantly more resistant to observation attacks
than PIN (U = 62, p < 0.01). In addition participants felt that PressureFaces was
more resistant to observation than PressurePIN (U = 30, p < 0.01). When asked
about any fatigue induced to the hands or fingers by Pressure Grid (1 is no fatigue,
5 is high fatigue) participants on average rated this at 1.88 (σ = 0.9); when asked to
rate the usability of the Pressure Grid (1 is not usable, 5 is very usable) the mean
participant response was 3.8 (σ = 0.9).
4.5 Discussion
The user study results confirmed our hypothesis that the Pressure Grid would be a
significant defence against observation attack for PIN and graphical password systems
on multi-touch interfaces. We were surprised that four participants were unable to
login using a captured PIN; reasons for this are a mix of the difficulty to control
the manner in which the PIN was entered by the inputter (instructions were not to
shield the input), and over-confidence from observers that the PIN had been captured
on the first attempt. Another surprising occurrence was that observers were able to
compromise PressurePIN. These observers commented that their strategy was to use
knowledge of the system workings to focus attention on one hand per observation,
and use the third observation to validate the information obtained.
The use of the Pressure Grid added approximately three seconds to the average
login duration of both PIN and Faces (see Figure 32). In our study, we noted that
our Faces graphical password system was significantly more resistant to observation
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Figure 32: The impact of the Pressure Grid on the login durations of participants
using Faces and PIN.
attack than PIN, as without the Pressure Grid 50% more participants were able to
successfully observe and re-enter a PIN over the Faces system. This is also despite
the lower entropy of Faces vs. PIN. A number of explanations are possible, firstly the
change in positioning of faces at each login could have made the task of observation
more difficult than it was for PIN. Also human face recognition has the interesting
property that it is heavily orientation dependent [119] which could have complicated
the task for an observer not in an optimal position behind the inputter. Tari et
al. [128] also discovered that alphanumeric passwords (not comprising meaningful
words) were more vulnerable to observation than a sequence of 5 Passfaces selected
with mouse input although the difference was not large. More research with greater
numbers of participants is required to firstly prove or disprove this effect, and also
determine whether any observation attack resistance is unique to faces, or extends to
other images too.
4.6 Study Limitations
The focus of the user study was the observability of the entered credentials, and the
usability of the Pressure Grid. The participants were aware of the artificial scenario of
being observed while authenticating to our systems, and it is a risk that the ecological
validity could be questioned due to the fact that etiquette and typical user behaviour
around tabletop interfaces is not yet widely established. Our goal was to test the
memory retention of images by attackers given similar conditions to our user study
participants. It is possible that more accurate results could be obtained if users did
not know they were being observed, although this is likely to be a difficult user study
to design.
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4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we explored the approach of securing recognition-based graphical pass-
words and PIN for observation attack by harnessing the interaction affordances of
multi-touch technology. We firstly enumerated the methods available to designers
who may seek to defeat observation attack. Designers can restrict visibility, subdi-
vide action, dissipate attention or transform knowledge.
In an empirical study we evaluated the Pressure Grid, a novel interaction tech-
nique that relies upon the particular interaction affordances of FTIR [57] multi-touch
technology. We discovered that the Pressure Grid significantly improved the resis-
tance of the authentication credentials to observation attack, and only increased the
interaction time for PIN and our variant of a Passfaces graphical password by approx-
imately 3 seconds. The results showed that participants observing the Pressure Grid
in combination with graphical passwords could not compromise a single login, indeed,
the closest any participant came to achieving this across all groups was guessing two
of the four components of the credential; conversation with participants after each
group suggested any correct entries were guesses. This resistance was likely due to
both the image stimulus and the fact that objects in the grid did not occupy a static
position between logins.
A number of broad design guidelines can be suggested to assist in the defence
against observation attacks against recognition-based graphical passwords: do not
rely upon an active user : defence should not depend upon a user volunteering to
perform an action pertaining to security, such sentiments are echoed by De Luca [29];
exploit the interaction affordances of specific technologies : security should exploit the
technology upon which it is deployed, this can enable security to better fit the context
in which it is deployed; consider the social context interactions should not require
that a user breaks social conventions to behave securely, as users will work around
any interactions that do not comply or will take steps to avoid the system completely.
The approach taken in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 has been to scaffold desirable
security behaviours based upon the design of new interactions built on top of ex-
isting graphical password schemes. This has produced promising results, however
based upon previous experience with alphanumeric passwords is more likely that in
practice less invasive system configuration changes involving the strategic selection
of images could also be applied to achieve similar results. In the following Chapter
we again consider the threat of observation attack but consider how defences could
be instead be implemented based upon strategic presentation of the login images,
and not through such a design approach that makes specific assumptions about the
deployment environment or technology.
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Chapter 5
Observation Resistant Graphical
Passwords through Image
Portfolios
In Chapters 3 and 4 we demonstrated that redesign of the user interface and inter-
action with existing graphical password schemes could provide scaffolding for secure
user behaviours. This approach considered interventions at the interface level and ex-
ploiting the interaction affordances of multi-touch technology. One limitation of such
an approach is that it is quite invasive from a system perspective, as flexibility may
not exist in the environment to constantly adapt to novel technologies and redesign
the interface. For these very cases it is important to explore how users can be shaped
in a less invasive, and more spontaneous manner by parameterising aspects of the
system. In the context of recognition-based graphical passwords, one underexplored
system feature that can likely be manipulated to shape user behaviours in this way
is the manipulation of the frequency of presentation or visual content of the images
presented to users; it is possible that techniques in this domain could provide scaf-
folding to both positive and negative behaviours which makes it important to explore
the space of possible interventions and their effects.
To provide resistance to observation attack within the aforementioned constraints
of preserving the simplicity of the user-facing features of the system and ensuring
minimal impact on surrounding infrastructure, De Angeli et al. [28] proposed the
key image portfolio, which means that a user would be assigned a set of key images
but would only be challenged to identify (and thereby expose) a random subset of
that portfolio at each login. This potentially presents benefits for observation attack
as every login challenge is likely to be visually diverse, however, this approach is
undermined by a vulnerability to intersection attack [31] because in its proposed
form introduces specific patterns in the frequency that key images appear in a login
challenge; these patterns can be monitored over time to enable an attacker to discover
the key images.
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In this chapter we secure the portfolio key image mode for intersection attack, the
resulting system serves to complicate observation attack without the need for users
to take part in specifically designed protocols, by creating visual variation in each
encountered login in terms of the key and decoy images presented. We evaluate the
impact of the resulting system upon usability, grounded in the context of mobile de-
vices to provide a further case study to explore the impact of ubiquitous computing
technologies [140] upon the design of security; recent estimates have suggested that
in 2012 there will be more data enabled mobile devices than people on the planet [21]
which provides critique for the keyboard and mouse assumptions for user authentica-
tion. Indeed, the increasing significance of devices for everyday email and banking has
made them an indispensable technology for many. We evaluate resistance to obser-
vation attack using methodology similar to that used in Section 4.4.1, and carry out
a field study where participants used our proposed mechanism on their own personal
devices.
5.1 Threat Model
The observation attack threat on mobile devices consists of attacks from an observers
collocated with the legitimate user during the authentication challenge; attackers
could be individuals known to the user, such as friends, colleagues, and even children.
This is due to the user being less likely to suspect malicious (malicious could mean
even gaining playful unauthorised access to the device) intentions from those individ-
uals in close proximity; we call this a friend attack. Social pressures can prevent users
from practicing security conscious behaviour in the presence of known individuals;
indeed, the security of an authentication system rests not only upon reliable technol-
ogy and robust security protocols, but also upon acceptability of the required security
behaviours in the social context. Insecure behaviour has been noted as a response to
such social pressures [109]. Impersonal attackers could also attempt an observation
attack to precede a device theft, although this may alert the user due to the need to
be relatively close to see the small display; official UK Home Office statistics report
that 700,000 devices were stolen throughout the UK in 2001 [58].
Different from the tabletop context, the mobile device is assumed to always be
with the user who must regulalrly authenticate to their device in public to access the
device features, giving our proposed attackers many more opportunities to view an
authentication session; therefore in an image-based authentication context on mobile
devices it should be assumed that observation attack is a core attack. We assume
attackers must retain any sensitive information in short-term memory, although the
complication of camera-based attacks is a desirable feature; an attacker who records
every authentication session has the best chance to comprise a system and this is
difficult to defeat without one-time credential entry. A lunchtime attack is where an
attacker tries to compromise the device protection over time while the legitimate user
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is briefly parted from their device; each time the attacker has the intention not to leave
a trace to ensure that future surreptitious access to the device will not be hindered,
by for example never triggering PIN lockout. There are two classes of lunchtime
attacker: firstly a naive attacker who can only make random guesses (most likely to
be an impersonal attacker), and secondly a knowledgeable attacker who by means of
observation attack, or another eavesdropping technique, has gained some knowledge
that will assist in the login procedure; we propose that the latter is most likely to be
a friend attack.
5.2 Intersection Attack vs. Observation Attack
Currently with recognition-based graphical passwords there exists a trade-off between
defence against observation attack, and the possibility of intersection attack. Intersec-
tion attack can be first seen as a threat in the VIP3 [28] system; the user is assigned
a set of key images (called a key image portfolio), and is challenged to recognise a
random subset of those images at each login. The desired effect is that the variation
in the key images between logins can hinder a replay attack after an observation at-
tack. Intersection attacks can occur because in the VIP3 system the decoy images
presented are fixed between logins, but each key image has probability of 1
2
to appear.
The attacker can know that the images that change between authentication sessions
are key images. Current wisdom to approaching this trade-off is to sacrifice the goal
of observation resistance and ensure every login challenge is identical [31, 59].
We propose a simple yet novel approach that allows the presentation of different
images per login and is resistant to intersection attack. In addition to a key image
portfolio we introduce a decoy image portfolio. If there will be variation in the key
images presented across login challenges, there should be exactly the same variation
in the presentation of decoy images so that patterns in frequency do not emerge. To
achieve this, key and decoy images should both be randomly selected from larger,
fixed sized portfolios where the same ratio exists between images randomly selected
to appear at login and the size of the portfolio. In other words, if kl and dl refer to
the number of keys and decoys displayed at any given login challenge respectively,
and k and d refer to the total number of key and decoy images being assigned to a
user, then the ratios should be chosen as in Equation 3:
kl
k
=
dl
d
(3)
In practice a system administrator would initially choose values for k; kl; dl,
then calculate d = dl
k
kl
. Calculation of the minimum number of images required to
bootstrap a system for the given parameters is given by d + k.
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5.3 Simulated Observation Attacks
The observation attack resistance offered by our proposed approach does not render
systems immune to attack, however increase the difficulty and time required to capture
sufficient information to gain an unauthorised login. In order to quantify the benefit
of image portfolios approach we created a simulation of an attack that incorporated
appropriate behaviour of a user, an attacker and the image portfolios, where kl = 4;
dl = 32. The value of k was an independent variable and d was adjusted accordingly
to preserve the correct ratios. The intention was to explore the capabilities of an
attacker having differing memory accuracies, against increasing size of the image
portfolios, where the attacker is attempting to observe and reuse key images. The
model encompassed the following behaviour:
1. A login challenge is presented, the attacker observes user entry of each key image
and given a fixed probability p (a parameter to our model) remembers it.
2. The attacker is presented with a new login challenge and has one attempt to
authenticate. If the attacker can identify 4 images previously observed being
selected, the attack is successful, otherwise unsuccessful.
3. Stages 1 & 2 repeat, with the knowledge of the attacker increasing each time
until an attack is successful.
Figure 33 illustrates the mean number of observations required for an attacker to
obtain: i) a single login ii) all key images which would guarantee unimpeded future
access to the system. Intuitively the number of required observed logins increases with
the size of the key image portfolio, and the decreasing accuracy of observer memory.
Considering the most likely case where the goal of the attacker is to achieve a single
login, a camera equipped attacker on average requires less than five observations
(100% memory accuracy), and needs more than 10 only when the size of the key
image portfolio is increased to 14. In practice, increasing the size of the key image
portfolio to this level is likely to be detrimental to usability; even where the attacker
has only a 50% chance to remember observed images the key image portfolio would
need to be of size 10 to force more than five observations.
Another case may arise where an attacker would like to obtain the entire key
image portfolio; the effect of inaccurate memory has a greater impact in this scenario,
particularly for the larger key image portfolios. This is intuitive as if an attacker
misses one image, the random nature of the images selected to appear at login means
that the missed image may not reappear for some time. The previous model assumes
that an attacker is only observing the key images, however it is clear that in viewing a
successful login, an attacker with the means for perfect recall (e.g. camera equipped)
can also learn from the images the user does not select. In this new scenario, the
functionality of the previous model is preserved but the attacker records all images
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Figure 33: Top: mean number of observations required by an attacker to learn a
sufficient number of key images to gain a single successful login; (bottom): mean
number of observations required by an attacker to learn the entire key image portfolio,
useful for unrestricted future access. Both represent averages of 10,000 simulated
sessions.
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and selections (where kl = 4; k = 6; d = 48; dl = 32). The goal of the attacker is
to obtain sufficient knowledge to perform a single successful login. There are three
desirable scenarios for the attacker: 1) the attacker can identify all key images in the
login challenge; 2) the attacker can identify all decoy images in the login challenge; 3)
The attacker knows the key/decoy role of every image in the login challenge. Figure
34 is a Pareto chart that illustrates the means by which an attacker with means for
perfect recall can obtain a successful login. On average 84% of attacks are successful
due to the attacker concentrating purely on key images presented in the challenge
set. In 12%of cases the attacker knows the role of all images in the challenge set,
and in only 4% of cases the attacker can identify all decoys in the challenge set (and
so derive the keys). It is interesting to note that scenario three is more likely than
scenario two. Since the likelihood of scenario three is intertwined with the likelihood
of scenario one (which is high), scenario two is least likely since this involves knowing
the decoy images and not the key images.
Figure 34: Pareto chart that illustrates the outcomes of 10,000 simulated observa-
tion attacks and the likelihood of various contexts that provide an attacker with a
successful login.
5.4 Implementation
We developed two implementations to operationalise our analysis, with the ethos that
what works in theoretical analysis and in practice can often be disappointingly dif-
ferent. We developed two systems, one with high entropy and one of low entropy
(see Figure 35); this was to reflect that recognition-based mechanisms within certain
bounds of complexity are flexible as to the entropy they can be configured to usably
provide; both make use of the image portfolios discussed previously, and have the
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capability to be bootstrapped using images taken directly using the camera function-
ality of device. A high level overview of the user experience is as follows: firstly the
user provides images to a client application that resizes the images and initiates the
image filtering process; the resulting set of images is then transferred to the device,
from which image portfolios are populated randomly. We decided to ask users of both
systems to 4 random key images (kl) from the key portfolio of 6 (k). This number
was informed by intuitive usability concerns of asking the user to retain more than
this number. At each login the selected images from each portfolio are shuffled to-
gether and displayed across the chosen number of screens; details of each system are
described in the following sections.
5.4.1 High Entropy Graphical Passwords
The high entropy system is the most resistant recognition-based mechanism to brute
force attack we have seen on mobile devices; and provides six-times more entropy than
a randomly generated PIN, as the probability of a random guess is 1
(364 )
. The user
interface is visually similar to those seen in previous research [125, 59], where images
are presented in a 3x3 grid; research has favoured this design due to an intuitive
keypad mapping available between the onscreen images and the numeric keys on a
device keypad. The disadvantage of this configuration is that images are displayed
small in size which can cause problems for users with imperfect vision. In this system
36 images are displayed across 4 screens in the 3x3 grid; the enforced ratios with
respect to the image portfolios are kl:k = 6:4 and dl:d = 48:32 indicating a user must
provide at least 54 images to bootstrap the system.
5.4.2 Low Entropy Graphical Passwords
The low entropy implementation adopts a new user interface convention for this genre
of system on mobile devices; images appear larger, and 24 are spread across 6 screens
in a 2x2 grid. The intention was this system would be designed to offer entropy
comparable to a randomly generated PIN; the probability of a random guess is 1
(244 )
. It
could be argued that low screen resolutions seen in many current devices is a transient
problem, however designs to accommodate this scenario in the immediate term have
implications for usability and accessibility, as users are better able to identify images
on-screen. In this configuration the chosen image portfolio ratios are kl:k = 6:4 and
dl:d = 30:20 indicating in total a user requires 36 images to bootstrap the mechanism.
5.5 User Study
Previous work published in the usable security community has suggested laboratory
studies can offer misleading results of password recall when compared to field studies
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Figure 35: Screenshots of the high entropy and low entropy systems. In the high
entropy system, images were displayed in a 3x3 grid, and in the low entropy version
displayed in a 2x2 grid.
[14]. In the years preceding this work in the wider HCI literature, arguments over the
validity of results obtained in these two configurations have long existed; this debate
is particularly strong in the field of Mobile HCI due to the recognition that mobile
devices are typically used in more dynamic contexts than desktop computers, and so
should not be evaluated in the same environment. Nielsen et al. [91] argues that field
studies are most effective in uncovering issues of cognitive load and interaction style.
Rogers et al. [103] comment that field studies are good at demonstrating how people
appropriate technologies in their intended setting, but are expensive and difficult to
conduct.
Of course there are arguments that dispute this added value, Kjeldskov et al. [73]
comment that field studies are not worth the added value and a good lab study uncov-
ers just as many usability issues. To date, controlled laboratory studies have yielded
high success rates in all instances for recognition-based systems; due to only subtle
design differences with these systems, we had no reason to believe our mechanisms
would perform differently in such a context. This motivated us to shift our attention
away from a controlled lab study, to a more pressing issue of how the high entropy
and low entropy systems might perform in everyday use on the personal device of
each participant. Our research questions concerned the level of user performance that
could be expected from such systems in everyday life; how human performance in
an observation attack would compare to our modelling of an attack; and finally how
users would appropriate the mechanisms into daily life.
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5.5.1 Method
We chose a between-subjects study design and recruited 17 participants within the
Nokia Research Centre through internal mailing lists, with the incentive of free cinema
tickets; in the early phases of the study this was reduced to 16 as the device of
one participant failed and participation could not continue. We split participants
randomly between the two systems, this meant 8 using the low entropy system and 8
using the high entropy version. All participants were smartphone users for regularly
accessing work email and other web-based services, which we believe placed them
within a key target group given our perceptions of who might need enhanced user
authentication on mobile devices.
Of the 16 participants, 10 were male and six female, 12 in the range 18-28 and
four in the 29-39 range and nobody older than 39. Education levels were high with
six to BSc level, nine to MSc and one to PhD level. The mobile devices owned by
participants were all Symbian S60 devices, with 11 owning the Nokia N95, others
included the Nokia E61 and E65; screen resolutions of devices were 320x240 (E61)
and 240x320 (N95 and E65). To initiate the study, participants visited the research
lab with a portfolio of approximately 80 images either already on their personal device
or on removable storage. The assigned mechanism was installed on the personal device
of each participant and the resized, filtered images 1 are imported automatically. For
the enrolment period the system assigned key images to the user and asked them to
achieve 3 consecutive correct logins in the presence of the moderator. The mechanism
was not actively securing the device, but was an application that allowed the user
to test retention of key images throughout the study, away from study facilitators.
Performance data such as success/failure of the login, time/date of the login and login
duration were logged automatically, and upon entry of a secret key combination could
be output to a file.
The study design was similar to that of Everitt et al. [42] where participants would
be sent emails when it was desired they should perform a login; this configuration had
the potential to be effective since all participants read emails on their device, the same
location on which the mechanism would be installed. For the first week, participants
would be asked to login twice per working day; for the second week, participants were
asked to login twice per day, every two days. We hoped to gauge the effect of reduced
usage on success rates after an intensive first week of usage.
On days when a login was required, we sent participants an email reminder at
10am and 3pm; upon receiving the email the participant would be required to open
the application and attempt to authenticate successfully. Upon success, the program
disappeared into the background, but if a participant could not login after three
attempts they would be locked out, and offered a logged reminder of their key images
so they could continue with the study. At the end of the study, the participants
1More details are given of our image similarity filtering procedure in our publication at SOUPS
2010 [37]
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visited the lab so that the log file could be extracted.
5.5.2 Study Materials
Each authentication mechanism was developed as a Java Midlet and contained logging
functionality that would record the time of day, the content of logins and the success
or failure of each attempt. An example entry from an extracted log file (with added
formatting) can be seen in Figure 36. From these entries we were able to analyse
statistics of user performance across the period of the study.
Figure 36: Example log entry for a single authentication attempt. The sequence of
numbers refers uniquely to images presented at login.
An example log file from the two week study and observation attack study can be
found in Appendix C.
5.5.3 Results
5.5.3.1 Success Rates
We define the success rate as ( successful logins
number of logins
) and calculated this across all logins for
each system. We collected 319 logins across two working weeks: 178 from users of the
low entropy system and 141 from users of the high entropy version. Of the 319 logins,
30 occurred at the weekend outside of the requested time period, however we included
these in our analysis and added data to week one. As the number of logins was not
strictly controlled, on average participants in the high entropy group logged in 17.6
times (σ = 7.9), compared to 22.3 (σ = 5.9) in the low entropy group. Participants
were accurate in authentication trials, as only two lockouts were experienced, both
from the high entropy group both from the same person in the week of reduced
usage. Tables 15 and Table 16 break down the performance into each week of the
study, and Figure 37 illustrates the daily fluctuations in success rates across the study.
Across both systems, performance remained stable between week one and week
two, with 77% in week 1 and 78% in week two. Analysing success rates per system,
this was 77% for both systems. From week one to week two the success rate of low
entropy users increased from 70% to 89% and was statistically significant (Mann-
Whitney U = 3, p < 0.05) however the decreased performance in the high entropy
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System Attempts Success Rate Lockouts
High Entropy 85 84% 0
Low Entropy 123 70% 0
Table 15: Success rates and attempts recorded for each mechanism during week one
where participants were requested to login twice per working day.
System Attempts Success Rate Lockouts
High Entropy 56 67% 2
Low Entropy 55 89% 0
Table 16: Success rates and attempts recorded for each mechanism during week two,
where participants were requested to login twice, every two days.
Figure 37: Success rates per day per system; participants were reminded to use the
system less frequently during the second week and this affected success rates in the
high entropy group.
system, from 84% to 67%, was not significant. The performance difference between
the two systems in week two was significant (Mann-Whitney U=3, p < 0.05). To
understand the success rates in more detail we classified logins using a convention
similar to that used by Renaud and Olsen [102] (high entropy- low entropy):
• A single successful attempt not preceded by an erroneous attempt (90- 107).
• 1-2 failed attempts followed by a successful attempt (18-29).
• A failed attempt not followed by a new attempt within 30mins (6-3).
We were also able to consider how success might be affected by the time of day
participants carried out their authentication attempts. Across both systems, 145
logins were recorded in the morning (AM), and 174 in the afternoon (PM). This
analysis contained no significant differences, nevertheless considering AM logins the
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success rate was 78%, and for PM logins this was 76%. Users of the high entropy
system experienced degradation in performance from AM to PM. In the mornings the
success rate was 83% and in the afternoons this fell to 69%. Users of the low entropy
system showed a more consistent performance with an mean AM success rate of 73%,
and this increased to 75% for PM.
5.5.4 Login Durations
As well as the accuracy of user recall performance, login durations were recorded
(see Figure 38). Login durations were recorded from the user first seeing the login
challenge until the final key press; the following discussion refers to successful login
durations. The mean login duration across both groups was 19.8 seconds (σ = 3.8).
Considering the high entropy group alone this was 19 seconds (σ = 4.7) compared to a
mean of 21 seconds (σ = 4.9) using low entropy; in a two-sample t-test this difference
was not significant (p = 0.366).
Considering the change in login duration for each week of the study however was
most interesting; in the case of both systems, login durations became faster. In the
first week the mean high entropy login lasted 22 seconds (σ = 4.9), in the second week
this fell to 15 seconds (σ = 3.6). This was significant in a two-sample t-test (t(30) =
4.09, p < 0.01). A similar effect was noted for users of the low entropy system, in the
first week the mean login duration was 23 seconds (σ = 4.7) and in the second week
this fell to 17 seconds (σ = 2.7). Again this was significant in a two-sample t-test
(t(30)=2.84, p < 0.05). While in the second week there was less data, both changes
were significant. Users of both systems experienced a similar level of improvement in
terms of login durations. However comparing systems on a week by week basis did
not produce significant results. The fastest instance of a correct login was 9 seconds,
with the slowest being 76 seconds; it is likely that the user generating the latter was
multitasking at the same time as performing the login.
5.6 Observation Attack User Study
This study was designed to complement the formal analysis of observation attack
conducted earlier in Section 5.3 to explore the number of observations required for a
human attacker to compromise each implementation in the context of a friend attack.
This phase took place one week into the data collection study, where participants
attended with others who had been using the same system. A benefit of conducting
the study at this point was that participants had already gained one week of expe-
rience with their assigned system and so its functionality had become habitual; we
believe this equipped participants sufficiently to launch their own observation attacks.
Participants were randomly paired and randomly assigned roles as either an attacker
or a victim as seen in a similar study [128]. The scenario offered to participants was
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Figure 38: The distributions of login durations recorded across both conditions across
the user study.
the following:
You and your assigned partner are friends, the victim has just called over
the attacker over to show a new application on their device. However while
both of you are looking at the screen, the device asks the victim to login
to continue. The victim does not know their friend is untrustworthy, and
is actively trying to learn their key images. So the victim continues to
login...
The victim was asked to login to their own personal device, holding it in a way
that was not sharing the screen with the attacker unrealistically (see Figure 39 for
the context). After viewing a login the attacker had a decision to make: the attacker
has learned sufficient information to attempt to login, and was given a maximum
of 3 attempts to reflect a ”three strikes” policy or the attacker asks the victim to
perform another login. This occurred a maximum of 10 times. After this phase the
participants switched roles and repeated the procedure where the new victim used
their own personal device to repeat the process.
5.6.1 Results
The mean number of observations required for observers to login was 7.5 (σ = 1.8)
against the high entropy system compared to 4.5 (σ = 0.6) against the low entropy
version. A Mann-Whitney test shows this to be a significant difference (U = 0,
p < 0.05). Referring back to the simulations presented in Figure 33, high entropy
participants performed as well as attackers with 30% memory accuracy (not detailed
on the graph), whilst low entropy participants were approximately 50% accurate. This
difference is reasonable since the shoulder surfing task for high entropy participants
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Figure 39: The context of the observation attack component of our user study, par-
ticipants could sit or stand.
was more difficult, more images were displayed and of a lower quality. There were
4 instances where participants were unable to login as an attacker, three using high
entropy and one using low entropy. The mean login durations of legitimate users was
16 seconds (σ = 9) and 23 seconds (σ = 24) for an attacker (U = 469, p < 0.01).
We calculated this using knowledge of the time and date of this study in the system
log. Figure 40 illustrates the difference in the distribution of login durations between
legitimate users and observers. There is a clear difference between the login durations
of legitimate users and observers. During the study we did observe that the key image
portfolio did provide some temporary resistance to an impostor login. In the context
of a lunchtime attack this temporary delay could resist attack for a significant period
of time depending on the access gained to the device by an attacker.
5.6.2 Questionnaire
After the study we distributed simple questionnaires and had informal discussions
with all participants to elicit opinions of the mechanisms and some security practices
in general. The small sample size prevented us from gaining meaningful statistical
consensus however we still interested to capture user experiences across the study. We
hoped that after using the mechanisms on their own devices intensively for two weeks
they would have stronger and more interesting comments than if we had performed
a short lab study. A selection of questions and comments are presented in Table 17.
When participants were asked if they normally used PINs on their mobile devices,
57% responded yes and 43% no. When asking those who responded negatively if there
were items on their device they would consider to be private, everybody responded
that there were. This suggests that those users attribute security to their assumption
that they will not be separated from their device. Ratings of the time required
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Figure 40: Histograms of the login durations collected from legitimate users and
those posing as observers. There is a clear difference between the login durations of
legitimate users and imposter users. This could be used to inform design of a login
timeout.
Question Yes No
Do you normally use a PIN on your device? 57% 43%
Were the login durations of the system acceptable 64% 36%
Did using the mechanism feel secure? 21% 79%
Table 17: Questionnaire results at the end of the two week study.
to login are important as the most crucial driver to user acceptance is often the
convenience of use. A disadvantage of graphical password schemes more generally
is that it typically takes much longer to authenticate than PIN, due to the visual
search required. 64% of users said the time required to login was acceptable, while
the remaining 36% thought the time cost was unacceptable. Providing the users
with a feeling of security is something that the mechanisms both lacked. 79% of
Participants indicated they felt more secure using PINs but could not come up with
concrete reasons why. This is possibly because of the transparency of the mechanisms
and their game-like nature. Some interesting and recurring comments received in a
free-text section of the questionnaire were the following:
”I would prefer to choose my own images”
”When I was walking around I had to concentrate much more than when
using a normal PIN, for that I dont need to see the keypad”
”During one login a particularly funny image appeared so I showed it to
my colleague”
”Its much harder to crack numbers than images isnt it?”
The majority of users expressed a desire to choose their own key image portfo-
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lio. Although, It is common knowledge that users are likely to choose authentication
credentials in predictable ways [74]; this trend has been noted in graphical password
studies too [27, 33, 132]. Where the distribution of credential is anything but uniform,
an attacker can prioritise a guessing attack by any known biases. One feasible con-
cession to this rule could be the system choosing a random subset of images slightly
larger than the number of required key images and allow user selection from within
this set.
A number of users lamented that the mechanisms demanded their visual attention
for use; with PINs they made it clear they were able to enter numeric digits without
viewing the screen (due to the tactile nature of the keypad) and multi-task more
effectively. A number of users commented how they treated the logins as an enjoyable
means to view the images on their device, one in particular commented how they would
show particularly amusing images that appeared to work colleagues; this hints that our
hypothesis of a friend attack is potentially realistic. The final comment could provide
an insight into why many users felt the mechanisms were less secure than PIN. The
user has an incorrect mental map of what makes credentials crackable and perceives
the game-like nature of the mechanism to be a reflection of its seriousness regarding
security. In addition, all their previous experience with mobile device authentication
had been with PINs, which likely also greatly informs their preference. A similar effect
was noted in a user evaluation of device pairing methods [135] where users associate
more difficult with more secure.
5.7 Discussion
During the field study we collected more login attempts than we anticipated; with
hindsight this this was inevitable given the novelty of the mechanisms and our decision
not to limit the number of logins collected per day. Although this occurrence resulted
in an interesting dataset where participants would sporadically use the authentication
system we provided, and the overall shape of the data was as we hoped, one week
of intensive image followed by a week of reduced usage. The maximum number of
logins recorded from a particular person, on a particular day was six. Accuracy
was similar across both mechanisms, in addition to the success rates, 60% of logins
from the low entropy group could be categorised as correct first time compared to
63% of logins on the high entropy system. All the user accuracy data indicates that
one intuitive hypothesis that participants of the high entropy system would have a
reduced performance over those performing the low entropy task does not appear to
be valid. After considering that this could be an anomaly attributed to the amount of
data collected, another possibility is that in a visual search task, practice can flatten
out the difficulty of the task. This could suggest that once participants have gained
enough practice with the mechanism, performance is not predicted by system entropy.
The results of the observation attack study show both mechanisms to be vulnerable
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to observation attack to some extent. Impostors observed on average 7.5 logins using
the high entropy version before being able to login, whereas using the low entropy
version this was an average of 4.5 logins. While the scenario did not take into account
the likely time gap between a lunchtime attacker observing a challenge and having the
opportunity to login, the results at least suggest a lower bound to attackers purely
using human memory to record images.
In designing and carrying out the field study a number of methodological insights
were gained that are relevant to others considering similar studies. Firstly participants
expressed apprehension towards full deployment on personal devices; our participants
were active smartphone users and busy members of an organisation, and due to the
increasing importance of mobile devices they were concerned that unexpected software
problems could block them from working. Secondly recruitment is based on specic
criteria, participants should own devices on the targeted platform (or devices should
be provided). This can reduce the size of the participant pool considerably. Using
multi-platform programming languages such as Java can help, although ability to
make low-level system calls is reduced. Finally, the devices on a particular platform
can be diverse; one platform can contain different devices that can provide different
user experiences e.g. screen resolutions and keypads. This hints at the difficulty of
studying security mechanisms on emerging ubiquitous computing platforms.
5.8 Study Limitations
The two week duration of the study was relatively short, however was chosen as we
hoped to capture the particularly stressful time of learning and using new credentials;
this proved to be a sufficient timescale to provide a glimpse of how users would
appropriate the systems into their daily routines, and enable us to provoke some strong
opinions. Also the mechanism was not actively securing the device and users had to
remember to open our application in order to authenticate which is slightly different to
a classic user authentication scenario. However , this enabled us to obtain a glimpse
of usability away from a laboratory environment. The success rates we report are
likely to be under-estimates to what may be obtained in a laboratory study as using
the mechanism was likely not the primary task for participants. Also with hindsight
we would have limited the number of login attempts that a participant could make on
the device per day, although the data we collected provided and interesting dataset
where different participants had different habits for using their assigned authentication
mechanism.
The observation attack study attempted to recreate an observation attack sce-
nario, and we must consider the ecological validity of this method. This is a difficult
phenomenon to recreate in an artificial setting, as typically a victim is unaware of
an attack taking place. However, our setup potentially fits well to our friend attack
threat model as the victim would know they were under observation. An alternative
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approach to recreating such a scenario could involve observers viewing a video.
5.9 Conclusion
In this chapter we have identified an intuitive recognition-based graphical password
protocol based upon the strategic presentation of images that provides a layer of
observation resistance, is not vulnerable to intersection attack, and does not force
excessive levels of indirection into the user interaction. To evaluate the usability of
this approach in an everyday context we installed mechanisms on the personal mobile
devices of participants, bootstrapped it using personal photographs, and asked them
to use it daily. User performance was good irrespective of the mechanism as the
success rate was 77% for each system. The success rates reported are similar to those
reported in a field study of Passpoints [14] where success rates ranged from 78%-83%;
other field studies that provide means of comparison include Passfaces (95%) and
Dynahand (97.4%) [102]. While this may seem like a large difference, the low entropy
system exhibited higher entropy than each of the aforementioned systems (excluding
Passpoints), and it is likely that a longer study would have allowed any performance
extremes to stabilise.
In a study that explored the observation attack capabilities of user study partici-
pants, we intuitively discovered that users of the high entropy system where images
were smaller and of reduced quality needed a mean of 7.5 observations to obtain a
successful login compared to 4.5 logins where participants attacked the low entropy
system where images were displayed larger and in higher quality. In the worst case
88% of participants attacking the low entropy system were able to successfully login
by capturing graphical password credentials. The analysis of the observation attack
threat suggests new defence methods: analysis of login durations : if an authentication
system requires a visual search, or cognitive processing of the login challenge legiti-
mate users are likely to be more skilled and thus faster than attackers; also it appears
important to treat aborted logins as failed logins : simply viewing the images present
in an authentication challenge can enable an observer to train to recognise particular
images during an attack.
The strategic use of the image portfolios to provide observation attack resistance
can be readily used by system administrators to provide some deterrent to observa-
tion attack. However, these image portfolios do not appear to be a scalable method
to achieve observation resistant graphical passwords as while increasing their size in-
creases difficulty for an attacker, difficulty is perhaps increased most significantly for
the user. Also, the randomness at which key images are presented could mean that
some images rarely appear and such rare appearances would likely cause login errors.
This could indicate the need to develop functionality for secure reminders, or that a
focus upon observation resistant interaction techniques is the most fruitful approach
to minimise errors and login durations. The design of an effective enrolment pro-
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cess such as that seen in the Passfaces [96] online system could serve to provide a
more longitudinal encoding of the images in memory where memorability limitations
remain.
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Chapter 6
Graphical Password Sharing and
Image Similarity
In Chapter 5 we explored how regulating the frequency at which particular images
were presented to users could provide means upon which to design observation resis-
tant graphical passwords. This approach took no account of the visual characteristics
of the images themselves; however, designing security around judicious selection of
images based upon their visual characteristics represents an as yet unexplored design
space for graphical passwords. In this chapter we explore how strategic selection of
images based upon considerations of image similarity could provide security benefits
in terms of impacting the ability of users to share a graphical password. Currently,
the usability of current methods of knowledge-based authentication (KBA) methods
can be attributed to a fine balance between memorability, recordability, and password
sharing. The sharing and recording of credentials has become an indispensable (yet
often unspoken) coping technique in remembering KBA credentials; Adams and Sasse
[1] report that at least 50% of participants in a survey of 139 wrote down passwords
as a result of the difficulty of remembering multiple passwords and compliance with
password expiration policies. In addition, the practice has been legitimately encour-
aged where computer systems use group passwords [1], and can serve a social function
for purposes such as delegation of access to computer systems.
Recently, the debate regarding the legitimacy of sharing alphanumeric passwords
and writing them down has been moderated by an awareness of the need to take into
account the realities of different contexts (e.g. that different contexts pose different
levels of risk). In an appropriate setting, and when carried out responsibly, writing
down and even sharing passwords is considered by some as one usable and secure
solution to the password management problem [23].
It appears to be a reasonable assumption that if graphical passwords were to
become widely used, users would be likely to attempt to adopt the same coping
strategies as observed with other KBA systems; that is, record the password externally
or communicate it to a trusted friend or colleague. The role of graphical passwords
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in this debate appears interesting, as they are assumed to be particularly resistant to
being written down and verbally communicated [31]. However, that users will find
it difficult to share graphical password credentials is an unchallenged assumption.
Uncertainty regarding the efficacy of users to carry out this practice likely creates
further reluctance for wider deployment for graphical passwords due to the significant
role password recording already plays in everyday password management. Of course,
no methodology exists to measure the extent to which users can share graphical
passwords. In this chapter1 we pursue an empirical method that enables us to reason
over the ability of users to share Passfaces [96] graphical passwords and explore the
extent to which assembly of image grids based upon qualities of image similarity can
facilitate or complicate this practice.
6.1 Threat Model
We define password description as any non-digital attempt to record or communicate
a password, using either an external representation or verbal/non-verbal means. This
encompasses sketches, written and spoken descriptions and instructions and even ac-
companying physical gestures. Technologies to facilitate the sharing of graphical pass-
words clearly exist; given the ubiquity of mobile devices with built-in cameras; these
provide an obvious and familiar way to record images in recognition-based schemes.
However, we assume that sharing such representations may be unattractive due to
their permanence, and likelihood the representations can be identified as graphical
password images if discovered by an adversary. It is likely that a more transient and
spontaneous way to share graphical passwords will be based upon description. Users
may wish to record a description in order to remember the credentials associated with
a particular account, or to be able to distribute the credentials in order to grant others
access to their system privileges. An attacker may actively seek out such descriptions
if they are recorded externally in order to have a route to gain unauthorised access to
a system.
6.2 Graphical Password Description
Unlike other forms of KBA, most graphical password schemes can neither be pre-
cisely written down (excluding Draw a Secret [68]) using a static media (e.g. pen and
paper) nor verbally communicated. Users therefore have to revert to the production
of a written or spoken description of their credentials. In relation to graphical pass-
words, the nature of users’ descriptions of graphical password credentials, and the
vulnerability of password schemes to description, have not been previously explored.
Description itself is a phenomenon of some interest given the widely held assumptions
1The content of this chapter has been published at the ACM Symposium on Usable Privacy and
Security (SOUPS) 2008 [36].
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related to Passfaces and other graphical schemes. One explicit claimed advantage
of the Passfaces scheme over conventional alphanumeric passwords is that Passfaces:
can’t be written down or copied” and can’t be given to another person” ([96], pg. 3).
A number of subtle configurations have been adopted to mitigate against the risk of
easy description, such as that the grids of faces in Passfaces are grouped by gender
and are selected to be equally distinctive so that Passfaces cannot be described by
gender or obvious characteristics: ”None of the faces stand out from the others” ([96],
pg. 5); and that ”Passfaces can be used in grayscale on all platforms in order to make
it even harder for a user to describe their Passfaces to someone else” ([96], pg.4).
As previously mentioned, no methods exist to enable us to quantify the difficulty of
sharing graphical passwords. Our objectives were to study four aspects of Passfaces
in relation to description: to analyse approaches to description; to quantify Pass-
faces’ vulnerability to description; to evaluate approaches to reduce its vulnerability
to description through the choice of decoy images; to explore whether there are any
significant gender differences in relation to creating and interpreting descriptions of
Passfaces in our sample.
Cognitive gender differences are the subject of active research and debate [56].
However, there are three widely accepted differences: linguistic ability, visuo-spatial
ability, and perceptual-motor ability.The term linguistic ability encompasses but is
not limited to: verbal fluency, grammar, writing, and vocabulary. One of the key
ingredients of effective communication (and thereby description) is a shared and subtle
understanding of any vocabulary used, yet potentially males and females are subject to
quite different cultural influences. In relation to password description, any differences
in terms of linguistic ability are particularly relevant; these appear developmentally
though it is not clear if these differences are maintained into old age. A study by
Huttenlocher et al. [64] revealed that on average there is a 16 word difference in
vocabulary between females and males at 13 months, increasing to 51 words at 20
months and 115 at 24 months. Horgan [34] discovered that females between 2 and
4 years old used longer utterances at a younger age than males, also showing more
linguistic maturity by demonstrating ability with the passive voice, participles and
adjectives.
Our approach to affect the vulnerability of Passfaces to description centred upon
the procedure by which decoy images would be associated to a given key image. To
explore these objectives we performed two user studies, the first of which supported
the second. The first study involved description collection where we gathered and
analysed a corpus of descriptions for faces in a collection gathered from the Passfaces
website. This was followed by the second user study, where in a web-based experiment
we asked participants to authenticate to a mocked up Passfaces system using only
descriptions of the key images in each grid.
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6.3 User Study 1 - Description Collection
The first user study was intended to collect a number of face descriptions to seed the
second user study. We collected descriptions for a set of 45 (27 female and 18 male)
face images taken from the Passfaces online demo.
6.3.1 Method
We recruited 18 participants (9 male and 9 female). The mean age of participants
was 26 (σ = 8). Participants were recruited opportunistically and comprised uni-
versity undergraduate and postgraduate students or graduate level employees. Each
participant was classified according the subject of their highest level qualification,
and although computer scientists dominated, there was an approximately even split
between computing science and mathematics on one hand, and arts and humanities
on the other (Figure 41). The recording sessions took place in a recording studio at
Newcastle University, a quiet environment free of distractions and background noise.
Participants were provided with an A3 sized sheet of paper containing the 45 images,
and asked to examine each face and describe it in isolation (without reference to other
faces on the paper) in their own time; that is, using as much time as they required
both in preparation for and during the recording. No advice was given on how to ap-
proach the descriptions, other than being given the scenario that they were describing
faces to a friend. Participants were left alone in the studio and afterwards the record-
ings were assessed in terms of the sound quality. In two cases it was deemed that
the quality of the recordings was not high enough to be used in the subsequent study
(due to participant interaction with the microphone e.g. not holding the microphone
close enough to the mouth) and two new participants were recruited. The following
discussion refers only to participants whose descriptions were usable. We allowed
elements of hesitation in the recording, although no examples of this were found to
be detrimental to the quality of the description. Each participant recorded verbal
descriptions of 15 random faces from the set of 45, providing us with six descriptions
per face, 3 male and 3 female.
6.3.2 Study Materials
The key materials required for this study were faces collected from the Passfaces online
demo. These were printed out at size 3cmx4cm which is a similar size to how they
appear online, and were fixed to A3 paper in a three rows of 15 configuration with
each assigned an ID number (see Figure 42). In addition, handheld voice recording
equipment was obtained to capture the verbal descriptions from participants.
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Figure 41: The classification of educational backgrounds of participants recruited to
the description collection study.
Figure 42: The sequence of faces given to participants in the Description Collection
study.
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6.3.3 Results
Our analysis of the results of this phase encompassed simple qualitative and quanti-
tive analysis of the content of the collected descriptions. The most readily apparent
strategy used by participants was to first describe a distinguishing feature, either re-
lating to the person (e.g. race) or their face (e.g. hair colour or length, nose or ear
size and shape). Where participants did not detect features that were sufficiently
distinct, they would systematically describe the face in a feature by feature manner.
Where there was a sense that participants became frustrated by their own ability to
formulate satisfactory descriptions, they often used the slight presence of clothing in
addition to their description of the face itself. Anecdotally, female participants ap-
peared much more likely to adopt a more holistic approach to description. By contrast
male participants often resorted to systematic list-like feature-by-feature descriptions
of faces. Females often attempted to present a richer sense of the person behind the
face and included judgements as to whether the person was happy, likely personality
traits, stereotypes, and even social class:
Female Describer (feature by feature description): “A white cau-
casian female. Uhm, mousy brown/blonde highlights. Quite big ears. Big
mouth. Uhm, wide jaw, big eyes.”
Female Describer (Holistic description incorporating. facial fea-
tures, personality traits and social class): “This girl looks young and
slightly embarrassed, again kind of, uhm, highlighted blonde hair. She’s
kind of, uhm, I don’t know, uhm, her hair is again kind of half falling
out, it’s kind of up in a kind of tied back way so, uhm, she looks friendly
enough again, looks like she’s probably well bred and,uhm, does lots of
sport, particularly with horses.”
The mean length of all recorded descriptions was 23 seconds (σ = 11). Interest-
ingly, the mean recording length for females was 27 seconds, which was greater than
that of males at 20 seconds; this difference was statistically significant (t(269) = 5.37,
p < 0.01). Furthermore, the male participants used 567 distinct words (from a total
of 4329), and the female participants 654 distinct words (from a total of 5560).
Further examples of faces and collected descriptions are provided in Appendix D.
6.4 User Study 2 - Passfaces Authentication using
Description
In the second user study we modelled the scenario of the participant receiving a
description of a sequence of Passfaces to login to a resource on behalf of a colleague.
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6.4.1 Method
We chose a within-subjects study design and recruited 56 participants for controlled
trials that took place during undergraduate computing science practical teaching sem-
inars. Of the 56 participants, 31 were male and 25 female; none had taken part as
participants in the previous study. The mean age of participants was 22 (σ = 7).
Rather than mirroring the typical enrolment-login procedure as seen in most user
studies of KBA, the study commenced at the login phase. At the presentation of each
grid of face images an audio description would be played relating to one of the face im-
ages displayed onscreen. In response, participants were required to click the face they
believed was being described. To login successfully a participant had to match each of
the 5 spoken descriptions with the corresponding face in the grid. For each grid, one
face was chosen at random as the target face, with the decoys generated depending
on the experimental condition. A particular face could not be the target more than
once in the same condition. We also ensured that each description was delivered by
a randomly chosen speaker, reducing dependence on a particular speaker. In order
to study gender differences, we imposed the additional constraint that participants
heard descriptions from speakers that were either all male, or all female (decided at
random upon starting the study). Descriptions could be replayed as many times as
required using on-screen controls. Participants were asked to perform all 3 conditions
in an order determined randomly by our software. To provide a small incentive we
offered 5 to participants who were able to match all descriptions in any condition.
Though the exact procedure by which decoy selection is undertaken in the commer-
cial Passfaces system is not known to us, we explored three different methods of doing
so, each corresponding to a different decoy selection procedure. In this way we could
evaluate the potential for image selection to provide resistance against description:
• Random groups: decoys for a target face were selected randomly for each grid
(control case).
• Visual groups: decoys are selected on the basis of visual similarities between the
target face and the decoys. Visual grouping seeks to maximise the number of
decoys that might match based on visual similarity judgments alone.
• Verbal groups: decoys are selected on the basis of the similarity of the verbal
descriptions of the faces of the target face and the decoys. Verbal grouping seeks
to maximise the ambiguity relating to verbal descriptions.
In advance of the study we assembled image grids according to the indicated
criteria for each grouping condition. Where image grids would be assembled according
to visual or verbal groups, methods were required to gain consensus regarding which
images could be considered visually or verbally similar. In the following sections we
describe these methods. Examples of descriptions generated by the participants for
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the target face chosen to illustrate the three study conditions in the following sections
are as follows:
“Long, red brown hair, parting in the middle. Uhm < break > happy
girl.”
“Okay, female, smiling. Uhm, Caucasian I would guess. Slightly longer
than shoulder length reddy-brown hair. Dark reddy brown hair. Dark
eyes.Uhm, not think not fat, average sort of, uhm,chubbiness. Uhm, slightly
pointed chin. Slightly odd looking smile. Uhm, quite big hair, straight
again, or slightly curly.”
“Sort of late 20’s, uhm, white girl with long brown hair. Looks a bit like
Kate Winslet.”
Though these are all descriptions of the target face, aspects of each do create
ambiguity when descriptions are applied to other collocated faces.
6.4.1.1 Random Groups
The base condition was the random grouping of key images and decoy images. When
a face was randomly selected to be the target face, the system selected 8 random faces
of the same gender to be decoys. This was repeated for each of the 5 grids and within
a trial a particular face was only used once as either a target or decoy. Figure 43
shows an example of a randomly generated grid where the target face is highlighted
in red.
Figure 43: Randomly assembled grid: decoys are selected at random within the set
of faces of the same gender (target face highlighted in red).
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6.4.1.2 Visual Groups
Decoy images in the visual groups condition were selected based on their visual simi-
larity to the target face. To gain a consensus on which faces were visually similar, we
recruited a second group of participants (similarity judges), whose similarity rankings
were used in the selection of eight visually similar decoys for each target face. These
volunteers were recruited in computer labs around Newcastle University campus and
each was assigned five faces out of our bank of 45. Of these 5 faces they were asked
to select as many other faces as possible that were lookalikes. Typically participants
selected six or seven, though some were assigned more faces depending on their per-
ceived difficulty of the task. Participant responses were recorded by an experiment
moderator. To determine consensus we manually looked through the results for any
agreement between participant choices of lookalikes so as to create a set of eight decoys
for each face. Where it was not possible to select eight decoys for a particular face
based on the similarity judgements alone (i.e. an insufficient number of faces had been
identified as similar) we manually selected the short-fall based on our own judgement
of similarity. At most only 2 decoys were selected at any one time using this ad-hoc
technique. Figure 44 shows the visually similar grid assembled for the same target
face. As expected the visual similarity of the members of the visual group is readily
apparent.
Figure 44: Visual groups: a grid of faces grouped by visual similarity (the target face
is highlighted).
6.4.1.3 Verbal Groups
The decoys in verbal groups were selected based on the similarity of the verbal descrip-
tions to the target face. Two descriptions were deemed similar if the same features
were emphasised and similar values used to describe those features. We developed a
systematic way to construct these groupings based on the set of 250 descriptions. The
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first step was to transcribe each collected description, and use the TextSTAT concor-
dance software to collate key terms used in accordance with each face. By looking at
the common descriptive terms arising in the descriptions we identified the following
features the participants were most likely to include in their descriptions (and the set
of values used):
• Hair: used 338 times in descriptions including the values: blond, black, dark/brown,
long, tied-back, short, red, curly, fringe.
• Face shape: used 162 times in descriptions including the values: round, oval,
small, long, pointed.
• Eyebrows: used 91 times in descriptions including the values: heavy/bushy,
shaped, dark, groomed, thin.
• Nose: used 68 times in descriptions including the values: big, crooked, but-
ton/small, long, wide, thin/pointy.
Figure 45: Illustrative verbal grouping procedure: Example tabulation of raw data
for a cross-section of possible facial features. For face 2, all face numbers occurring
on the same row as face 2, for any feature, are candidate decoys.
Figure 45 illustrates the verbal description grouping process. In selecting the
verbal group decoys for face 2, we would first make a note of all faces where the
adjective long was used. This is repeated for hair, eyebrows and nose descriptors, and
scores are incremented for each matching feature value (and decremented for explicit
conflicts). The eight faces with the greatest tally are used as decoys for the target
face. As already described, in a small number of instances we had to use our own
judgement to select decoys where this verbal similarity ranking did not yield 8 decoys.
Figure 46 shows an image grid assembled to be verbally similar; the verbal groups
exhibit more variation in appearance than the visual groups.
6.4.2 Study Materials
The central component of the user study was a web-based login screen that closely
simulated a typical Passfaces login, where users would be presented with 5 image grids
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Figure 46: Verbal groups: a grid of faces grouped by verbal similarity (the target face
is highlighted).
sequentially with each displayed in a 3x3 formation. The 45 faces presented were the
same as used in the first study, which enabled us to construct three grids of female
faces and two grids of male faces. The sexes were grouped to mirror standard practice
in the Passfaces system. The study was implemented as a website with a PHP and
MYSQL backend and logged the content of the authentication challenge and also the
user response. An example screen is seen in Figure 47.
Figure 47: Example Passfaces grid in the description study. Participants were required
to select the face to which an audio description refers. The interface widget below the
image grid is the audio control panel.
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6.4.3 Results
Across the 56 users, we collected 158 login attempts collectively, 54 in the random
groups condition, 55 in the visual groups condition, and 49 in the verbal groups
condition. Of those 158 logins, 13 (8%) of those logins were successful; that is, where
the participant correctly associated all 5 verbal descriptions with the correct target
face.
Condition Attempts Male/Female Success
Random Groups 54 29/25 8
Visual Groups 56 31/25 4
Verbal Groups 49 26/23 1
Table 18: Number of successful logins in the different experimental conditions.
Table 18 shows the number of attempts made in each condition, the male/female
participant split in that group, along with the number of successful login attempts.
Login success was greatest for the random groups and lowest for the verbal groups.
The mean score (out of 5) in the random condition was 3.57 (σ = 0.91) compared
to 2.87 (σ = 1.07) in the visual groups condition t(107)=3.63 p < 0.01. The mean
score in the verbal groups condition was 2.81 (σ = 1.14). The difference between the
verbal groups condition and the random condition was also statistically significant
(t(101)=3.64 p < 0.01). Scores in the random condition are concentrated about 3 and
4 out of 5 with 40 of the 54 participants scoring in this range. This theme of scoring
highly was also reflected by 8 participants achieving 5/5, higher than both the visual
and verbal conditions combined.
The shape of the distribution of the visual groups scores is bell shaped with scores
concentrated mainly around 2/5 and 3/5. It is surprising that 5 more participants
scored 4/5 in the verbal condition than the visual condition, while so few in the
verbal condition scored 5/5. A possible contributing factor is that, as the number of
participants in each condition was not overly large, 8 fewer participants in the ?verbal
condition did not allow extremes to even out.
Although participants were not placed under time pressure, we measured the time
taken to complete each authentication attempt. Our assumption was that partici-
pants would take the least time to complete the random groups condition due to the
audio descriptions appearing less ambiguous. In fact, the mean timings differed little
between the three conditions, the mean was 155 seconds (σ = 172) for the random
groups, 152 seconds (σ = 151) for the visual groups, and 149 seconds (σ = 155) for
the verbal groups; there was no statistical significance in the difference.
6.4.3.1 Descriptions
Overall participants associated audio descriptions with the correct face 62% of the
time (482/780). Using male descriptions participants were correct 60% of the time
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Figure 48: Random vs Visual vs Verbal groups: A breakdown of the scores achieved
in each condition.
(238/395) and using female descriptions this figure was 63% (244/385). Some de-
scriptions were clearly more effective than others; the following discussion refers to
the descriptions listed in Table 19. For example, we correctly expected the image in
Figure 49(a) to be easily distinguished as only two faces out of the 18 male faces had
red hair, indeed, though relatively short, these descriptions were highly effective in
supporting the identification of the correct face. Description 1 was used correctly 8
times out of the 8 it was played to participants; description 2 and description 3 were
both used correctly 3 times out of the 3 they were heard. Unlike face (a), face (b) does
not have such distinctive features and as a result the task of constructing an effective
verbal description is made significantly more difficult. Description 4 was used twice
with no correct responses while description 5 was used three times and also received
no correct responses. Describers of faces (c) and (d) experienced similar difficulties
and the worst performing descriptions in the experiment were associated with these
faces. Descriptions of each of these faces were heard 4 times and resulted in no correct
responses:
Figure 49: Example faces: participants showed diverse performance depending on the
image.
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# Describes Description
1 Figure 49(a) “Big red hair, large forehead.”
2 Figure 49(a) “Pale skin, ginger hair, almost smirking rather than smiling.”
3 Figure 49(a) ”Male, ginger hair. Ginger eye-brows. Uhm, slightly curved
eyebrows. Uhm, broadish nose, head slightly tilted back.
Not smiling so much. Ears showing around the hair-cut,
quite curly hair. Can’t see any clothing, uhm, the way
the shot’s taken”
4 Figure 49(b) “Female with, straggly < break > dark < break > brown
with slight lighter blondish< break > highlights or areas
within her hair. Tied back presumably. < break > Looking
up in the corner, slightly chubby face”
5 Figure 49(b) “A white female, with her hair up but some of it coming across
her face like two bits down the side of her face. < break >
Uhm< break > uhm < break > like a brown jumper on with
a bit of a white collar.”
6 Figure 49(c) “Uh, he’s got blonde short hair, and his eyebrows are quite
prominent, quite thick eyebrows, uhm, but also quite big eyes.
Uhm he’s got quite a long face.”
7 Figure 49(d) “Uhm, large eyes. Uhm, long blondy hair. Happy looking.”
Table 19: Examples of descriptions collected that provided interesting authentication
behaviours. These descriptions refer to images in Figure 49.
6.4.4 Gender Differences
On average females outperformed males with a mean score of 3.21 vs. 2.99 (see Ta-
ble 20 for a breakdown for each condition). However, female performance was more
consistent than that of males as displayed (see Figure 50). The upper tail ratio for
female participants either achieving 4 or 5 is 1.14. This means that for every 100
males achieving 4 or 5 you would expect 114 females to do the same. We also noticed
trends that females scored better using female descriptions. Aside from females scor-
ing the most successful logins using female descriptions, they also performed better
overall using female descriptions rather than male descriptions (mean 3.39 vs. 2.97).
Interestingly males performed better using male descriptions rather than female de-
scriptions (mean 3.04 vs.2.92) although this was not statistically significant. Table
21 shows a breakdown of successful logins in terms of the gender of the participant
and the gender of the speakers in the audio descriptions. Females using female audio
descriptions were the most successful, with male listeners using female descriptions a
close second. Females marginally outperformed males in every condition.
Condition Female Male
Random Groups 3.72 3.42
Visual Groups 2.92 2.83
Verbal Groups 2.96 2.68
Table 20: Female vs male performance in each experimental condition.
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Figure 50: Comparison of male and female performance in the login task, 5/5 indicates
a successful login.
Condition M:M M:F F:M F:F
Random Groups 1 0 1 5
Visual Groups 1 3 0 1
Verbal Groups 0 1 0 0
Table 21: Gender combinations of describer and listener and the number of successful
logins that resulted with that combination (e.g. M:M = male listener using male
description).
6.5 Discussion
The results highlighted that graphical passwords are not prohibitively difficult to
share by description, indeed, although 8% of participants could authenticate success-
fully with a description overall. Participants in the random groups condition achieved
an overall mean score of 3.57, compared with 2.87 in the visual groups condition and
2.81 in the verbal groups condition. As these figures indicate, participants performed
best in the random condition, where it was most likely faces were distinctive enough
for descriptions to have maximum chance of distinguishing the correct image. Inter-
estingly there was no significant difference between performance in the visual group
and the verbal group which suggests each has a similar detrimental effect on the
sharing of Passfaces graphical passwords.
Real-world implications of future research confirming and extending these results
could involve the similarity of Passfaces decoys being adjusted depending on the
security context of system deployment. In corporate environments where password
sharing is not desirable, the similarity of decoys to the target face according to some
metric could be increased, whereas for other contexts this could be relaxed. While
our results did not reveal any significant performance differences between male and
female participants, it was interesting to note that females did perform better on
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average across all conditions over males. In addition, descriptions created by females
tended to include more detail and be significantly longer in duration than those of
male participants. As such, females performed significantly better when using female
descriptions over those of males. One simple technique that could be adopted to make
description of recognition-based credentials difficult is for the system to vary the order
of the challenge images presented to the user. In this situation the best a describer
could do is to describe all their faces in the hope the listener could identify with one
of the descriptions. We speculate this technique would be highly prone to error on
the part of the listener.
6.6 Study Limitations
The ability of our participants to authenticate is likely to be a lower bound rather
than an upper bound to likely user performance. When collecting descriptions there
was such variation in participants’ ability that a participant could have been hindered
in scoring authenticating successfully in our second study by being randomly assigned
a description which to them was not so meaningful. In this situation a participant
is almost reduced to a random guess. In a set-up incorporating a two-way dialogue
between describer and listener we feel the results would have been more resounding.
In addition the experiment could have been performed using a larger bank of images
and have been a more socially embedded affair. Such an experimental setting would
give a better indication of the likely manifestation of graphical password sharing in
the real world.
6.7 Conclusion
This chapter has contributed a methodology and empirical results that demonstrate
the degree to which Passfaces can be verbally shared between users, and also how
judicious choice of decoys based upon their visual content can reduce the vulnerability
to description. Our empirical study has highlighted the reality that, contrary to
common wisdom, users can share Passfaces graphical passwords. 15% of logins in the
random groups condition were successful, with this being reduced to 7% in the visual
groups condition and 2% in the verbal groups condition.The results suggest that the
topic of description warrants levels of investigation on a par with other accepted issues
facing graphical passwords such as observation attack. We also anticipate that the
vulnerability of graphical password schemes to description could have impact on issues
of both memorability and observation attack which we did not explore in this work.
Recognition-based schemes such as Story [27] and VIP [28] use images representing
very different themes and are likely to be easily described based on the content alone.
Schemes such as Deja Vu [31] in part aim to explicitly address description, yet the
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computer generated random art yields unique images. Thus Deja Vu may admit
description via the very distinctive features that are intended to provide its immunity.
In an alphanumeric password setting users are typically forbidden to write down
and share passwords. However, conventional passwords are so well suited to this type
of distribution that users are able to share them with anyone they please. If system
administrators do not wish users to write down and share passwords they might use
a scheme that by its very nature mitigates against the sharing and external recording
of authentication secrets. Indeed, as we better understand the nature of password
description, the ability to write down and describe credentials might in future be
incorporated as an explicit selection criterion for authentication schemes. The signif-
icant differences observed highlight the importance that image choice can have upon
the usability and security of graphical passwords beyond enticing predictable image
choice as observed by Davis et al. [27].
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Chapter 7
Towards Automated Detection of
Image Similarity
Chapters 4,5 and 6 presented user studies that explored the scaffolding of user be-
haviours in the context of recognition-based graphical passwords. One issue consis-
tently encountered during these works was the uncertainty over suitable criteria to
assemble a usable set of images. While the usability of this genre of graphical password
is increasingly understood, it appears likely that the usability benefits are contingent
upon subtle attributes of the image sets that are presented to users. It has been
noted that visual and semantic similarity exhibited between images has the potential
to disrupt the picture superiority effect by causing errors in visual search [35] and
rote learning [121]. For security and simplicity, it would be desirable that image sets
are assembled randomly; however, the constraints that exist when creating a usable
login challenge imply that some degree of skill is required to do this effectively in a
manner that preserves security. In Chapter 6 we discovered that the presence of image
similarity in the login challenge could hinder the ability of the user to share Passfaces
graphical passwords; combined with our proposal that it could also hinder or help us-
ability, it seems likely that image similarity can either positively or negatively scaffold
user behaviours during authentication. Without developing a good understanding of
the conditions under which such scaffolds are created and manifest, there is likely to
be reluctance to deploy recognition-based graphical passwords. Figure 51 illustrates
different extremes of assembling decoy images for a particular key image.
Zurko and Simon [153] remind us that user-centred security should be propor-
tioned between end-users, developers and system administrators. Unfortunately such
a holistic consideration is lacking in this graphical password context, as there is cur-
rently no systematic or empirically verified convention to reason over the similarity
in an image set, and as a result this process must likely be performed by hand on the
basis of commonsense judgments of image semantics [28]. Users themselves could be
asked to tag for similarity, but this can present security threats if users attempt to
circumvent the process to obtain an overly simplistic login task. This absence of a
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systematic means to evaluate image similarity, combined with the potential impact of
inappropriate levels of similarity on authentication error rates, constitutes a signifi-
cant barrier to the real world deployment of graphical passwords. Indeed, the need for
such a spontaneous approach to the filtering of images becomes more pressing when
considering other deployment level phenomena such as password resets, where new
image sets would need to be generated in response to user demand.
One as yet unexplored approach to solve this problem is to harness image pro-
cessing research from the field of content-based image retrieval (CBIR) [55]. One
fundamental challenge is to determine whether two images are similar. In this field
the underlying assumption is that images with similar visual characteristics are more
likely to be semantically similar [138]. In this chapter1 we explore the efficacy of a sys-
tematic method to identify instances of visual similarity between images, and explore
the impact of its careful manipulation upon usability and security of a recognition-
based graphical password login, a context thought to be particularly suitable for
graphical passwords yet complicated for similarity judgments [101].
Figure 51: Extremes of decoy image selection for the same key image: (left) decoys
are semantically different; (centre) semantic and visual similarity to key image; (right)
decoys are semantically similar yet different from the key image.
7.1 Usable and Secure Graphical Passwords and
Image Filtering
We firstly define some terms: the image set comprises all the images available to
the authentication system; the login challenge is a subset of the image set, which is
comprised of both key images and decoy images and is presented to the user at login.
There are a number of conventions regarding the presentation of the login challenge
to users, however for simplicity we constrain our discussion to the mode where the
1The content of this chapter was published at the Annual Computer Security Applications Con-
ference (ACSAC) 2012 [38].
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login challenge is displayed across a sequence of grids, and where one key image is
certain to appear in each grid. Image filtering is the process of reducing an image
set into a login challenge through a process of evaluating the usability and security
features of particular images.
The absence of an accepted automated process to perform image filtering has likely,
in part, motivated recent research pursuing the identification of an optimal image type
for recognition-based graphical passwords [62]. This optimal image type is intuitively
one that minimises the burden placed upon a person to undergo the process of image
filtering by hand, and one that allows users to perform favourably in recall tests
with the login challenges assembled using that process. The drive to satisfy both
constraints has led to a focus upon particularly contrived image types that by design
permit a narrow range of possible interpretations as to their content (e.g. clipart).
The lack of explicit attention given to image filtering even in these contexts appears
to assume that it is a one-off procedure, and that the resulting login challenge can
be reused for each user of the system. However, likely realities of deployment might
make the use of a finite image set unrealistic. For instance, inevitable password resets
would mean that previously seen images must be discarded from the image set for a
particular user. In addition, if the image set or login challenge is static between users,
then attackers can build up knowledge regarding user behaviour with those images
e.g. user choice, can permit phishing, and spontaneous distribution of credentials e.g.
password sharing, observation attack (due to the images providing a common frame of
reference shared between users). This approach also takes little account of results that
have suggested users have better memory retention for images they have created [101],
nor context-specific defenses that result from strategic selection of image content (as
we proposed in Chapter 6).
There is a general lack of knowledge regarding the impact of strategies of image
filtering upon usability and security. The assumption so far has been that images
should all be semantically and visually different for purposes of usability. A different
strategy is illustrated by Passfaces [96], a commercial system where the image stimuli
are drawn from a database of normalized face photographs. A brief description offered
regarding their image filtering procedure is the following: “The grids of faces in
Passfaces are grouped by sex and are selected to be equally distinctive so that Passfaces
cannot be described by gender or obvious characteristics” [96] pg. 5. This illustrates
sensitivity to risks of large semantic differences in the login challenge and the ability
for users to share the graphical passwords. Usability concerns must result, however
one study of human memory involving 2500 images presented in pairs showed that
participants could be accurate at remembering precise image details. Even where
images were visually and semantically identical and exhibited only small differences
in detail, e.g. orientation, user recognition rates were only marginally worse than
when images exhibited semantic differences [10]. The assembly of a login challenge
based upon distinct semantics is perceived to improve usability, but those assembled
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to incorporate similar semantics could be harnessed to improve security.
In either case, while the curation of a usable and secure login challenge remains a
skill residing with those with the greatest experience of doing it, the propagation of
such systems more generally is limited. The spontaneous use of everyday uncurated
image collections (e.g. photographs) in this context is perceived to be particularly
challenging, however, this image type is in some ways attractive, as sets of uncurated
images are ubiquitous in personal collections and online. It is possible that if meth-
ods of automated image filtering based upon judicious analysis of image content are
identified, this could reduce the imperative to identify an optimal image type.
7.1.1 Similarity in the Recognition-based Graphical Password
Login
There is currently little convention to follow regarding where to apply systematic
analysis of image similarity. Figure 52 outlines points in a typical recognition-based
graphical password login challenge that could comprise the image filtering procedure.
Analysis can occur on a per-grid and a per-login basis. On a per-grid basis, intra grid
key-decoy similarity refers to the similarity between a key image and collocated decoy
images. The most usable visual search is one where decoy images appear distinct
from the key image [35]. High similarity in this dimension suggests that users might
confuse the key image with a collocated decoy image, whereas low similarity suggests
the key image would appear to be easier to identify amongst the decoy images. Intra
grid decoy similarity refers to the difference between collocated decoy images. In
isolation such consideration provides few usability issues, however high intra grid
decoy-decoy similarity and high intra grid key-decoy similarity indicates that a grid
may overall appear visually similar, which could complicate usability, observation
attack and description [36].
The per-grid consideration should be complemented with per-login analysis. Inter
grid key similarity refers to the similarity between key images. If there is high sim-
ilarity in this dimension there is a threat that an attacker might infer that pattern
(e.g. all key images are of specific objects or contain particular colours). If this dif-
ference is too great, it is likely that images will be more difficult to remember for the
user who must remember visually and semantically disconnected images. Inter grid
key-decoy similarity refers to the similarity between a decoy image and non-collocated
key images. This is important from a usability perspective, as a decoy image may
appear to be similar to a non-collocated key image and entice users to select it erro-
neously. Inter grid decoy similarity considers the similarity of decoy images across a
whole login challenge. High similarity in this regard, along with high intra grid decoy
similarity, indicates that decoys across the whole login could appear visually similar,
whereas high inter grid decoy similarity and low intra grid decoy similarity indicates
that there exists similarity within the decoys in each grid, however each grid appears
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visually different.
Figure 52: Points at which to consider image similarity across an example login. Red
indicates a per grid requirement, and blue indicates a per login consideration.
7.2 User Study 1 - Human Consensus of Image
Similarity
Perceptions of image similarity are subjective. However, in order to measure the
success of a proposed image processing intervention, it is necessary to first obtain
some ground truth notion of pairwise similarity that exists within a particular image
set. To do this we carried out a user study to capture a human consensus of similarity
within an image set to provide the basis for further study.
7.2.1 Method
We assembled a set of 101 digital photographs and recruited 20 participants (14 male,
6 female with ages µ = 27, σ = 6) who were staff and students in the research lab.
Each participant was asked to organise the printed set of 101 images into piles on
a tabletop according to a similarity ranking method proposed elsewhere [123]. This
involved the participant being asked to organise the set of images into piles, with the
only criteria being that those perceived to be similar should be placed in the same pile.
No further advice is offered. The raw data per-participant were the image numbers
present within each pile. Across all participants this was aggregated into a score n
for each image pair (x, y), where (x, y) = n means that image x and y appeared on
the same pile n times, where n ≤ 20, and high values of n indicate high agreement
of similarity. The set of 101 images was intended to be representative of a typical
photograph collection. The size of the image set was chosen to provide a manageable
sorting task for participants. The images were printed onto high quality paper (100mm
x 80mm) and the reverse of each was numbered. For descriptive purposes only we
132
Figure 53: Visualisation of the number of strong matches identified per image in
the first study. A strong match is determined by a threshold upon the number of
participants that must have classed an image pair as being similar. Overall: 1 partici-
pant=4424 strong matches; 2=2462 strong matches; 3=1425 strong matches, 14=148
strong matches.
labeled the images according to the following informal categories: People (9): focus
is a person or group of individuals; Scene (30): the focus is purely a landscape scene;
Object (14): the focus is purely an object; People/Scene (47): the focus is upon
people and scenery; People/Object (1): the focus is upon both people and an object.
The image collection contained images taken to a wide range of photographic quality,
and was sourced by aggregating a number of personal collections.
7.2.2 Results
Figure 53 gives an overview of the raw output for this study, which highlights the
subjective nature of image similarity judgments even across a relatively small image
set. For each image, the graph illustrates the number of other images considered
to be a strong match for similarity. For a pairing to be considered a strong match,
we applied a threshold to n that represented the minimum number of times images
should have been placed on the same pile. As we increase the threshold, fewer images
are classed as a strong match. The median number of piles participants sorted the
images into was 21.5 (IQR = 12.25) with a minimum of 6 piles and a maximum of
32 piles. Images in the people and scene categories generally had the highest number
of image matches (Median=45, IQR=13) and those in the Object category had the
least (Median=33; IQR=23). No systematic investigation of the strategies used to
group images was conducted, but in general it was apparent that these ranged from
matching particular objects in the image, to matching the overall context, contrast
level or principal colours. Although we only use 101 images in the results, the graph
shows 102 (the original number) since one image was misplaced in the course of the
study (#84).
7.2.3 Choosing an Automated Similarity Metric
A final phase of this study was to test a number of image processing methods to
identify one that was most appropriate to detect the most severe instances of similarity
as identified in the sorting task. The threshold of n ≥ 14 (that is: in our first study,
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fourteen or more participants judged two images as similar) provided a basis for us
to identify the most severe cases of similarity that any automated mechanism should
detect. The field of Content-based Image Retrieval is fast moving; our approach
was to test a number of candidate image signatures that would not require extensive
expertise in image processing to understand and implement. We reused the images
from the first study and performed analysis with those images in the CIE(L*a*b*)
color space [50] which is more perceptually linear than RGB or HSV. We implemented
each of the following in OpenCV:
• Statistical Moments: treat each channel of a digital image as a probability
distribution and calculate the first three statistical moments. To compare two
image signatures we calculated the Euclidean distance between the statistical
moments of each colour channel and threshold the result.
• Colour Histogram: the histogram bins contain the frequencies of particular pixel
values. Firstly we initialise a histogram with 16x16x16x16 bins, which divides
each 8 bit color channel into 16 bins. In the normalisation phase, each bin is set
to a value between zero and one representing its relative frequency with regard
to the other bins. Then we remove any bins with less than 1% of the volume as
this can be attributed to noise. To compare histograms we calculate the (EMD)
[106] which treats the histograms as piles and provides the minimum cost of
turning one pile into the other. The threshold for similarity was 0.9.
• PerceptualDiff [149]: this is not an image signature but is a suite of algorithms
that contains a model of the human visual system. Its canonical task is to opti-
mise the computer graphics task of global illumination, by determining whether
two scenes are perceptually similar. We were interested to see if a more sophis-
ticated approach held promise.
For each method we made a single pass of the digital images from the sorting
study where each was resized to 384x286. We took each image in turn, calculated the
corresponding image signatures and compared to every other image in the set, noting
the images that were judged to be similar in each case. To calculate the success of
these routines, we employed widely used metrics for information retrieval: recall and
precision:
Recall =
|relevant images| ∩ |retrieved images|
|relevant images| (4)
Precision =
|relevant images| ∩ |retrieved images|
|retrieved images| (5)
We had knowledge of relevant images from the first user study in the form of
the strong matches identified by participants for each image. Retrieved images are
the set of images that the particular automated method judged to be similar. The
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metric of recall provides a measure of the fraction of relevant images that a particular
method returned. The precision provides the fraction of the returned images that
were relevant and is sensitive to false positives. Where thresholds had to be chosen to
make a decision of similarity for a particular image processing intervention, they were
selected to balance precision and recall. To incorporate spatial information into the
calculations we also augmented the statistical moment and colour histogram methods
with a vertical or horizontal region of interest (ROI). This involved partitioning images
with a vertical or horizontal line, calculating the image signature for both halves and
using the mean of the two as the result for that image. Table 22 summarises the
filtering results obtained for each method. In addition to precision and recall we
calculated the F1 score, which is used to aggregate both precision and recall and
represents a weighted average of the two.
Overall, the colour histogram image signature applied to whole images provided
the best recall at .58. The addition of spatial information to the image signature
through the vertical ROI gave higher recall than the horizontal ROI but also intro-
duced more false positives. The use of statistical moments was less effective than the
colour histogram in all configurations, as recall was .34, and this in fact dropped with
the introduction of ROI, although ROI eliminated false positives. PerceptualDiff pro-
duced a lower recall than both colour histogram and statistical moments. The use of
PerceptualDiff was most effective at returning very strict matches where visually the
objects and colours in the scene appeared similar. As might have been anticipated,
the recall using the ROI was consistently lower than signatures based upon whole
images, but ROI augmentation also yielded fewer false positives. This was reflected
in a high score for precision.
Method Recall Precision F1
Colour Histogram .58 .95 .4
Colour Histogram & Vertical ROI .48 .8 .3
Colour Histogram & Horizontal ROI .41 1 .3
Statistical Moments .34 1 .3
Statistical Moments & Vertical ROI .2 1 .2
Statistical Moments & Horizontal ROI .07 1 .1
PerceptualDiff [149] .24 .9 .2
Table 22: Results from filtering procedure on an image set with 800 photographs,
resized to 384x286.
Since the color histogram approach provided the best recall and the highest F1
score, we chose to use this in our second study. The efficacy of the colour histogram
is likely because that representation captured the diversity of colour without being
restrictive spatially. This method did not provide a perfect recall score; however, we
believed this score was difficult to better given the set of images in use.
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7.3 User Study 2 - Recall Test Using Automati-
cally Selected Image
The first user study suggested that the optimal image signature we tested was the
colour histogram, as it provided the closest predictor of the human similarity judg-
ments we collected. Our remaining research question concerned whether systematic
manipulation of thresholds chosen for this image signature could have a predictable
impact upon the short-term recall of users in a typical graphical password login.
7.3.1 Method
We chose a between-subjects study design where the independent variable was the
similarity between a key image and its decoy images, and the dependant variables
were user performance in terms of recall and login time. We developed a web-based
system that would challenge the user to identify four key images across four grids
of nine images in a 3x3 layout, with one key image certain to appear in each grid,
providing theoretical entropy of 12.7 bits. We chose three experimental conditions
where similarity between the key image and its decoy images was controlled by a
threshold upon the EMD distance d between the colour histograms of the images:
• Similar: where 1 > d ≥ 0
• Middle: where 4 > d ≥ 3
• Dissimilar: where 6 > d ≥ 5
Studies in psychology [35] have observed how the difficulty of the visual search
should decrease with decreasing similarity between target and non-targets. We were
hoping to recreate a similar trend. To generalise our results more effectively we firstly
discarded the image set used in the first study and obtained a set of 1000 images
used in other image processing research [138], and removed any portrait oriented
images for display consistency (reducing to 800). The database is highly categorical,
which provides a worst case scenario for this study. In advance, we also chose 8
key images that represented exemplars of particular categories in the image set (see
Figure 54). These key images were persistent across conditions. For each key image
and experimental condition we automatically chose eight decoy images according to
the condition-specific similarity criteria. We also enforced distances between other
images in the login to respect the image filtering concerns discussed in Section 7.1.1.
Within a particular condition, once an image was selected as a decoy to be associated
with a particular key image, it could not be selected to appear as a decoy image for
a different key image within that condition. Also, a key image could not reappear
as a decoy image. Figure 55 provides an example of decoy image selection for one
particular key image across all three conditions.
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Figure 54: The key images chosen for the study, these were the same in all study
conditions.
We recruited participants from the crowdsourcing platform Amazon Mechanical
Turk. Kittur et al. [72] provide hindsight from conducting user studies on this plat-
form, in particular that the most suitable tasks are those that have a verifiable answer.
Clearly those carrying out studies on crowdsourcing platforms must design robust ex-
periments that do not rely on literacy, and due to its remote nature take measures
to detect behaviour that may undermine the integrity of the study. The user sample
on Mechanical Turk was suitable as they are likely to be technology savvy adults.
There were a number of study phases: registration: participants were requested to
give information such as worker ID and demographic information; enrolment: where
the participant would be given 30 seconds to view four key images randomly selected
from our set of eight (see Appendix E for an example); wait: A JavaScript enforced
stoppage of 30 minutes where participants could not progress to the next phase, but
were free to carry out other tasks on Mechanical Turk. If participants attempted to
progress beyond the wait period too quickly this could be detected via use of server
side timestamps. The last phase was recall: the participant attempts to recognise the
images assigned to them and has a single attempt to do so.
Due to the remote nature of the study we designed the following study defenses
in order to have increased confidence in our results: anti-image caching : the images
presented at login were drawn from a different location on the server than those at
enrolment. This removed the threat that the key images would load faster due to
caching; anti-print screen: participation was restricted to Internet Explorer and via
a JavaScript we cleared the clipboard of the participant every 100 milliseconds. If
consent to do this was not granted the experiment would not continue; dynamic key
images : key image sequences were not static across participants and there were
(
8
4
)
different possibilities for the sequence of key images that could be presented. This
meant that if images were recorded they may not be immediately reusable by another
participant; HTTP GET parameter protection ensured that we could detect where
parameters were maliciously altered in the browser or the back button was pressed.
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Figure 55: Example image grids assembled for key image #4 using similar, middle,
and dissimilar decoy image criteria.
7.3.2 Results
We received 364 completed logins across a 6 day period. We treated as outliers those
who completed the login procedure identifying no key images in less than 5 seconds.
This reduced the numbers down to 343 with 117 in the similar condition, 112 in the
dissimilar condition and 114 in the middle condition. In terms of demographics, 72%
of participants were from India, with the United States the next prominent location
at 7%. Most of the participants were male (73%). In terms of age, 269 were in the
age group 18-30, 67 in the group 31-40, 15 in the age group 41-50, and 13 were 51+
years of age.
7.3.2.1 Accuracy
We firstly calculated a login success rate on a per-participant basis i.e. to compare the
participants who correctly identified all 4 images. This was calculated by (successful
logins/total logins). The raw data comprised success/fail value to represent a login.
There was a significant difference between the performance of participants in the
dissimilar group (70%) and the similar group (29%) χ2(1, N = 229)=37.716, p < 0.01.
In addition there was a significant difference between the success rate in the middle
(59%) and similar condition χ2(1, N = 231)=20.716, p < 0.01. The difference between
the dissimilar and the middle condition was not statistically significant. Table 23
presents a more detailed illustration of participant performance. We also calculated
a per-click success rate that represented correct clicks
total clicks
for each condition. The benefit
of this calculation is that it can give insight into accuracy in a manner less sensitive
to a single mistake by a participant. For example, a single problematic image grid
could reduce login success rates considerably, whereas in reality this would reduce
the per click success rate less severely. There was a significant difference between
the success rates in the dissimilar condition (90%) and the similar condition (67%)
χ2(1, N = 916)=57.679, p < 0.01. There was also a significant difference between
the success in the middle (80%) and the similar condition, χ2(1, N = 924)=19.758,
p < 0.01. The difference between the dissimilar and the middle condition using this
metric was not significant.
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Condition Score Distribution
0 1 2 3 Success
Similar (n = 117) 6 (5%) 14 (12%) 26 (22%) 37 (32%) 34 (29%)
Middle (n = 114) 5 (4%) 8 (7%) 14 (12%) 20 (18%) 67 (59%)
Dissimilar (n = 112) 0% 6 (5%) 6 (5%) 8 (7%) 74 (70%)
Table 23: The number of key images correctly identified (out of four) in study two.
Success is 4/4.
Figure 56: The number of login errors made per key image and per experimental
condition.
Figure 56 illustrates the number of errors made per condition per image. Overall
the errors do follow an intuitive pattern, they increase as the decoy images become
more similar to the key image. However there are two exceptions, image 3 and image
7. Looking closely at the grids for these images, it is likely these errors can be
explained by inter grid key-decoy similarity: a decoy image was visually similar to a
non- collocated key image. This likely created confusion as to which image the user
should select. This could indicate that the threshold we imposed on this instance of
similarity was not sufficiently high. The graph also illustrates the interesting case of
image 6 in the similar condition: there was a large number of user errors recorded when
they were asked to identify this image. The decoy images for this image appeared
visually and semantically similar. Analysis of errors made on a per-image basis across
conditions highlighted a number of significant results too (see Table 24).
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Image Success % Success % χ2
Similar Dissimilar
1 71% 91% χ2(1,120)=5.729, p < 0.05
2 66% 95% χ2(1,119)=14.540, p < 0.01
5 55% 87% χ2(1,105)=14.207, p < 0.01
6 32% 93% χ2(1,117)=46.230,p < 0.01
7 77% 95% χ2(1,81)=31.777, p < 0.01
Similar Middle
5 55% 83% χ2(1,116)=10.449, p < 0.01
6 32% 70% χ2(1,116)=16.726, p < 0.01
Middle Dissimilar
2 74% 95% χ2(1,101)=8.614, p < 0.01
6 70% 92% χ2(1,115)=10.125, p < 0.01
7 73% 95% χ2(1,123)=10.908, p < 0.01
Table 24: Significant differences noted in user performance across experiment condi-
tions on a per-image basis.
7.3.2.2 Login Durations
We also recorded time required for users to login in each condition. This was recorded
from the first grid appearing onscreen, until the final click. We treated the data as
non-parametric due to the existence of a number of particularly long login durations
distorting the mean. The median login duration was 57 seconds in the similar group,
in the middle group 40 seconds, and in the dissimilar group 36 seconds. The difference
between the similar and dissimilar conditions was significant in a Mann-Whitney U
test (Z=-4.730, p < 0.01). Using a Wilcoxon 1-sample sign test we estimated the
95% confidence interval for the medians. This estimates that participants in the
dissimilar condition would take between 33-40 seconds, in the middle condition 38-51
seconds, and in the similar condition 48-68 seconds. This suggests that the choice of
decoy selection method could also have a significant impact upon the login durations.
Figure 57 shows the distribution of login durations recorded for successful logins for
each condition.
7.4 Discussion
The vision of this research is that a system can take an arbitrary set of images and
perform a filtering operation to generate a usable and secure login challenge, or else
conclude that an image set does not contain suitable images for this purpose. Such a
spontaneous approach to the generation of a login challenge becomes more useful when
considering deployment level phenomena such as password resets, where ineffective
recycling of images could cause confusion between new key images and old. A perfect
automated semantic separation of images appears to be a difficult goal; however, we
have shown that taking a coarse grained approach to the problem can affect usability.
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Figure 57: Length of successful logins in each condition: top left) similar; top right)
middle; bottom left) dissimilar; bottom right) overall.
As a result it seems possible that ensuring a specific visual difference between images
using pixel-level image signatures could assist in automated image selection strategies
for recognition-based graphical passwords.
The recall test results suggest that comparison of pixel-level image signatures can
affect the usability of recognition-based graphical passwords in terms of both user
accuracy and the time required to login. We observed significant accuracy results
between the similar and dissimilar condition, and the similar and middle condition.
We did not observe significant differences between the middle and dissimilar condi-
tion. The login durations were also significantly impacted between the similar and
dissimilar group with a significant difference of 21 seconds in the medians. The most
damaging type of similarity we noted was inter grid key-decoy similarity, which is
the similarity between a decoy image and a non-collocated key image. In this case
the user erroneously selects a decoy image that appears similar to a non-collocated
key image. Particularly conservative thresholds should be employed when considering
this type of similarity. The remote scenario places success rates in a realistic zone,
as participants were not within the sphere of influence of experimenters. Such results
have important implications for deployment of recognition-based graphical passwords,
as they serve to highlight the impact that seemingly subtle image choices can have
upon the usability of the system.
The results have implications for graphical password systems of all genres. This
work has focused upon recognition-based graphical passwords where there are multiple
grids and one key image on each screen. However, our taxonomy of image filtering
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is relevant to systems where images are static for all users, or for configurations
where key images are randomly distributed across the grids [31, 59] and our proposed
mechanism in Chapter 5. The results also have implications for other systems such
as Passpoints [143], where future research could focus upon some notion of similarity
between images to predict whether similar user choices could be expected between a
number of images.
7.4.1 Security Implications
The introduction of deliberate and measurable differences in visual similarity between
images creates the potential for traces of this process to be left behind and exploited
by attackers, who could infer key images and gain unauthorised access to systems. The
particular threat is guessability, that patterns in the composition of the login challenge
could be reverse engineered to allow an attacker to make better than random guesses.
The goal for an attacker is to obtain a successful login without any interaction with the
user through activities such as coercion or observation attack. We should assume that
an attacker knows the method used for image filtering and any thresholds employed,
and is able to capture the login challenge specific to a particular user. If the system
provides direct authentication [120] we assume the attacker has compromised the
username of the legitimate user and can capture the login images for offline analysis.
If the infrastructure is local authentication then an attacker may be able to take a high
quality photograph of the images, although this could be considered less likely. Other
threats to be considered when introducing visual differences in the image filtering
procedure include observation attack and description.
7.4.1.1 Key Relative Filtering
Key relative filtering [102] has been proposed in previous work as a method that is
suitable for small image sets, as it imposes few constraints upon the login challenge
composition. The procedure is to firstly identify the key image, reject all images within
a similarity distance d of the key image and select decoy images randomly from the
remaining images. However, an attacker could identify candidate key images even
without knowledge of the thresholds being used, by recalculating pairwise similarities
to search for patterns. One way to do this is to create a similarity matrix (see Figure
58) which is a simple visualisation that captures pairwise EMD distances between
images in a single nxn grid. In Figure 58 each large square represents the location
of a single image, and the smaller squares within contain the EMD distance between
that image and every other image in the 3x3 grid. The figure represents a particularly
vulnerable case where the key relative similarity threshold is d < 3. In this case the
attacker could conclude that the centermost image has a good chance of being the
key image, since it is the only image that exhibits such a careful pattern (d > 3)
in pairwise similarity values. Even without knowledge of the threshold the attacker
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Figure 58: Similarity matrix that illustrates the pairwise EMD distance d between
images in a single 3x3 image grid. This grid has been assembled with key relative
filtering [102].
could make a good guess at its value based upon the minimal d observed for each
image in the matrix.
7.4.1.2 Exhaustive filtering
The analysis of key relative filtering has shown that for purposes of security a more
holistic approach to image filtering should be taken, in order to hide traces of the
filtering procedure. One approach is based upon ensuring a minimum distance exists
between all images in the grid. One limitation of this approach is that while it
enforces a minimal distance between all images, there is no upper bound, which could
leave the login vulnerable to observation attack, as images exhibiting large visual
differences could remain in the login challenge. An alternative approach that could
eliminate this threat is based upon similarity intervals, where additionally an upper
bound of similarity is also enforced. However, this approach would likely be difficult
to implement in small image collections, as a greater number of images are likely to
be rejected due to the increased number of similarity constraints upon a permissible
image. There is a trade-off between the volume of images rejected in the filtering
procedure and the number of constraints that are enforced. As a compromise, a
minimum distance approach is likely to be suitable in smaller image sets and where
observation attack or description is less likely to be a threat. An example of the
visual differences that may result is illustrated in Figure 59. In order to minimise the
number of images that must be rejected, a useful strategy in general involves:
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Figure 59: (Left) grids assembled using minimum distance approach where d = 2;
(right) similarity intervals where 4 > d > 0.
1. Choosing a strategy for decoy selection i.e. similarity or dissimilarity.
2. Choosing a candidate key image, and calculating the distribution of pairwise
similarity between it and the rest of the image set.
3. Sorting the images in ascending order of EMD, then, if choosing for dissimilarity,
choosing from the back of the list, and if choosing for similarity, choosing from
the front of the list.
4. Repeating 2-4 for each key image.
7.5 Study Limitations
In this study we did not consider the longitudinal memory impact of the recall task;
we chose to model a short-term memory task as password enrolment is a particularly
traumatic period for committing new credentials to memory. However, we believe our
scenario introduced sufficient stress into the enrolment procedure to enable us to have
confidence in the results. The success rates are constrained by the fact that users
were not working with their own images and only had one attempt to identify the
images. In addition, the participants were not logging into a real system and so not
authenticating to access anything of value. Finally, the image processing intervention
we chose only operated at the pixel-level. Study of more sophisticated techniques that
incorporate object segmentation may prove to be a fruitful future research direction.
7.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we considered the usability, security and deployment issues inherent in
the process of choosing images to comprise a graphical password login. This process
would likely be one which varies greatly between instantiations of graphical password
systems. In particular we explored the extent to which automated image processing
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techniques applied at the pixel-level can be used to systematically affect the amount
of visual similarity, and so usability, in a typical login. We found that using a colour
histogram in the LAB colour space as an image signature, and comparison of sig-
natures using the Earth Movers Distance [106] was the most fruitful approach. In a
recall test with more than 300 people recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk we found
that selecting decoy images to differing levels of similarity could impact the number
of errors that occurred during an authentication session. We found significantly fewer
errors made by users viewing grids with dissimilar decoys compared to those viewing
the most similar decoys. In the most significant case we found that our automated
decoy selection method could affect login success rates by 40%. While this result
may appear intuitive, the contribution is that we noted the potential for recall to be
affected systematically. We also highlighted that there were secure and insecure ways
to choose images for login using automated methods.
These results are significant as they show the importance that an apparently subtle
deployment decision such as the choice of images can have upon the usability and
security of graphical passwords. A system administrator can without intent create a
particularly difficult recognition task. Future work in this domain could consider more
sophisticated methods of searching for image similarity. Such a direction of research
would likely have implications for graphical passwords of all genres. For instance in
the Passpoints [143] system some notion of similarity between images would be useful
to help predict whether similar user choices could be expected between a number of
images.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
As Herley and van Oorschot [60] note, despite the widespread desire to revamp the
current state of knowledge-based authentication (KBA), not only have we failed to
make significant changes, but our reliance upon conventional methods of KBA con-
tinues to grow. The management of alphanumeric passwords and personal identifica-
tion numbers (PINs), have shaped security practices that are firmly embedded into
our everyday lives, and their deployment is supported by a near ubiquitous techni-
cal infrastructure. Alternative approaches to KBA face the significant challenge of
demonstrating real-world value in terms of being usable, secure, cheap, easy to de-
ploy and maintain, provide credentials that are both easy to replace and cannot be
shared; note, alphanumeric passwords and PINs also fail to meet these criteria, which
adds weight to the reluctantly held assumption that a universally usable and secure
authentication mechanism is an improbable ambition for the future of security and
privacy. Instead, the choice of authentication mechanism must be made as a trade-off
that incorporates the relevant model of likely adversaries, as well as an understanding
of the characteristics of the user population [100], the context and the technology.
In this thesis we have contended that the design and evaluation of graphical pass-
word systems should take account of usability and security, but also deployability ;
currently, graphical password research has a limited understanding of the interplay
and interdependence of these three factors. Our own conceptualisation of deploya-
bility was centred upon the problem of providing scaffolding for desirable authenti-
cation behaviours to users, and understanding the impact of socio-technical threats
that could emerge in the context of graphical passwords. In the absence of large scale
deployments of candidate schemes and accompanying ethnographic studies, empirical
research has a responsibility to develop lightweight methods to gain insight into the
likely appropriation of novel systems, lest systems introduce revenge effects [129] that
impact security in unforeseen ways. Our hope is that this inquiry has shed light on new
considerations pertaining to KBA that will help both researchers and practitioners
better understand the difficult trade-off between usability, security and deployability.
In this chapter we revisit the research questions posed in Section 1.3, summarise our
contributions, and propose potentially fruitful avenues for future research.
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8.1 Research Questions
8.1.1 How can interaction design scaffold secure behaviour
in graphical password schemes?
The diversity of potential deployment environments means that it is unlikely that
graphical password systems will be deployed in an archetypal form. Consequently, it
is important that research explores the impact upon usability that results from the
fine-tuning of systems to satisfy context-specific security constraints. In particular, it
is important to explore how this fine-tuning can be performed to limit the potential for
revenge effects [129], negative side effects that emerge when usability is overexerted
for purposes of security. In this thesis1 we considered two classes of interaction design
interventions that aim to support users to avert threats that result either as a result of
low levels of compliance with standard security advice or as a result of the unusually
public nature of a shared collaborative interface. In Chapter 3 we focused upon
improving the strength of Draw a Secret (DAS) [68] graphical passwords, and in
Chapter 4 the design of multi-touch interaction techniques to resist observation attack
in recognition-based graphical passwords.
In Chapter 3 we proposed an interface modification to DAS and evaluated its
potential to increase the usability of strong graphical passwords (DAS is a system
specifically designed to provide a large password space). Models of cognition suggest
that users in practice are unlikely to create graphical passwords that exploit the se-
curity benefits of DAS’s potentially large password space [130, 131]; if born out in
practice this would render DAS considerably less secure than the theoretical analysis
of its password space might suggest. In Section 3.2 we proposed that these weak
trends may arise due to the visual appearance of the drawing grid; in response, we
proposed the addition of a background image to introduce additional cues to support
the creation and recall of more complex drawings. In Section 3.3 we described an eval-
uation of the resulting system: Background Draw a Secret (BDAS) and showed that
users of BDAS created (and successfully recalled) more complex graphical passwords
than users of DAS. However, while the background images did significantly improve
the complexity of graphical passwords chosen by our participants in general, it did not
give rise to strong graphical passwords for all participants. As with DAS, BDAS and
indeed alphanumeric passwords, the most convenient user behaviour is still to choose
simple credentials that are easy to remember. Indeed, future work should to consider
how background images could introduce a new set of biases as to the drawings users
would create (Section 3.4.1 speculated on the impact such biases could have upon
security).
In Chapter 4 we considered the threat of observation attack to recognition-based
1in parallel to this thesis we considered the use of eye trackers as an entry method for observation
resistant graphical passwords [36]
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graphical passwords. The typical defence against such attacks has interesting social
implications as systems tend to assume a user who will proactively shield input from
bystanders. However, in the case of collocated users (such as at a shared multitouch
interface) the act of shielding interactions is an implicit signal of mistrust and social
pressure will influence users not to engage in such behaviour. Our response was to
consider how the interaction affordances of emerging multi-touch technology could
be harnessed to permit the design of observation resistant interactions within the
authentication procedure; without impacting upon the authentication scheme itself.
In Section 4.3 we explored the design space for observation resistant interactions on
multi-touch surfaces. In an empirical lab-based study we found that the Pressure
Grid (Section 4.4.3.1) proved to be an effective defence against observation attacks
and only had a small impact upon the time taken to perform a login with either
Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) or a recognition-based graphical password.
The design of discreet user interactions that exploit affordances of the deployment
platform appears to be a more effective means of defending against observation at-
tacks, than the image portfolio approach described in Section 5.2 (which had a more
significant impact upon successful login durations in the user study).
The solutions described in Chapters 3, and 4 stand as examples of interaction de-
sign that aim to align user behaviour with a secure path of behaviour. The problem
at large appears to be that graphical passwords (and KBA more generally) main-
tain a reliance on an active user who makes decisions that prioritise security ahead
of usability. Reconfiguring interaction in widely studied graphical password systems
constitutes a promising approach to the promotion of more security compliant be-
haviour, without redesigning the underlying authentication system. Notable recent
work that considers such issues includes the use of principles of persuasive technol-
ogy [49] to improve user choice of alphanumeric passwords [51] and the Passpoints
graphical passwords system [16].
8.1.2 How can strategic selection of images provide scaffold-
ing in graphical password schemes?
While user interaction with existing authentication systems can be re-envisioned to
support users to behave desirably with authentication credentials, such an approach
assumes that systems and infrastructure are sufficiently flexible to admit such adap-
tation. However, recognition-based graphical passwords are intrinsically configurable
through the choice of images provided to the user; in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 we ex-
plored strategies for image delivery, and how careful consideration and manipulation
of image content can provide both usability and security benefits.
In Chapter 5 we explored the challenge of defence against observation attack
through manipulation of the frequency that secret images were presented in the login
challenge. By incorporating randomness in the exposure of the secret images, we
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aimed to increase the difficulty for an attacker to observe and reuse the secret images
to gain a successful login. Most importantly, this defence could be realised without
assuming that a user would actively defend their input. In Section 5.2 we described
how image portfolios could increase the complexity of an observation attack, and re-
sist intersection attack; we explored how much protection this might bring in practice
in Section 5.3 by developing statistical models of observation attacks.
In Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 we focused upon the relationship between image
content and usability and security. In Chapter 6 we explored the impact of judicious
choice of images (based upon visual and verbal image similarity) on the verbal sharing
of Passfaces [96] graphical passwords. In our empirical study, described in Section 6.4,
we found that the assembly of a login challenge that contains instances of visual and
verbal similarity could impact the ability of users to login to a Passfaces system using
recorded verbal descriptions. Indeed, we found that images selected to be visually
and verbally similar had a similarly detrimental impact on user; this suggests that
the manipulation of image similarity could reduce the impact of password sharing by
inhibiting description.
In Chapter 7 we conducted two user studies to assess the effectiveness of auto-
mated image selection schemes. This considers both the choice of image content
and the image selection strategy. In our first user study, described in Section 7.2
we found that pixel-level image signatures based upon colour histograms were a low-
computation cost, but effective, approach to automatically estimate visual similarity.
In the second study, described in in Section 7.3, we applied this result and used our
histogram-based estimation algorithm to systematically manipulate the pairwise sim-
ilarity between elements of a login challenge. We discovered that by manipulating the
similarity threshold we could directly influence recall performance for a recognition-
based graphical password scheme based on everyday images.
The impact of image choice on the usability and security of recognition-based
graphical passwords is large, yet in the majority of studies conducted in graphical
password research, very little emphasis has been placed on the processes or strategies
for assembling a login challenge. In recent work [90] we made initial investigations
how automated judgments of image similarity could impact observation attack and
description in the context of a novel recognition-based graphical password system.
The challenge for alternative authentication solutions is to demonstrate evidence of
new types of value that impact the trade-off between security, usability, deployability,
and convenience. Future work exploring automated image choice could help graphical
passwords exploit such results in an automated manner, and provide such added
value. This thesis has explored how to, and highlights the need to, develop a more
systematic understanding of image choice, so that those who are seeking to deploy
graphical password systems can harness the security benefits of appropriate image
choice whilst being aware of the potential impact of such choices on usability.
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8.1.3 What is the impact of graphical passwords upon socio-
technical threats?
The usability and security of KBA are both sustained and threatened by the practices
of the user. On the one hand users develop memory aides to remember credentials, for
example by sharing them with others and writing them down, and on the other hand
they can gain unauthorised access to accounts based upon non-technical attacks such
as observation attack. One requirement placed on future KBA is to not make worse
the current state of play; this causes us to ask how we might determine if graphical
passwords are subject to the same insecure behaviours (such as password sharing or
writing down), or whether they even promote such behaviour more than PINs and
alphanumeric passwords. The most common research method to uncover the extent
of these workarounds is the self-report survey [114, 113], which inevitably can only
uncover the range of practices that subjects are prepared to reveal.
To this end we have made a number of methodological contributions. In Chapters 4
and 5 we explored the vulnerability of recognition-based graphical password systems
to observation attack. Our focus on observation attack highlighted the impact of
emerging ubiquitous computing technologies and their environment upon threats to a
KBA. Firstly we explored threats to collaborative multi-touch tabletop systems, and
secondly, threats to users of mobile devices. In both studies we cast participants as
attackers attempting to discover the credentials being entered by other participants.
in Chapter 6 we proposed an approach to modelling the ability of users to verbally
share Passfaces graphical passwords.
In Chapter 4 we explored the design space for mechanisms that harnessed multi-
touch interaction to defend against observation attack, and evaluated the ability of the
Pressure Grid against two collocated observers (see Figure 29 for the study context).
This enabled us to discover that our variant of Passfaces appeared less vulnerable to
observation attack than PINs, but also that design of user interaction around that
scheme could make that scheme significantly more difficult to compromise.
In Chapter 5 we considered a different approach to defence against observation
attack based upon delayed exposure of images in the login challenge. In Section
5.2.1 we proposed that a friend attack could be particularly potent against mobile
devices, due to the social imperative not to signal mistrust to collocated people by
shielding the entry of sensitive information. To explore the efficacy of the observation
resistant graphical password configuration we proposed, in Section 5.3 we assembled
a statistical model of an attack and illustrated the protection that it provided given
an adversary observing multiple logins over time; this was complemented with an
empirical study of observation attack (see Figure 39). We discovered that a low
entropy version of our graphical password system that had higher quality images was
more vulnerable to observation attack than the high entropy version.
Chapter 6 considered the problem of users being able to verbally share graphical
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passwords and the generally accepted assumption that the use of images in KBA would
make this difficult. To gain an empirical understanding of users ability to do this in
practice, we collected a corpus of verbal descriptions (see Section 6.3) of faces and
explored the extent to which users could login to our mock-up of a Passfaces system
using those descriptions (see Section 6.4). We found that the careful selection of decoy
images, to be either visually or verbally similar to key images, had the potential to
reduce users ability to effectively verbally share Passfaces-style graphical passwords.
The design of our empirical studies, in which subjects attempt attacks and carry
out insecure workarounds has allowed us to explore the efficacy of novel forms of
defence, and also fine-tune the usability of those defences. Such an approach to
future KBA systems and contexts can provide insight into the severity of phenomena,
before deployment in a real context with real users.
8.2 Summary of Contributions
The contributions of this thesis can be summarised as follows:
1. We highlighted the importance of the role of deployability when considering the
usability and security of graphical passwords. Our conceptualisation of deploy-
ability comprised the explicit recognition of the problem of providing context-
specific scaffolding to desired user authentication behaviours, and the impact of
interventions upon usability and security. Our empirical studies explored how
interventions could positively and negatively shape user behaviours.
2. We proposed a framework for supporting designers to scaffold user behaviours
to defend against observation attack. By applying this framework to the con-
temporary problem of authentication on shared public multi-touch interfaces,
we were able to articulate a design space of observation resistant augmentation
to a standard graphical password.
3. We identified description as a threat to recognition-based graphical passwords
and performed an empirical study to explore the ability of users to verbally share
Passfaces [96] graphical passwords. We discovered that through the manual
manipulation of similarity of decoy images and key images we could directly
impact on users ability to identify key images from audio descriptions.
4. We proposed novel empirical methods to facilitate the study of socio-technical
threats in laboratory-based studies, and the usability of systems outside of a
laboratory environment. We measured user performance in matching audio de-
scriptions to face images as an estimator for the prevalence of description. Also
we refined a method proposed elsewhere to explore the observation resistance
of graphical passwords on shared displays and mobile devices, asking users to
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perform as attackers and observe live authentication sessions. Finally we per-
formed the first field study of graphical passwords on mobile devices, where our
system was installed on the personal devices of participants.
5. We performed the first attempt to harness image processing techniques to iden-
tify instances of image similarity that could be detrimental to usability if in-
cluded in a recognition-based graphical password grid. The need for a human
to perform this task is a severe limitation in terms of the deployability and
scalability of this genre of graphical password. We conducted a usability eval-
uation of the best method we tested with over 300 participants recruited using
Amazon Mechanical Turk where login challenges were assembled to include dif-
fering levels of similarity. We found that manipulation of the similarity levels
allowed us to provide both positive and negative scaffolding of user authentica-
tion behaviours behaviours, highlighting the importance of image choice in the
usability and security of graphical passwords.
8.3 Future Work
The results and discussion in this thesis suggest a number of interesting potential
future research directions.
8.3.1 Scaffolding User Choice of High Entropy Graphical Pass-
words
In Chapter 3 we observed that users could be supported to create and recall high
entropy graphical passwords through interventions to the interaction design of DAS
[68]. Future work should consider the impact of image choice upon the drawings
users would likely create. As entropy is still a core concern for user authentication
credentials, there is still a need to consider approaches that support users to choose
strong graphical passwords. Of course, innovation in the support of users to choose
stronger authentication credentials is of no value without further innovation to support
users to remember those credentials. DAS, Passpoints [143], and Pass-Go [127] are
schemes that by their design provide an environment for users to choose high entropy
graphical passwords (should they wish); researchers should further consider methods
to align ideal notions of secure user choice with the choices users are most likely to
make in practice. Promising work in this regard has been carried out by Chiasson et
al. [16] who trialled the use of persuasive [49] techniques to encourage users to choose
less predictable click points in Passpoints. In addition their intervention increased
the difficulty for users to choose the more predictable click points.
Although visual stimuli have been shown to be more memorable than words or
numbers [117], it is still inevitable that at some point users may forget their graphical
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password, particularly if forced to manage a large number of high entropy credentials
across many systems. This could suggest that greater consideration should be given
to designing for forgetting. It is likely that usable and secure schemes could be devel-
oped to enable users to record and recover their graphical passwords; FacePIN [40]
was designed as a method to enable users to remember PINs, that avoided explicit
recording of the PIN, and potentially does not need to be associated to any system
infrastructure in particular. Finally, Chiasson [13] proposes that designing for giving
implicit feedback to the user during the authentication session, this appears to be
a promising direction to design with the assumption that users, even with the best
intentions, will forget their credentials one day.
8.3.2 Mass Longitudinal Comparisons of Representative Graph-
ical Password Systems
Despite the field of graphical passwords having existed for over 12 years [5] there
are still uncertainties over the most appropriate evaluation method to uncover in-
sights into usability and security, at a time when computing platforms are evolving
rapidly. Traditional studies of usability have taken place in the laboratory to ensure
the participant is not distracted from the task that has been carefully designed by
experimenters; however, the turn to ubiquitous computing [140] technologies, and in
particular the widespread adoption of mobile devices, means that laboratory-based
experiments have significantly less ecological validity [104] compared to field-based
approaches, that is, their results appear less generalisable to in the wild use. Indeed,
Chiasson et al. [14] report large discrepancies in user performance recorded between
a usability study conducted in a laboratory and one conducted in a field study. This
raises interesting questions about the combination of studies that are required to form
a holistic understanding of how appropriate mechanisms are for their usage context.
Now that the design space of graphical passwords appears increasingly explored, it
could be that a turn to methodology is required, and future user studies could seek
to place a greater emphasis on consistent platforms and research tools. Systems to
support such research exist, for instance the MVP web authentication framework [15].
8.3.3 Experience-centred Security
In this thesis the consideration of the human aspects of security has focused exclusively
upon usability. This domain of usable security is inherited from the roots of Human
Computer Interaction (HCI) in its second wave [9] form of fine-tuning systems to
make workers more efficient in their usage of computer systems in the workplace. This
approach conceptualises the user based upon their cognitive ability, and theoretical
models of action developed to describe human decision making. This makes the
assumption that by making systems easier to use, users will find it easier to make
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the correct security decisions. This is true, usability is important, however this focus
alone does not appear sufficient to produce a holistic understanding of human-centred
security. Technology, and computer security are no longer encountered solely in the
workplace by young adults; security-facing systems now play an active role in everyday
life, with systems used by diverse groups of users such as older people, children and
those with disabilities. This implies new requirements aside from ease of use for
technology and its associated security to complement our everyday lives.
Security is simultaneously a feeling and a reality, and they are not the same [112].
Third-wave HCI research considers that user interaction with technology is simul-
taneously emotional, aesthetic, sensual and intellectual [81]. Research in the HCI
community has considered how to probe user experiences, and also how to design for
them. Research attention has considered, for example, to design for fun experiences
[8], and uncomfortable experiences [4]. A number of disparate works in the security
domain hint towards the need for this holistic account of user experiences: Singh et al.
[118] discuss the password sharing behaviour in contexts ranging from married cou-
ples to Australian indigenous islanders who delegated finances to each other. Vines
et al. [136] explore the drivers of trust around financial management for people over
eighty years of age. In addition, Vines et al. [137] discuss how trust practices emerged
around financial transactions conducted using paper cheques.
In computer security we have much to learn about our intersection with the lit-
erature on user experience. Implicitly we have designed computer systems to create
unpleasant interactions in the form of providing unreasonable rules and creating guilt
when users circumvent those rules. Security researchers should not be exempt from
taking account of the context, and developing rich understandings of the user; the
sustaining of personal relationships often proves to be a key driver for the breaking
of security rules, this appears to be a natural entry point in this domain. Of course,
such an approach requires innovation in methods of engaging with users, reflection
upon how this affects the process of design [43], and how to produce security as a
result of such an understanding. By taking steps in this direction we can edge closer
to designing user-centred security in its broadest sense.
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Information for participants 
 
Are you a person that always forgets passwords? Or has anyone ever cracked your password? 
To combat both these problems a new genre of passwords is on the horizon…Graphical 
Passwords. Draw a secret (DAS) is a graphical password scheme that aims to be better than its 
textual counterpart in both security and usability. An example of a DAS grid is seen below. 
                          
    Fig 1: Example password     Fig 2: Example password                Fig 3: Example password 
Fig 1 – Is the equivalent of setting your password as “password” very poor! 
Fig 2 – A tree, could this be something you would draw?, and be able to remember ? 
Fig 3 – Difficult to remember, impractical. 
 
Procedure… 
You will be presented with a drawing grid and asked to draw an image to represent your 
graphical password. You will notice there is a coordinate system on the grid. To correctly 
repeat a drawing you must draw through the same squares in the same order, also lifting 
your pen in the same places. This means your drawing can be slightly different each time you 
draw but still acceptable. Then you will be asked to return a week later to see if you remember 
it… 
Jargon… 
 Stroke – Separate Lines! a line drawn, at the end of which you lift the pen up from the 
paper. Drawings can contain many strokes (see fig 3) 
 Length – The number of cells you cross in total.  
 
It is essential to create a drawing which is as complex as you can remember 
Illegal moves…. 
         
                                               fig 4: tracing grid lines           fig 5: cutting diagonals 
The above diagrams show two illegal means of constructing an image, you cannot create an 
image using lines like the above. If you do so, you will have to start again… 
Appendix B
Background Draw a Secret (BDAS)
Enrolment and Login Sheet
Note. Dimensions altered to fit margins.
171
 Draw-a-Secret Experiment 
Name  
 
 Set your password…. 
 Set the password you will use here: 
 
 
 
 
Repeat your password…. 
 
 
Remember 
1) Lifting your pen from the paper DOES constitute part of your password 
2) Passwords that contain crossings that pass very close to diagonals are void. 
 
Appendix C
Example log file from two weeks of
usage for the mobile-based
graphical password system
Note. Monday 3rd contains the observation attack study.
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*********Enrol********** Mon Oct 27 12:54:18 GMT+02:00 2008 8888494 
8801138 7963511 4442334 8078067 4102145 
 ***Login *** Mon Oct 27 13:13:26 GMT+02:00 2008 true 58.244 Keys: 4102145 
4442334 8888494 7963511 Decoys: 8769762 7448873 6493381 9912283 
5759174 6272508 8002273 306148 6077224 9242885 6191203 814571 
5066761 7382931 4010575 9988092 4206270 2644439 3357672 7575297 
4806405 5144585 1945808 7105789 6321093 6206394 3754854 195791 
9830985 3250059 6602862 5787659 
********TRY AGAIN********** Mon Oct 27 13:13:35 GMT+02:00 2008 
***Login *** Mon Oct 27 13:14:14 GMT+02:00 2008 true 34.918 Keys: 8801138 
7963511 4442334 4102145 Decoys: 9988092 9830985 6191203 5144585 
5066761 306148 6272508 6321093 8769762 6206394 6892001 7575297 
9003944 1406885 8002273 8254532 5759174 6077224 5803717 3357672 
5304269 6493381 3754854 945608 6148842 9242885 7448873 2644439 
7382931 7105789 5862731 1945808 
********TRY AGAIN********** Mon Oct 27 13:14:19 GMT+02:00 2008 
 ***Login *** Mon Oct 27 13:14:46 GMT+02:00 2008 true 24.998 Keys: 4442334 
8078067 8801138 8888494 Decoys: 6892001 6191203 4010575 9003944 
9910993 8972678 9830985 8002273 9242885 814571 6077224 6053809 
195791 5759174 2644439 7382931 6321093 5066761 4210635 306148 
6272508 7575297 5787659 3357672 5803717 9912283 8254532 7448873 
3754854 4806405 5304269 5144585 
 ***Login *** Mon Oct 27 15:21:37 GMT+02:00 2008 true 34.773 Keys: 8801138 
8888494 4102145 4442334 Decoys: 945608 5304269 4010575 8002273 
6272508 6148842 7448873 6892001 3357672 8769762 7105789 5759174 
7382931 3557552 9912283 814571 4806405 4210635 6053809 6077224 
9910993 3754854 195791 3250059 9242885 5144585 9003944 4206270 
306148 6493381 9988092 5803717 
 ***Login *** Tue Oct 28 07:48:14 GMT+02:00 2008 true 27.48 Keys: 4442334 
7963511 4102145 8888494 Decoys: 1406885 5759174 3250059 6892001 
5066761 9003944 9830985 4206270 6077224 7448873 8769762 4014623 
5803717 7575297 3357672 6272508 9988092 6602862 9242885 9910993 
4010575 945608 7382931 5304269 814571 5787659 8002273 8254532 
4210635 306148 8972678 3754854 
 ***Login *** Tue Oct 28 14:50:45 GMT+02:00 2008 true 26.624 Keys: 7963511 
8078067 8888494 8801138 Decoys: 6206394 1406885 8972678 1945808 
8254532 306148 2644439 6272508 3357672 814571 4010575 6321093 
7105789 5759174 5862731 7575297 9003944 4210635 9830985 195791 
4206270 9242885 7448873 945608 4806405 5803717 8002273 3557552 
6602862 3754854 9910993 5787659 
 ***Login *** Wed Oct 29 07:16:46 GMT+02:00 2008 true 27.837 Keys: 8078067 
4442334 8888494 4102145 Decoys: 6493381 7575297 4210635 7105789 
1033254 3250059 6053809 4806405 306148 6602862 3754854 2644439 
6892001 9912283 6148842 5066761 6206394 8002273 9988092 5803717 
5144585 945608 8769762 3357672 6191203 1945808 5787659 814571 
1406885 4206270 6077224 8254532 
 ***Login *** Wed Oct 29 19:40:50 GMT+02:00 2008 true 22.698 Keys: 4442334 
4102145 7963511 8078067 Decoys: 5787659 5759174 2644439 1945808 
4014623 3557552 8002273 306148 6148842 945608 6206394 7448873 
5304269 1033254 9242885 8769762 5862731 6493381 3250059 5144585 
8972678 7382931 9988092 5803717 6892001 6602862 4206270 9830985 
9003944 3754854 4010575 6077224 
 ***Login *** Thu Oct 30 16:19:32 GMT+02:00 2008 true 16.367 Keys: 8801138 
4442334 7963511 8888494 Decoys: 6206394 3357672 6892001 2644439 
5803717 7105789 6077224 1945808 7448873 8254532 814571 8972678 
7382931 4010575 6053809 306148 6272508 5862731 945608 1033254 
9242885 9912283 8002273 3557552 6493381 5066761 5787659 9910993 
5759174 5144585 4014623 9988092 
 ***Login *** Fri Oct 31 09:01:08 GMT+02:00 2008 true 19.796 Keys: 4442334 
7963511 8888494 8801138 Decoys: 3357672 6493381 6148842 814571 
6191203 9910993 8769762 945608 5787659 7105789 4010575 2644439 
1406885 5862731 3557552 7448873 8254532 1033254 9003944 6077224 
4806405 5144585 5803717 9912283 8972678 4206270 3754854 4210635 
7575297 1945808 9242885 8002273 
 ***Login *** Fri Oct 31 14:27:41 GMT+02:00 2008 true 20.592 Keys: 4442334 
4102145 8801138 8888494 Decoys: 5066761 6892001 945608 8769762 
4010575 9910993 6148842 7382931 3357672 6053809 6077224 1033254 
814571 7448873 5304269 5787659 4014623 9830985 5144585 7105789 
6191203 1406885 5803717 8972678 8254532 6602862 3250059 9988092 
6493381 195791 5759174 2644439 
***Login *** Fri Oct 31 17:37:00 GMT+02:00 2008 true 36.862 Keys: 4442334 
4102145 7963511 8888494 Decoys: 3250059 5787659 8769762 5862731 
4806405 6191203 1945808 3557552 306148 195791 7105789 8254532 
9003944 6321093 4210635 1406885 9830985 9988092 9242885 5304269 
7448873 6602862 8972678 3357672 6206394 5066761 9912283 6148842 
5759174 6272508 6493381 5803717 
 ***Login *** Mon Nov 03 08:53:13 GMT+02:00 2008 true 17.357 Keys: 4442334 
8888494 7963511 8078067 Decoys: 945608 9910993 1945808 1033254 
2644439 3557552 4806405 6191203 5144585 6206394 8002273 3250059 
6493381 195791 5304269 1406885 7382931 5066761 4210635 6053809 
8254532 5862731 8769762 3357672 9242885 8972678 814571 7448873 
6321093 9912283 6148842 306148 
 ***Login *** Mon Nov 03 14:20:07 GMT+02:00 2008 true 17.952 Keys: 8801138 
7963511 4442334 8888494 Decoys: 7448873 1033254 9988092 1406885 
8254532 9003944 7105789 814571 4210635 8769762 6206394 6602862 
5803717 306148 5066761 3754854 1945808 7575297 945608 3357672 
2644439 6148842 6892001 5304269 6077224 6053809 195791 3250059 
6272508 4014623 6191203 9912283 
 ***Login *** Mon Nov 03 14:21:02 GMT+02:00 2008 true 15.981 Keys: 7963511 
4442334 8078067 4102145 Decoys: 9912283 5803717 8769762 8002273 
5144585 8972678 5304269 1033254 6272508 6493381 1406885 6148842 
814571 3357672 9830985 1945808 4806405 6191203 5066761 9003944 
195791 3250059 6892001 9988092 6321093 7575297 4206270 5862731 
5787659 4014623 9910993 5759174 
 ***Login *** Mon Nov 03 14:21:31 GMT+02:00 2008 true 17.253 Keys: 8078067 
8888494 8801138 4102145 Decoys: 2644439 4010575 5759174 7105789 
7448873 4014623 5862731 195791 6602862 6493381 1945808 814571 
3557552 3250059 8002273 7575297 8254532 8972678 3357672 4206270 
5787659 9003944 6077224 6272508 6206394 945608 5304269 6321093 
5803717 4806405 5066761 6892001 
********TRY AGAIN********** Mon Nov 03 14:21:44 GMT+02:00 2008 
 ***Login *** Mon Nov 03 14:22:17 GMT+02:00 2008 false 33.141 Keys: 4102145 
7963511 8078067 8801138 Decoys: 306148 5759174 7448873 6272508 945608 
3754854 5304269 5803717 8972678 4010575 1033254 5066761 3557552 
5144585 7105789 9830985 6493381 4206270 1945808 2644439 9910993 
6077224 6148842 4210635 9912283 814571 6191203 6321093 7382931 
5787659 8002273 5862731 
********TRY AGAIN********** Mon Nov 03 14:22:19 GMT+02:00 2008 
 ***Login *** Mon Nov 03 14:22:50 GMT+02:00 2008 false 29.948 Keys: 4102145 
7963511 8078067 8801138 Decoys: 6191203 5759174 3754854 1406885 
6321093 5144585 9910993 5803717 9988092 2644439 6892001 195791 
6602862 9830985 945608 3357672 5066761 7448873 6493381 7382931 
8002273 3250059 1945808 5787659 6053809 4206270 6148842 814571 
3557552 6272508 4014623 8254532 
********TRY AGAIN********** Mon Nov 03 14:23:17 GMT+02:00 2008 
 ***Login *** Mon Nov 03 14:23:35 GMT+02:00 2008 true 17.292 Keys: 8801138 
4102145 8078067 4442334 Decoys: 8002273 7448873 4010575 306148 
5304269 6321093 6191203 4806405 7575297 7105789 7382931 3754854 
9988092 8972678 8254532 6602862 6148842 1033254 5759174 8769762 
6206394 4014623 5144585 4206270 9830985 9912283 9003944 9910993 
3557552 3250059 6077224 9242885 
********TRY AGAIN********** Mon Nov 03 14:23:42 GMT+02:00 2008 
 ***Login *** Mon Nov 03 14:24:21 GMT+02:00 2008 false 38.578 Keys: 8078067 
7963511 4102145 8888494 Decoys: 9988092 6053809 8972678 6191203 
4210635 5066761 3557552 4010575 3754854 5803717 5759174 6892001 
306148 4014623 1945808 7382931 6272508 5862731 3357672 9003944 
6206394 9910993 814571 8002273 5304269 5787659 6602862 9912283 
5144585 8769762 6148842 6077224 
***LOCKOUT!*** Mon Nov 03 14:24:21 GMT+02:00 2008 
********TRY AGAIN********** Mon Nov 03 14:24:23 GMT+02:00 2008 
 ***Login *** Mon Nov 03 14:24:55 GMT+02:00 2008 false 30.603 Keys: 7963511 
8078067 4102145 4442334 Decoys: 7575297 3557552 6602862 6206394 
5787659 306148 1033254 7105789 6148842 2644439 8769762 6272508 
6321093 8972678 8002273 9988092 7382931 3250059 6077224 5862731 
6053809 4206270 5803717 5066761 9912283 3357672 8254532 6892001 
4014623 4010575 6493381 1945808 
********TRY AGAIN********** Mon Nov 03 14:24:57 GMT+02:00 2008 
 ***Login *** Mon Nov 03 14:25:18 GMT+02:00 2008 true 13.479 Keys: 8801138 
4102145 8078067 8888494 Decoys: 6191203 945608 6053809 9830985 
9988092 9912283 3250059 5144585 8254532 5304269 814571 3557552 
6206394 5787659 3357672 6321093 4210635 1033254 4014623 5803717 
5759174 6077224 2644439 8972678 6272508 4806405 9242885 6493381 
1945808 7575297 9003944 4206270 
********TRY AGAIN********** Mon Nov 03 14:25:23 GMT+02:00 2008 
 ***Login *** Mon Nov 03 14:25:50 GMT+02:00 2008 false 26.467 Keys: 7963511 
8078067 8801138 4102145 Decoys: 9910993 3250059 5144585 6272508 
814571 9003944 3754854 6321093 5304269 6077224 5066761 6892001 
8254532 5803717 6053809 1033254 4210635 5862731 195791 5787659 
7575297 1406885 6191203 8972678 306148 1945808 6206394 4014623 
5759174 6493381 7382931 3357672 
********TRY AGAIN********** Mon Nov 03 14:25:51 GMT+02:00 2008 
 ***Login *** Mon Nov 03 14:26:36 GMT+02:00 2008 false 44.15 Keys: 8801138 
7963511 4442334 8078067 Decoys: 4014623 9242885 195791 5803717 
5144585 3557552 6148842 1033254 945608 8254532 1945808 3754854 
9003944 6892001 9988092 9910993 4010575 8769762 1406885 5759174 
7575297 2644439 7448873 5787659 814571 306148 6053809 6321093 
9912283 6077224 7382931 6191203 
********TRY AGAIN********** Mon Nov 03 14:26:43 GMT+02:00 2008 
 m***Login *** Mon Nov 03 14:26:59 GMT+02:00 2008 true 15.437 Keys: 8078067 
4442334 7963511 8801138 Decoys: 6148842 3250059 5803717 4206270 
6892001 6272508 4210635 6077224 9910993 6206394 3754854 6321093 
6053809 5862731 9003944 306148 9988092 7105789 1406885 5304269 
8002273 7382931 814571 2644439 9912283 6191203 4806405 8769762 
945608 5787659 8972678 5759174 
********TRY AGAIN********** Mon Nov 03 14:27:05 GMT+02:00 2008 
 ***Login *** Mon Nov 03 14:27:45 GMT+02:00 2008 false 38.65 Keys: 8888494 
4442334 8801138 4102145 Decoys: 9910993 6077224 4010575 2644439 
9242885 306148 3250059 195791 5759174 6206394 5803717 6892001 
7448873 4014623 7382931 814571 4206270 7575297 9003944 6602862 
6493381 6321093 5862731 9830985 1406885 6148842 4210635 5787659 
3557552 1945808 8254532 7105789 
***LOCKOUT!*** Mon Nov 03 14:27:45 GMT+02:00 2008 
********TRY AGAIN********** Mon Nov 03 14:27:46 GMT+02:00 2008 
 ***Login *** Mon Nov 03 14:28:06 GMT+02:00 2008 false 19.034 Keys: 7963511 
8801138 8888494 4102145 Decoys: 6892001 5144585 9910993 3754854 
945608 6493381 5862731 6206394 8769762 4014623 8972678 9242885 
2644439 5803717 814571 7382931 5304269 6077224 3250059 7575297 
6272508 4806405 9830985 8002273 5787659 4206270 6321093 6602862 
1033254 6148842 7448873 5066761 
********TRY AGAIN********** Mon Nov 03 14:28:11 GMT+02:00 2008 
 ***Login *** Mon Nov 03 14:28:28 GMT+02:00 2008 true 15.925 Keys: 8078067 
8801138 7963511 4102145 Decoys: 5144585 6602862 306148 9910993 
6191203 5803717 3357672 3557552 9003944 6272508 4806405 3250059 
1945808 4014623 6206394 5759174 8002273 945608 8769762 4010575 
5304269 6053809 9912283 3754854 2644439 6148842 7382931 9242885 
6321093 5787659 9988092 195791 
********TRY AGAIN********** Mon Nov 03 14:28:32 GMT+02:00 2008 
 ***Login *** Mon Nov 03 14:28:58 GMT+02:00 2008 false 25.409 Keys: 8801138 
8078067 8888494 7963511 Decoys: 9910993 3250059 3754854 195791 814571 
5862731 3357672 1033254 7105789 8972678 5304269 9830985 6493381 
5759174 6191203 7448873 1945808 4806405 4210635 945608 9912283 
4206270 306148 5803717 8002273 3557552 4010575 6272508 6148842 
6077224 9003944 6321093 
********TRY AGAIN********** Mon Nov 03 14:29:11 GMT+02:00 2008 
 ***Login *** Mon Nov 03 14:29:46 GMT+02:00 2008 false 14.116 Keys: 4442334 
8078067 8888494 4102145 Decoys: 945608 4206270 6148842 6321093 
9988092 5304269 8769762 1945808 9912283 5144585 4210635 4014623 
2644439 9910993 5803717 6602862 3557552 7105789 5066761 1406885 
8972678 9242885 7382931 6191203 6272508 195791 7448873 3250059 
8002273 8254532 9003944 1033254 
********TRY AGAIN********** Mon Nov 03 14:29:48 GMT+02:00 2008 
 ***Login *** Mon Nov 03 14:30:03 GMT+02:00 2008 false 14.662 Keys: 7963511 
8078067 4102145 8888494 Decoys: 9912283 6053809 9242885 5862731 
4010575 6206394 8972678 5144585 3557552 6892001 4806405 8769762 
6077224 7575297 7448873 4014623 5066761 9003944 1406885 5787659 
6602862 4206270 9910993 1033254 2644439 6321093 8002273 5304269 
8254532 5803717 195791 6272508 
 l***Login *** Wed Nov 05 15:15:37 GMT+02:00 2008 true 17.254 Keys: 8078067 
4442334 8801138 8888494 Decoys: 3357672 3557552 945608 4210635 
1033254 2644439 1406885 195791 9830985 5144585 306148 9003944 
7382931 8254532 9912283 7575297 4010575 6191203 8769762 1945808 
5759174 6077224 5066761 9910993 5304269 6148842 6053809 7448873 
6892001 3250059 814571 6272508 
 ***Login *** Wed Nov 05 17:02:45 GMT+02:00 2008 true 18.682 Keys: 8888494 
7963511 4102145 4442334 Decoys: 5066761 6191203 6892001 1033254 
4014623 6272508 195791 7105789 5787659 7448873 5862731 3557552 
8769762 6206394 8002273 7382931 306148 945608 3754854 9988092 
4210635 814571 5803717 9003944 6077224 7575297 3357672 5304269 
6602862 8972678 4206270 6493381 
 ***Login *** Fri Nov 07 09:17:04 GMT+02:00 2008 true 13.578 Keys: 8801138 
4442334 7963511 8078067 Decoys: 7105789 3357672 3250059 6892001 
6191203 9910993 4806405 5759174 7448873 3754854 6053809 6321093 
9830985 9912283 5144585 5862731 9003944 4014623 4206270 5304269 
8002273 2644439 5066761 8254532 9242885 1406885 8769762 195791 
5803717 6148842 6493381 814571 
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Female describer: Uhm, <break> a blonde young woman, with a quite hesitant look 
about her. She's got her hair tied back and there's <break> little bits com-ing down 
the sides. <break> Scarf tied around her neck. 
Female describer: Okay, she's a girl and she's got kind oflongish blonde hair, looks 
as though it's been high-lighted, so. Uhm, quite straggly wearing a scarf. Uhm, looks 
quite friendly. Uhm, got her hair tied back. That's about it really. 
Female describer: She's got blonde hair. Uhm, quite a wide open face, quite pretty. 
<break> Uhm 
Female describer: Okay, female, uhm, sort of longish, uhm, darkish blonde hair with 
a some sort of yellow top and some sort of white-ish collar. Erm. <break> I don't 
know, slightly long chin <laughs>. 
Male describer: Female, blonde, dark eyes, thick red lips.<break> Round face, good 
skin 
Male describer: Er, blonde woman, quite sticky out chin. Big lips, quite attractive 
 
 
Female describer: He's got, uhm, hair that come down to his jaw line, uhm, it's quite 
thick hair almost like a girl would wear in a bob. Uhm, he's got, he's not smiling a 
great deal but even he's got quite a small mouth as well, he's got dark eyes which are 
quite prominent, uhm, and quite, uhm, a reddy-pink complexion as well. 
Female describer: Okay, the next one's a man. Uhm <break>he's got quite <break> 
an oval face, quite a pointy chin <break> he's got brown hair cut down to his, uhm, 
chin. It's quite, a bit wavy a bit unkept.<break> Uhm, he's got a small mouth 
<break>.He's got brown eyes and quite bushy eyebrows. Uhm <break> he's got quite a 
wide face, and a bit of a vacant look about him in this picture. 
Female describer: White male. Uhm, chin length brown hair that's quite wavy. Uhm 
<break> he's got a brown jumper on. Uhm. 
Male describer: A boy with long brown hair. A small smile on his face. Wide coloured 
face. 
Male describer: Male with <break> chin length, slightly unkept, dark brown hair, 
long dark brown hair. Ovalish square type face. 
Male describer: Uhm, First thing to notice is the hair. Uhm <break> quite big open 
eyes, uhm, <break> again face isn't symmetrical, uhm ,<break> first thing to notice is 
the hair. The mouth, not much of a defined jaw line, cheek bones or anything like that 
 
 
Female describer: Chinese or Taiwanese girl. Smiling, slightly. Erm, looking full face 
sort of onto to me with her dark hair tied back, middle, uhm, side-parting, sorry. 
<break> Just looking down slightly but still looking right at me. 
Female describer: She looks quite young. She's got short, dark hair. Nice eyes, nice 
eye shadow. Uhm, she looks young. I think she's, sort of Asian. Round face, and hair is 
short and dark, with a severe parting. 
Female describer: Okay, this girl has either got, uhm, quite short hair or it is tied 
back. Oriental with, uhm, brown eyes and very dark hair. Smiling, doesn't look 
desperately friendly, but I think it's just the camera in front of her. 
Male describer: Uhm, female, uhm, slightly Oriental looking, dark hair, comb parting 
on the left hand side, uhm, wearing some sort of white top. 
Male describer: Uhm, female dark eyes, dark hair, Asian origin, uhm <break>, round 
face, round chin. 
Male describer: Er, female, Asian origin, dark hair 
 Female Describer: “This girl looks quite young, she's got uhm dark hair that looks as 
though she's had high-lights in but it's on the whole very dark. Uhm, she's a uhm, got 
dark eyes and sort of quite heavy eyebrows again. Sort of pronounced chin this girl. 
She looks quite friendly, her forehead's quite big and her cheeks quite pink.” 
Female Describer: “uhm <break> smiling a little bit shyly. Uhm, she's got dark 
brown hair hanging loosely probably in a long bob along her face, centre part-ing 
again, no fringe. Probably quite slim. <break> Winona Ryder type if I had to describe 
her like anybody.” 
Male Describer: “White female, sort of light brown to red-dish hair. Long. Uhm, 
wideish mouth, quite tanned, dark eyes <break> square head. Prettyish.” 
Male Describer: “Fairly attractive woman with long brown hair.” 
 
Female Describer: “He's got very neat, short dark, very dark hair. Uhm, quite a low, 
wears his hair, style, uhm, which is quite low over his forehead. Uhm, per-haps quite a 
low hairline. And he's got very prominent dark eyebrows that do very long, is actually 
one side of his face to the other, really. Uhm, he's got, uhm, very slight mustache. Uhm, 
and when he smiles he doesn't, his teeth don't show. Uhm, and he looks quite young as 
well like he doesn't, uhm, the fact that he, uhm, he has quite a youthful complexion 
also she's got quite slightly tanned skin.” 
Female Describer: “Okay, this one's, uhm, a man. He's got short, very dark brown 
hair that looks like its got some curl to it. Huge bushy eyebrows. Uhm, dark brown 
eyes and a bit of stubble where a moustache could grow but not on the rest of his 
chin. He's got quite full lips. Uhm <break> and he looks he's got an European kind of 
Italian or Spanish colouring to his skin, or a sun tan. Uhm, he's got quite a wide nose 
at the bottom of his nose but the bridge of his nose is quite narrow. Uhm.” 
Male Describer: “Boy. Laughing without showing his teeth. Looking straight ahead, 
thick eyebrows.” 
Male Describer: “Male with, very thick dark black hair. Very strong hairline. Has 
dark bushy eyebrows and slight moustache stubble.” 
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